CHAN.] PRYOR V. PRYOR-Ex parte CLAXTON, Re CLAXTON. COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY Wednesday, June 12. (Before the LORDS JUSTICES.) PRYOR V. PRYOR. Right of way-Partition suit-Motion to restrain use of road-Jurisdiction. The Court of Chancery has no jurisdiction to decide the question of a public or private right of way upon a motion in a partition suit. THIS was an appeal motion from an order of Bacon, V. C. Ann Peacock and Jane Ann Peacock being the owners of certain freehold property in Lambeth, by an agreement made in July 1808, undertook, after a certain part of the property should have been let on building leases, to demise the remainder to trustees for one Capreol for sixty-one years, upon trust, to lease the same upon the like plan as should have been adopted with respect to the other part, or in such manner as Capreol should think fit. In pursuance of this agreement, a lease was granted in 1813 to Capreol's trustees, the lease reciting the agreement and showing by a plan the manner in which the other part of the property had been dealt with. Upon this plan appeared a street called Frances-street, and part of the land comprised in the lease was garden ground adjoining the north end of Frances-street. By an indenture, dated the 4th June 1813, the trustees, at the request of Capreol, granted a building lease of this piece of garden ground to one Ford, and for the whole term, less ten days. Ford erected houses on each side of this piece of ground, thus forming a continuation of Frances-street towards the north end. A partition suit having been instituted with regard to the property, and a receiver having been appointed, the question arose whether, on the expiration of the lease in 1869, the public could be prevented from using the continuation of Francesstreet as a public way, and accordingly the plaintiff, who was entitled through the reversioners to part of the property, moved that the receiver might be directed to place a bar across that part of the street, in order to stop the public from using it. The hearing before the Vice-Chancellor is reported in 26 L. T. Rep. N. S. 758, where the facts of the case will be found more fully stated. The Vice-Chancellor having held that there had been a valid dedication to the public of the portion of the street in question, and having refused the motion with costs, the plaintiff appealed. Little, Q.C., Managhten and Cohen (of the Common Law Bar), for the appellant. Eddis, Q.C. and W. W. Karslake, for persons in the same interest. Kay, Q.C. and Whitehorne, for Messrs. Maudslay and Co., who opposed the motion. Hemming, for the Attorney-General. Lord Justice JAMES, on the appellant's case being opened, said :-I do not know where the jurisdiction is to try the question in this suit, but I am quite prepared to relieve the appellant from the consequences of the Vice-Chancellor's decision. Therefore our order will be prefaced by a declara [CHAN. tion that we are of opinion that this court has no jurisdiction to decide the question of a right of way, either public or private, on a motion in a partition suit, and the appeal motion must be dismissed with costs, but without prejudice to any party, notwithstanding the possession of the receiver, taking such proceedings as he may be advised with respect to the alleged right of way. Lord Justice MELLISH Concurred. Solicitors for the appellant, Macleod and Watney. Solicitors for the respondents, W. and J. Gibson. Solicitors for the Attorney-General, Raven and Bradley. Friday, June 21. (Before the LORDS JUSTICES.) Ex parte CLAXTON, Re CLAXTON. Bankruptcy-Annulling adjudication on equitable grounds Suit in Chancery by next friend-Bankruptcy of next friend-Bankruptcy Act 1869, s. 8. A widow, on her own behalf and as next friend of her infant children, who were made co-plaintiffs with her, instituted a suit for the administration of an estate in which she and her children were interested. Having failed to pay the costs of certain interlocutory proceedings in the suit, which she was ordered to pay to the defendants, a debtor's summons was taken out against her, and not having paid, she was subsequently adjudicated a bankrupt. On an appeal by her from the order of adjudication: Held, that the court was bound to make the adjudi cation on proof of the facts by the Act required to be proved, and that the bankruptcy of the next friend would not embarrass the suit in Chancery, and would not be an equitable ground of defence to the adjudication. Quære, whether the old rule as to staying proceedings or annulling an adjudication on equitable grounds, is applicable to a bankruptcy under the Act of 1869. If it is applicable at all, the question should be raised by a special application to stay proceedings or annul the adjudication, but equitable grounds cannot be raised as a defence to a petition for adjudication. THIS was an appeal from an order of Mr. Registrar Roche, sitting as Chief Judge in Bankruptcy. In April 1870, Emily Claxton and her three infant children, by her as their next friend, instituted a suit against Arthur Claxton and Walter Claxton, the trustees of the will of Noah Claxton, for the administration of the testator's estate. By two orders made in the suit on the 15th April and the 24th July 1871, Mrs. Claxton was ordered to pay to the defendants the costs of certain interlocutory applications, which were taxed at 331. 10s. 8d. and 291. 10s. 10d., making together 631. 1s. 6d. On the 16th Dec. 1871, the defendants served Mrs. Claxton with a subpoena to enforce payment of this sum. The money not being paid, the defendants on the 15th Jan. 1872, took out a debtor's summons against her for the amount, and as she still failed to pay, they, in the following month, filed a petition for adjudication of bankruptcy against her, and on the 25th April the registrar made an order adjudicating her a bankrupt. From this order Mrs. Claxton appealed, upon the ground that the object of the petitioning cre ditors was only to impede or defeat the proceedings in the suit. Karslake, Q.C. and Brough, for the appellant, contended that the adjudication ought to be annulled, inasmuch as it was evident that the intention of the petitioning creditors was merely to impede the suit, for if they had only wanted to be paid what was due to them, they might have issued an attachment against her, or proceded against her under the Debtors' Act 1869. They referred to Ex parte Kemp, 1 M. D.& De G. 657; Ex parte Bourne, 2 Gl. & J. 137; Ex parte Browne, 1 Rose, 151; Ex parte Upfill, Re Upfill, L. Rep. 1 Ch. 439; Hewitson v. Sherwin, 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 576; L. Rep. 10 Eq. 53. Without calling upon Phear, who appeared in support of the registrar's order, Lord Justice JAMES said, that he was of opinion that the registrar had no discretion in the matter, but that he was bound, ex debito justitiæ, to make the adjudication on the facts required by the Act being proved. Whether the old rule as to staying proceedings or annulling an adjudication on equitable grounds was or was not applicable to the case of a bankruptcy under the Act of 1869 was a matter of great importance, but it was not necessary to decide that point now. However, it appeared to his Lordship that the mode of raising the question in a proper case would be by a special application to stay proceedings, or to annul the adjudication, and on such an application the court could give such equitable relief as it might think just, and upon such terms as it might think fit; but equitable grounds could not be raised as a defence to a petition for adjudication. In the present case, his Lordship did not desire to put the parties to make a fresh application, for he was satisfied that there was no ground for applying the rule in this case. The defendants in the suit had obtained an order against the next friend for payment of costs. They had a right to enforce payment, and bankruptcy was one of the remedies provided by the law. They had a right to make her a bankrupt, even at the risk of impeding the suit in Chancery, but in truth her bankruptcy would not embarrass the suit at all. The bankrupt would still remain the next friend of the infant plaintiffs, unless the court should think fit to remove her, and she and her solicitor could continue to conduct the suit, by merely obtaining the common supplemental order to bring the trustee under the bankruptcy before the court. There was, therefore, no foundation in fact for this application, and the appeal must be dismissed with costs. Lord Justice MELLISH was of the same opinion. Appeal accordingly dismissed with costs. Solicitor for the appellant, F. Andrew. Solicitors for the respondents, Westall and Roberts. July 5 and 6. (Before the LORDS JUSTICES.) KETTLEWELL v. BARSTOW. Practice-Production of documents-PedigreeSealing-up. A pedigree is not one entire document of which a plaintiff, if entitled to see any part, is of necessity [CHAN. entitled to see the whole; but a defendant may seal up such portions of the pedigree as to which he swears that they relate only to his own title, and do not evidence or in any way relate to the title of the plaintiff, or to the matters in question in the cause. A defendant will be protected from producing documents as to which he swears that they do not relate to any issue or matter to be tried at the hearing of the cause, but consist exclusively of documents to the production of which the plaintiff will be entitled by way of consequential relief in the event of his succeeding at the hearing in any of the issues in the cause. Decision of Bacon, V.C. reversed. THIS was an appeal from an order of Bacon, V.C. The suit was one instituted by the plaintiff to obtain production of the title deeds of certain real estate to which he claimed to be entitled as the true heir-at-law of Ann Fawcett, who died a spinster and intestate in 1858, being at the time of her death seised in fee of real estate in Yorkshire of considerable value. The bill was filed against certain persons, who also claimed to be the true heirs of Ann Fawcett, and who on her death had entered into possession of the estate and of all the title deeds. The bill alleged that the defendants had wrongfully obtained possession of the estate and title deeds, the plaintiff being the true heir-at-law of Ann Fawcett, both ex parte paterna and ex parte materna, as he was lineally descended from her great grandfather. In the affidavit of documents in their possession relating to the matters in question in the suit, which two of the defendants were required to make, they put under the head of documents protected as relating to their own title exclusively (amongst other things), the sealed portions of a pedigree which related both to their own family and to that of the plaintiff, which was all on the same sheet of paper, but of which they had sealed up those parts relating exclusively to their own family, leaving open only those parts which related to the plaintiff's and the common pedigree. In the affidavit the defendants stated that they objected to produce these sealed portions of the pedigree for the inspection of the plaintiff, "on the ground that such parts thereof as we have caused to be sealed-up, evidence or relate to our own title or the title of the said co-defendants only, and do not evidence, make out, or support, or tend to make out or support, or in any other manner relate to any such estate, right, title, pedigree, or heirship as aforesaid claimed by the plaintiff, or any part or link of or in the same, or do not relate to the matters in question in this cause." They also objected to produce certain documents set out in the schedule to the affidavit under the heading Y, "on the ground that the same do not, nor do any of them, relate to any issue or matter to be tried at the hearing of this cause; but, as we are advised to say, consist exclusively of documents of which the plaintiff will be entitled to the production, by way of consequential relief, in the event of his succeeding in any of the first six issues in the cause, but not in any other event.” On a summons by the plaintiff to have the sealed portion of the pedigree discovered, and the documents under the heading Y produced, the ViceChancellor held that the plaintiff was entitled to see the whole of the pedigree, which was one entire document which he had a right to see unmutilated and unconcealed; and that he was also entitled to the production of the documents under the heading Y; the fact that they did not relate to any issue or matter to be tried at the hearing being no reason why they should not be produced. From this decision the defendants appealed. Eddis, Q.C. and Russell Roberts, for the appellants. In Wigram on Discovery, p. 261, it is stated that the right of a plaintiff in equity to the benefit of the defendant's oath is limited to a discovery of such material facts as relate to the plaintiff's case, and does not extend to the discovery of evidence which relates exclusively to the defendant's case. In Bolton v. The Corporation of Liverpool (1 My. & K. 88; 3 Sim. 467), Lord Brougham says: "I take the principle to be this; a party has a right to the production of deeds sustaining his own title affirmatively; but not of those which are not immediately connected with the support of his own title, and which form part of his adversary's. He cannot call for those which, instead of supporting his title, defeat it by entitling his adversary. Those under which both claim he may have, or those under which he claims alone." Here we distinctly swear that the sealed portions of the pedigree do not support or in any way relate to the plaintiff's title, and therefore we are entitled to keep them sealed up. On this point they also referred to Compton v. Earl Grey, 1 Y. & J. 154; Minet v. Morgan, 24 L. T. Rep. N. S. 120; L. Rep. Then, as to the documents under the heading Y, we De la Rue v. Dickinson, 3 K. & J. 388; Mitford on Pleading, 5th edit. p. 226. 66 Kay, Q.C. and Cottrell, for the respondent.The pedigree is one entire document, and we contend that we are entitled to see the whole of it. In Hylton v. Morgan (6 Ves. 293), where Lord Eldon refused upon motion to aid the plaintiff in proceedings at law without the authority of this court, he nevertheless says, as to the pedigree, I apprehend a production would be ordered;" and in Rumbold v. Forteath (3 K. & J. 752), the present Lord Chancellor (then Wood, V.C.), after citing the words of Lord Eldon in Hylton v. Morgan, said: "and that is the inclination of my own opinion." A family pedigree cannot be split up, nor can part of it be sealed up, but a person who [CHAN. is entitled to see any part of it is entitled to see the whole of it. In Luscombe v. Steer (37 L. J. 119, Ch.), a defendant was ordered to produce the whole of a document, though he had sworn that certain portions of it set out in his affidavit of documents alone assisted the plaintiff's case, or related to the matters in question in the cause. In Carver v. Pinto Leite (25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 722; L. Rep. 7 Ch. 90), where your Lordships allowed a defendant to seal up certain portions of documents, there was no admission, as in the case of this pedigree, that the whole of the documents related to matters in question in the cause. The defendant's affidavit containing that admission is not in the common form so as to protect them from producing the whole pedigree. It is a studiously evasive affidavit, and that fact inclines the court to refuse protection to the persons making it: (Smith v. Duke of Beaufort, 1 Hare, 521). As to the documents under the heading Y., we contend that the defendants are not to be the sole judges whether the documents are material or not. They also referred to Lafone v. The Falkland Islands Company, 4 K. & J. 34. Without calling for a reply, Lord Justice JAMES said:-I think, with regard to the documents under the heading "Y.," that the defendants are sufficiently protected, as they swear by their affidavit that those documents do not relate to anything to be tried at the hearing of the cause. The main question is as to the pedigree. Now it was contended before us that a pedigree is one document, and that because it is one document, part of it cannot be sealed up. That was almost the sole argument of the learned counsel, Mr. Kay, and the authorities to which he referred, as far as I understand them, are authorities directly to the contrary. One document may contain the pedigree of A. and the pedigree of B.; it may contain a hundred pedigrees, and yet be only one document, containing the pedigrees of all the different branches, lineal and collateral, of the descendants of one person. There is nothing more easy to predicate than that the same document may contain the pedigree of A. and the pedigree of B., and other matters with which neither A. nor B. has anything to do, and which have nothing to do with the matter in question in the cause. Therefore it appears to me that there is nothing whatever in the suggestion that the pedigree is a document the whole of which must be produced. But a question upon which some doubt crossed our minds was this whether, on looking at the pedigree itself, we can see that some parts, which are now sealed up, may prove the plaintiff's case. The defendants, however, have positively sworn that the parts which they have sealed up do not in any way tend to prove or make out any part of the plaintiff's pedigree, that they simply relate exclusively to their own pedigree, and do not relate to anything at all connected with the case set up by the plaintiff. In a case of this kind, where the plaintiff does not give his own pedigree at all, but simply comes here and says, I am heir-at-law ea parte paterna, or I am heir-at-law ex parte maternâ, without any statement of his own case, the defendant has a right to say, I am entitled to protect myself from discovery. The plaintiff may turn out not to be the heir ex parte paternâ or the heir ex parte materna. That is the thing to be proved in the first place, and I think that, under these circumstances, considering the danger of COBBETT v. WOODWARD. CHAN.] opening all a man's documents, even to his pedigree in this way, the discovery should not be granted. It would be giving a man who has not shown the slightest colour of a title the right to see something which may tend to prove that some one else might be able to show a flaw in the defendant's title. The danger is so great that I should hesitate to grant such discovery unless compelled to do so by the authority of some previous decision of this court. If any man comes here with an imaginary case-and that is what the defendants here say that the plaintiff's case is, for he states no pedigree, nor does he explain how he makes out his title, but he only says, "Show me all your documents, and I shall be able to turn you out of possession," in the absence of authority, I think we ought not to enable a man to see documents which a defendant has said on oath do not in any way tend to make out his case. One may conceive that there may be some facts in the pedigree which may possibly tend to prove some part of the plaintiff's case, but that is not sufficient to bring it within the rule as to discovery. It must be something which tends to make out such a case as the plaintiff has got to prove. Here the court does not not see that, and therefore we must for the present give credit to the oath of the defendants when they depose that no part of what is sealed up relates to any part of the title of the plaintiff. I think, therefore, that this pedigree should be left sealed up as it is. Lord Justice MELLISH.-I am of the same opinion. In the first place, I think this is a case where we are bound to be very cautious as to what documents we compel the defendants to discover. Here it appears that Ann Fawcett died in 1858, possessed of a very considerable estate, and the defendants thereupon entered and obtained possession, and they have apparently got peaceable possession of the estates and all the documents of title. Then there is a bill filed in which the plaintiff states in the vaguest possible way what his own title is. The way in which the case is stated in the bill cannot but give rise to a suspicion that the case is to a certain extent a fishing case, and that the plaintiff knows of no positive title of his own, but wishes to find out whether he has one. Then upon that, the question is, What documents are the defendants obliged to discover? They admit that there is a pedigree of the family, and they produce it so far as it shows the exact line from the person through whom apparently the plaintiff claims, though it is not quite clear that he confines himself to that; but apparently the plaintiff claims through Elizabeth Kettlewell, and I suppose he means to say that he is descended from the father or the grandfather of Elizabeth Kettlewell, and the pedigree as produced does show a direct line from Ann Fawcett up to Elizabeth Kettlewell. The defendants cover up all the rest of the pedigree, and they make an affidavit that the covered portion does not relate to the title or the pedigree of the plaintiff at all, but relates either to the title or pedigree of the defendant, or does not relate to the matters in question in this suit at all. I am of opinion that a pedigree cannot be considered, as an agreement has been considered in some cases, as one entire document. It is obvious that you might have a pedigree of an entire family, nine-tenths of which would be immaterial to any question in the cause. I cannot help thinking that the defendants in this case are entitled to some protection, because [ROLLS. it may be that by discoverng what they have sealed up they would discover something which might be very prejudicial to them in a suit with some totally different person from the plaintiff, and they have made their positive affidavit that the parts of the pedigree which they have sealed up do not in any way tend to prove the title or pedigree of the plaintiff. It appears to me that as we do not know what the plaintiff's case is, and as there is nothing apparently to help his case, we should be going too far if we compelled the whole of this pedigree to be produced. Solicitors for the appellants, Johnson and Weatherall. Solicitor for the respondent, A. Hemsley. ROLLS COURT. Reported by G. WELBY KING, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Injunction June 4, 5, and 20. COBBETT v. WOODWARD. Copyright-Illustrated furnishing guide-Advertisement-Costs. C., an upholsterer and house furnisher, published a guide for furnishing houses, containing introduc tory remarks on furnishing, estimates, terms of business, and a synopsis, with illustrations of numerous articles of furniture. W., also carrying on business as an upholsterer and house furnisher, subsequently published a furnishing guide, in which he adopted the style of C.'s work, copied several of the drawings of decorated furni ture, and extracted certain passages from the synopsis and introduction of C.'s work, and also his general remarks. On a suit by C. to restrain the publication of W.'s work, Held, that the drawings were a mere advertisement for the sale of particular articles, which anyone might imitate, and which anyone might advertise for sale, and that there was no copyright in such an advertisement; and as regarded the letterpress, that where it bore the trace of original com position it was entitled to protection, but not where it simply described the contents of a warehouse, the exertion of the proprietor, or the common mode of using familiar articles. THE plaintiff in this suit had for twenty years past carried on business as an upholsterer and house furnisher at Deptford-bridge, in the county of Kent. In the year 1866 the plaintiff published a book under the title of "Cobbett and Co.'s New Furnishing Guide," which contained information and advice on the subject of house furnishing, under the heads "Introduction," "Terms of Business," "Synopsis," and "General Remarks on House Furnishing," together with estimates and inventories of furniture appropriate for houses of different classes, and also illustrations or drawings of designs, and patterns of articles, many of which were original, and the book was registered at Stationers' Hall. The defendant carried on business at Worcester as an upholsterer, under the firm or style of "F. Woodward and Co." In August 1868, he published a book, entitled "F. Woodward and Co.'s Illustrated Furnishing Guide," which was in a great measure copied from the plaintiff's book, and in its style and plan was an imitation thereof. The introduction to the plaintiff's book contained the following passage: Cobbett and Co. have the pleasure of offering to noblemen, clergymen, and gentlemen about to furnish their houses, either wholly or in part, one of the most carefully prepared and useful illustrated guides to furnishing ever published. Having the several advantages of about twenty years' experience in house furnishing, of very extensive premises containing manufactory, show rooms, and galleries covering nearly an acre of ground, of a well-trained staff of competent salemen and workmen, together with a large capital employed, they feel quite justified in saying that no gentleman wanting to furnish his house with sound well-made furniture of elegant design, equal in every respect to that of the best West-end houses at 25 per cent. less in price, can by any possibility do better than give the order to our firm. The introduction to the defendant's book was as follows: Francis Woodward and Co. have great pleasure in offering to noblemen, clergymen, and gentlemen about to furnish their houses, either wholly or in part, a very carefully prepared and useful illustrated furnishing guide. Having the several advantages of many years' experience in house furnishing, of very extensive premises containing show rooms, galleries, and manufactory built expressly by themselves for this trade, of a well-trained staff of competent salesmen and workmen, together with a large capital employed, they feel justified in saying that gentlemen wanting to furnish with sound well-made furniture of elegant design and first-class workmanship, equal in every respect to that of the best houses in the kingdom, will do well to inspect their stock before doing so. Then appeared a page in the plaintiff's book containing the following words: Terms of Business. All goods delivered carriage free to the purchaser's house in any part of the kingdom, regardless of distance. No charge for packing or packing materials. Payment considered due in cash as soon as invoice is delivered. Credit accounts must be matter of special arrangement. References to clergymen and gentlemen in nearly every part of England. Competent salesmen will wait upon intending purchasers at any distance free of charge to take measurement and give special estimates where required. In the defendant's book, at the end of the introduction, appeared the following words: Terms of Business. All purchases above 201. delivered free within twenty miles of Worcester. No charge for packing. All packages allowed for in full if returned within fourteen days and not damaged. Payment, cash on delivery of invoice. Credit accounts must be matter of special arrangement. References to noblemen, clergymen, and gentlemen for whom we have furnished. Competent salesmen will wait upon intending purchasers free of charge to take measurements and give special estimates where required. Experienced workmen sent to any part of the Ünited Kingdom. In the following page of plaintiff's book, under the respective heads of "carpets," ""floor cloths," "kamptulicon," and "bedding," appeared the following statements: Carpets. For this department we have lately erected large show rooms, which contain a magnificent stock of Axminster, Wilton, Brussels (both hand loom and power loom make), Kidderminster, Royal Victoria felt, and every other variety now in use. Floor Cloths.-To ensure durability, this article must be of first-rate manufacture, and well seasoned. We always keep in a wareroom, devoted to the purpose, an immense quantity of the finest makes produced in the kingdom, and of every width used, from tyd. to 8yds. wide, without a seam. The new patterns now ready are peculiarly elegant, and a great improvement upon any hitherto produced. Kamptulicon. Of all makes, at manufacturer's prices. Bedding.-No part of a furnishing order requires more faith in the parties supplying the various articles than [ROLLS. Carpets. For this department we have erected large show rooms, which contain a magnificent stock of Brussels, tapestry, Kidderminster, Royal Victoria felt, and every other variety now in use. All carpets planned, cut, and laid down free of charge within a moderate distance of Worcester. Floor cloths and kamptulicons.-To ensure durability, this article must be of first-rate manufacture and well seasoned. We always keep in stock an immense quantity of the finest makes produced, and of every width up to 4 yards wide. Bedding.-No part of a furnishing order requires more faith in the parties supplying the various articles than bedding. It is quite possible to make a difference of 25 per cent. in real value without discovery, except by the wear. Our price list is the lowest at which bedding of the purest and best materials can possibly be supplied. The last eight words being printed in small capitals. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant had copied his " 'General Remarks on House Furnishing," and also some of his estimates for furnishing houses of various classes. Southgate, Q.C. and F. C. J. Millar for the plaintiff. The defendant has not only adopted the style of the plaintiff's book, but has copied large portions of it word for word. Although the defendant's book must necessarily bear some resemblance to that of the plaintiff, yet the defendant is not at liberty to benefit by the exertions of the plaintiff, in the compilation of his work. Cassell v. Stiff, 2 R. & J. 279; Fry, Q.C. and William Pearson for the defendant -The plaintiff's book is a mere advertisement, and does not come within the Copyright Act, which was intended for the protection of literary effort and works for the lasting benefit of mankind. Even if the plaintiff was entitled to a copyright in his work, yet the registration was invalid, inasmuch as the plaintiff is described therein as residing at Deptford, whereas he in fact resided at Greenwich. Low v. Routledge, 33 L. J. 713, Ch. ; 10 L. T. Rep. N. S. Mathieson v. Harrod, L. Rep. 7 Eq. 270; 19 L. T. Rep. Further, it has been the custom in the trade for any upholsterer preparing a book of this kind to avail himself of works of a like nature, and adopt such portion of them as he pleases, and where several persons have been allowed to pirate, the court will not restrain any particular person from doing so: (Rendell v. Murray, Jac. 311.) They also referred to Murray v. Bogue, 1 Drew. 353; Page v. Wisden, 20 L. T. Rep. N. S. 435; The Leather Cloth Company v. The American Leather Jarrold v. Houlston, 3 K. & J. 708. Lewis v. Fullarton, 2 Beav. 6; Kelly v. Morris, L. Rep. 1 Eq. 697; 14 L. T. Rep. N. S. 222. LORD ROMILLY (after stating the facts).-On |