JER, 第 12 卷,第 1-2 期Hanyang Economic Research Institute in collaboration with Hanyang University College of Business and Economics, 2007 |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 25 筆
第 204 頁
... principal , manipulation of information may arise when agents and supervisor ( s ) collude to conceal the relevant infor- mation from the principal . This paper addresses this problem within the framework of triangular or multilateral ...
... principal , manipulation of information may arise when agents and supervisor ( s ) collude to conceal the relevant infor- mation from the principal . This paper addresses this problem within the framework of triangular or multilateral ...
第 211 頁
... principal designs the main contract , which describes the ver- ifiable innovation activity level a and the cost target C. Then , the principal assigns the innovative task a to the agent who is identified as efficient by the supervisor's ...
... principal designs the main contract , which describes the ver- ifiable innovation activity level a and the cost target C. Then , the principal assigns the innovative task a to the agent who is identified as efficient by the supervisor's ...
第 213 頁
... principal is not . ( c ) Agents and supervisor engage in a collusion game to reach a side contract . Ô ( d ) Supervisor reports ( sends a message ) ↑ = ( Ô1,02 ) to the principal . After hearing it , the principal assigns the ...
... principal is not . ( c ) Agents and supervisor engage in a collusion game to reach a side contract . Ô ( d ) Supervisor reports ( sends a message ) ↑ = ( Ô1,02 ) to the principal . After hearing it , the principal assigns the ...
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