JER, 第 12 卷,第 1-2 期Hanyang Economic Research Institute in collaboration with Hanyang University College of Business and Economics, 2007 |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 25 筆
第 230 頁
... determination of the task assignment is given ( exogenous ) , but the allocation of the real authority is optimally ( endogenously ) determined . 16 We could say that our paper results from mixing the yardstick competition ( tour ...
... determination of the task assignment is given ( exogenous ) , but the allocation of the real authority is optimally ( endogenously ) determined . 16 We could say that our paper results from mixing the yardstick competition ( tour ...
第 249 頁
... determined later . Since consumers are identical , for given total quantity X and participation level n the individual consumption quantity is simply given by x = X / n . The firm will extract the whole surplus of the participating ...
... determined later . Since consumers are identical , for given total quantity X and participation level n the individual consumption quantity is simply given by x = X / n . The firm will extract the whole surplus of the participating ...
第 250 頁
... determined , and iii ) the overall market congestion level is efficient in equilibrium . Condition ( 3 ) together with the condition for utility maximization yields the optimal marginal price for a given n as follows : α P ( n ) = n d ...
... determined , and iii ) the overall market congestion level is efficient in equilibrium . Condition ( 3 ) together with the condition for utility maximization yields the optimal marginal price for a given n as follows : α P ( n ) = n d ...
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