of the wife, which it was sought to esta-
blish conclusively by putting in a record
and proceedings in the Divorce Court,
from which it appeared that in a suit
instituted by the Defendant against his
wife for dissolution of marriage, the jury
had found the adultery, but that the
petition had been dismissed upon the
ground that in a cross suit, instituted by
the wife, it was proved that he also had
committed adultery. Held, that as the
judgment of the Divorce Court did not
alter the status of the parties, it was
not conclusive evidence of the adultery
of the Defendant's wife, as between him
and a stranger.
Needham v. Bremner.
Page 731

ILLEGAL

Partnership. See Parliament, I.

ILLNESS.

As to admissibility of depositions in evi-
dence in case of. See Deposition.

IMPLIED CONDITION.

When the contract was to do work on
the premises of another destroyed by
fire. See Contract, I.

"IMPORTER,"

Meaning of, in Customs Amendment
Act, 1859. See Customs.

INCREASE

Of sureties' risk when no discharge. See
Bond.

INDORSEMENT

Of bill of exchange drawn and accepted
in England payable in France, by
drawer in England. See Bill of Ex-
change, I.

Of bill of lading by consignor and re-
indorsement to him. See Shipping,
III.

On invoice a memorandum of bargain.
See Frauds, Statute of, III.

SOCIETIES ACTS.
See Co-operative Society.

INDUSTRY.

Agricultral and commercial. See Par-
liament, II.

INFERENCES OF FACT.
Special case empowering Court to draw
reasonable. See Partnership, IV.

INFERIOR TRIBUNALS

Not bound by reasons given in judg-
ments of House of Lords. See Part-
nership, III.

INJUNCTION

Under the Railway and Canal Traffic
Act, 1854, for undue preference in
receiving at railway station goods for
forwarding the same night. See Rail-
way Company, III.

INJURIOUS AFFECTION

Of a messuage, traverse of, as to part
of claim for compensation under the
Lands Clauses Consolidation Act. See
Arbitration, II.

INJURY,

Action for personal, against railway
company. See Negligence, I.
See also as to actions for personal injury,
Ibid. II., III., IV., VII.

INSPECTORSHIP.

Deed of. See Bankrupt, IX., X.

INSURABLE INTEREST.
See Insurance, II., III.

INSURANCE.

I. By a policy of marine insurance in
the ordinary form, the Defendants in-
sured the chartered freight, payable at
home, of the Plaintiffs' vessel, S., on her
voyage from America to the United
Kingdom, "warranted free from parti-
cular average; also from jettison, unless
the ship should be stranded, sunk or
burnt." The policy contained the ordi-
nary suing and labouring clause, with
an express declaration that the acts of
insurer or insured, in recovering the
property insured, should not be con-
sidered as waiver or acceptance of aban-
donment. On the voyage the ship put
into Rio in distress, and was so damaged
as to become a constructive total loss,
but the goods were removed, and being
placed in another ship, reached the port
of discharge in safety. There was no
notice of abandonment, and the chartered
freight was paid. The Plaintiffs claimed
as for a total loss, and also, under the suing
and labouring clause, for the expenses
of trans-shipment, and for freight of the
substituted ship, which, with expenses at
Rio, did not exceed the chartered freight.

Held:

1. That the expenses incurred were of
a character to be within the suing
and labouring clause.
2. That apart from the question of
usage, the suing and labouring
clause is applicable to all cases in
which the underwriter is saved from
liability to loss, whether partial or
total, and whether an abandonment
does or may possibly take place or
not; and that the occasion on which
the said expenses where incurred
was within that clause.

3. That the provision in the policy as
to warranty against particular aver-
age only limited the insurance to
total loss of the freight by the perils
insured against, without reference
to extraordinary labour or expense
which might be incurred by the
assured in preserving the assured
from loss.
4. Semble, that evidence was receiv-
able to show that the phrase "par-
ticular average" had an understood
meaning, according to which it did
not include "particular charges;"

III. Semble, a mere agent without
possession or lien has not an insurable
interest to the extent of the value of the
goods, simply because his name appears
in the bill of lading instead of that of
his principal.
Ibid.

IV. The Plaintiff's firm, brokers at
Liverpool, having received an order from
M., of Londonderry, to ship him, as
they were in the habit of doing, some
guano, wrote to M. that they had en-
gaged a ship to deliver the goods, and
stated the price; and asked him if he
proposed to insure. M. insured the
goods; and next day replied to Plaintiff
thus: "I cannot understand this (the
price), when I know that M. L. sup-
plies you guano in Scotland at 91. 15s.
net there to dealers; besides, I look as
heretofore for the special allowance made
to me at the origin of our transactions;
and now that you are making some
arrangements, it may be as well that I
should know how we are to get on for
the future." M. did not countermand
the goods; and the Plaintiff shipped
guano, of which D. & Co. were the
sellers. On receipt of M.'s letter, the
same day, 4th March, he obtained from
the captain a bill of lading making the
goods deliverable at Londonderry, "to
the order of G. S. & Co. (the Plaintiff's
firm) or their assigns;" and by the in-
voice the goods were described as “de-
livered to account of M.” Plaintiff's
firm also on that day insured the goods
with the Defendants. On the 7th the
ship and cargo were totally lost. On
the 9th M. and the Plaintiff met, while
ignorant of the loss, and having agreed

as to price, the Plaintiff thereupon in-
dorsed the bill of lading, and handed it,
with the invoice, to M., who accepted
a bill for the amount. M. then brought
an action against his underwriters, re-
covered 1,200l., and was paid 1,150l.,
and this was the amount at which the
goods were valued in the now Plaintiff's
policy, and M. paid D. & Co. in full.
The Plaintiff then brought this action,
averring an interest in himself, and
claiming in effect, and really for the
benefit of M., the following items-viz.,
501. of the former verdict not paid, 491,
extra costs, 1047 difference between the
interest which he recovered and the
interest which he had to pay his own
bankers in order to raise money, and
201. travelling expenses, not alleged to
be connected with the insurance; and
he obtained a verdict for 2007. Held,
that the Plaintiff had no insurable in
terest; and the Court refused to amend
the declaration by inserting a statement
of interest in Plaintiff's principal, on
the ground that M. was the real Plain-
tiff in the action.

Ibid.

V. The warranty of seaworthiness,
which is implied on the part of the as-
sured in respect of a ship, does not ex-
tend to lighters not belonging to the
ship, but employed for the landing of
the cargo at the port of discharge. Lane i
and Another v. Nixon.
Page 585

VI. To a declaration on a voyage
policy in the usual form, by which the
Plaintiff insured certain goods from
Liverpool to Melbourne, "including all
risk to and from the ship," and it was
provided that the adventure upon the
goods should continue until the same
be there (i. e., at Melbourne) discharged
and safely landed," alleging an average
loss by the perils assured against, the
Defendant pleaded that the injury hap-
pened after the goods had been dis-
charged from the ship, and while they
were in a lighter (which it was conceded
did not belong to the ship) intended to
convey them from the ship to the shore,
and that the lighter was not seaworthy
for the purpose, and the injury was
caused solely by such unseaworthiness.
Held, that the plea was no answer to
the action.
Ibid.

VII. A policy reciting an agreement
for insurance of plate glass, not horizon-

tally placed or moveable, "from loss
or damage originating from any cause
whatsoever, except fire, breakage during
removal, alteration or repair of pre-
mises," insured the Plaintiff against all
damage and loss "by or from any cause
whatever, except only as above speci-
fied;" subject to the condition that
within ten days of the loss notice should
be given to the manager or some known
agent of the company. A fire broke
out in a house adjoining the Plaintiff's,
and extended to the back of his premises,
thirty yards from his shop windows; he
began to remove his furniture and stock
in trade, and called in some neighbours
to assist him: a crowd, attracted by the
fire, pulled down the window shutters,
broke the plate glass windows, and stole
his goods. L. was the agent of the com-
pany through whom the policy was
effected, but before the fire the De-
fendants had transferred their plate glass
insurance business, with all liabilities, to
another company. The Plaintiff sent
in his claim to L. the day after the fire,
who forwarded it to the new company.
Held:

1. That the loss did not originate from
fire or from breakage during re-
moval within the exception in the
policy.

2. That the notice to L. was a suffi-
cient compliance with the condition.
Marsden v. The City and County
Assurance Company.

Page 53

INTERESSE TERMINI.
See Covenant.

INTEREST.

Insurable. See Insurance, II., III.
Of tribunal in event. See Clerk.

INTERROGATORIES.
Examination of witnesses abroad on,
See Shipping, II.

INVITATION.

Person resorting to a building in the
course of business by occupier's, Ac-
tion by, for personal injury from negli-
gence. See Negligence, II.

INVOICE,

Indorsement on, a memorandum of bar-
gain. See Frauds, Statute of, III.

IRREGULAR EXECUTION,
Setting aside, on terms of bringing no
action. See Practice, I.

IRREGULARITY.

Upon a judgment after verdict for
Defendant, Plaintiff assigned as error
in fact, that all the special jurors who
had been struck were not summoned;
that by reason thereof and the names of
the said special jurors not having been
called over at or after 10 o'clock, the
hour named in the summons, only ten
special jurors attended and were sworn,
and that two talesmen were thereupon
sworn on the said jury. Held, that
there was no error, the matters com-
plained of being irregularities, which
ought to have been complained of to the
Court below on motion. Irwin v. Sir
George Grey, Bart.
Page 113

JUDGE,

Jurisdiction of, where summons asks for
costs. See Practice, I.

Order of, acquiescence in. Ibid., III.
Decision of, as to admissibility of depo-
sition. Power of Court to review, See
Deposition.

Order of, for reference by consent. See
Arbitration, III.

JUDGMENT

Of Court of competent jurisdiction. See
Clerk.

Of Divorce Court, not altering status of
parties. See Husband and Wife, II.
Of House of Lords. Effect of, See Part-
nership, II., III.

JURISDICTION

Of judge, where summons asks for costs.
See Practice, I.

VOL. I.-C. P.

Judgment of Court of competent, See
Clerk.

Of County Court, after a winding-up
order, to stay action. See Co-opera-
tive Society.

JURY,

Direction to, in action for breach of
promise of marriage. See Marriage,

I.
In action for negligence where there is
contributory negligence on the part
of the Plaintiff. See Negligence, V.,
VI.

Process. See Irregularity.

JUSTICES,

Appeal from, under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43,
8. 3. See Appeal, I.

Licence of, to remove cattle. Ibid., II.
Of Quarter Sessions. Dismissal of clerk
of peace by, See Clerk.

LAND.

In order to sustain an action for de-
priving land of its lateral support by
excavation in land adjoining, damage to
the Plaintiff to an appreciable extent
must be proved. Smith v. Thackerah
and Another.
Page 615

Demised, not conterminous with en-
croachment on waste by tenant. See
Encroachment, I.

Relation of value of building to value
of, See Parliament, IV., V., VI.
Sale of. See Sale.

LANDING,

Of goods imported in a ship from foreign
parts. See Shipping, I.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Encroachment on waste by tenant. See
Encroachment.

See also Covenant.

3 Q