JER, 第 12 卷,第 1-2 期Hanyang Economic Research Institute in collaboration with Hanyang University College of Business and Economics, 2007 |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 35 筆
第 217 頁
... incentive for collusion between the supervisor and the bad ( high cost ) agent does not exist . Thus , if the collusion incentive constraint for the bad ( high cost ) agent is satisfied ( non - binding ) , i.e. , A2 < 0 at the first ...
... incentive for collusion between the supervisor and the bad ( high cost ) agent does not exist . Thus , if the collusion incentive constraint for the bad ( high cost ) agent is satisfied ( non - binding ) , i.e. , A2 < 0 at the first ...
第 221 頁
... incentive constraint ( CIC ) is discretely large , in other words , the collusion incentive constraint ( CIC ) will be violated . The low - powered job design aCP < a1 is better from the viewpoint of efficiency . That is , though the ...
... incentive constraint ( CIC ) is discretely large , in other words , the collusion incentive constraint ( CIC ) will be violated . The low - powered job design aCP < a1 is better from the viewpoint of efficiency . That is , though the ...
第 229 頁
... incentive constraint . Hence , the equilibrium collusion regime is optimal . Especially , VC corresponds to the situation where relevant infor- mation is induced through competition between the agents . LC also attains the approximate ...
... incentive constraint . Hence , the equilibrium collusion regime is optimal . Especially , VC corresponds to the situation where relevant infor- mation is induced through competition between the agents . LC also attains the approximate ...
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