JER, 第 12 卷,第 1-2 期Hanyang Economic Research Institute in collaboration with Hanyang University College of Business and Economics, 2007 |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 31 筆
第 211 頁
... side contract . Side contracts specify the amount of side transfer t ; to the player i = 1,2 , S , which depends on the agent's choice of effort a ;, and the supervisor's report 0 . Now , following Tirole ( 1992 ) , we shall define a ...
... side contract . Side contracts specify the amount of side transfer t ; to the player i = 1,2 , S , which depends on the agent's choice of effort a ;, and the supervisor's report 0 . Now , following Tirole ( 1992 ) , we shall define a ...
第 213 頁
... side contracts are imple- mented . All transfers are made according to the main and side contracts . Period 2 Promotion within the organization is implemented on the basis of the task assignment in Period 1 , and agent i = 1,2 receive ...
... side contracts are imple- mented . All transfers are made according to the main and side contracts . Period 2 Promotion within the organization is implemented on the basis of the task assignment in Period 1 , and agent i = 1,2 receive ...
第 214 頁
... side contract . Since we assume that side payments accompany the deadweight cost ( a kind of transaction cost ) , ts means the amount of the side payment that the supervisor actually receives . The third term is the cost of effort e ...
... side contract . Since we assume that side payments accompany the deadweight cost ( a kind of transaction cost ) , ts means the amount of the side payment that the supervisor actually receives . The third term is the cost of effort e ...
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