JER, 第 12 卷,第 1-2 期Hanyang Economic Research Institute in collaboration with Hanyang University College of Business and Economics, 2007 |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 45 筆
第 37 頁
... optimal tariff t * is obtained : t * = 50/19 . With the optimal tariff , the outputs of home and foreign firms are given by : x1 ( t * ) x2 ( t * ) = = 120/196 , 0/196 , ( 28 ) ( 29 ) where ( t ) denotes outputs under optimal tariffs ...
... optimal tariff t * is obtained : t * = 50/19 . With the optimal tariff , the outputs of home and foreign firms are given by : x1 ( t * ) x2 ( t * ) = = 120/196 , 0/196 , ( 28 ) ( 29 ) where ( t ) denotes outputs under optimal tariffs ...
第 38 頁
... optimal quota is greater than that under optimal tariff if the importing country can absorb a substantial por- tion of quota rents . Otherwise , social welfare under optimal quota is smaller than that under optimal tariffs . When VERS ...
... optimal quota is greater than that under optimal tariff if the importing country can absorb a substantial por- tion of quota rents . Otherwise , social welfare under optimal quota is smaller than that under optimal tariffs . When VERS ...
第 246 頁
... optimal unit - price scheme . It is well known in the literature that the optimal uniform toll produces not only the socially optimal level of consumption but also creates the revenue required to finance the optimal road capacity under ...
... optimal unit - price scheme . It is well known in the literature that the optimal uniform toll produces not only the socially optimal level of consumption but also creates the revenue required to finance the optimal road capacity under ...
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