that he will do no repentance, that he shall then have a just CHAP. punishment.

"He has appointed all creatures to be servants, except angels and men, and hence they are the servants of these other creatures. They have their ministerial duties till doomsday. But men and angels, they are free. He dispenses with their servitude.

"What! can men say, that the Divine Providence has appointed this, that they should not fulfil these duties, or how? May they neglect them; that they may not do good? Now it is written that God will render to every man according to his works. Why then should any man be idle, that he work not?

“Then said I, it is obvious enough to me, that God knew it all before, both good and evil, before it happened. But I know not, whether that shall all happen unchangeably, which he knows and has appointed.

"Then,' quoth he, THERE IS NO NEED THAT ALL SHOULD HAPPEN UNCHANGEABLY though some of it shall happen unchangeably. This will be that, which will be best for our necessities; and that will be his will. But there are some so directed that there is no necessity for this; and though its being done would neither injure, nor benefit, nor be any harm, yet it will not be done.'

:

“Think now, by thyself, whether thou hast appointed any thing so firmly, that thou thinkest that it shall never be changed by thy will, nor that thou canst be without it or whether thou again art so divided in opinion, on any thought, whether it shall happen to help thee, or whether it shall not. Many are the things which God knows before they happen; and he knows also whether it will hurt his creatures that they should happen. But he knows not this for the purpose of willing that they should happen, but that he may take previous care that they should not happen. Thus a good ship-steerer perceives many a stormy wind before it occurs, and folds his sail, and awhile also lays down his mast, and then abides the beating, if, before the threatening of the adverse wind, he can guard himself against the weather.""93

In this train of original reasoning, it is remarkable, that Alfred's sound and practical understand

93 Alfred, p. 142 — 144.

II.

V.

BOOK ing has fixed itself on the true solution of this difficult question. The Deity foresees, when He pleases, all things that can happen, not that every thing which He foresees should happen; but that He may select out of the possibilities which his foresight anticipates, those things which it will be most beneficial to his creation to take place; but He does not even will these unalterably. He binds himself in no chains. His laws are not made to be immutable, when the course and changes of circumstances make alteration advisable. "There is no need," as our royal sage intimates, "that all things should unchangeably happen." Alfred felt it to be wiser, from his own experience, to reserve and exercise the right of making new determinations and arrangements as new exigencies occurred; and he has reasonably applied the same principle to the Divine Government. The Deity could make all things unchangeable if he pleased, and could from all eternity have so appointed them. But there was no need for his doing this. It was wiser and more expedient that he should not do so. He is under no necessity, at all times, or at any time, to exert all his possibilities of power. He uses on every occasion so much of it as that occasion requires, but no more. He involves himself in no fetters of necessity. He is always doing what it is the best and fittest to do, and reserves to himself the right and the freedom of making at every period whatever new arrangement the progress or the new positions and the welfare of his creation require.

THUS Alfred has hit upon the real wisdom of opinion on this contested subject, which many theologians and metaphysicians have failed to attain.

II.

He could not have left a more impressive instance CHAP. of the penetrating sagacity of his clear and honest mind.

BOETIUS was advancing to the point but missed it; for he seems to have thought, like most, that whatever was foreseen must occur. Alfred's idea of an exerted foresight to choose from, without the necessity of the thing foreseen therefore unalterably occurring, was a beautiful distinction of his correct judgment.

INSTEAD of the reasoning of Boetius, in the fifth prosa of his last book, Alfred substitutes the following of his own :

"Then said I, Thou hast very well helped me by this speech. I wonder why so many wise men should have laboured so much on this subject, and have found out so little that was wise.' "Then quoth he, Why wonderest thou so much? Is it so easy to be understood? How! knowest thou not, that many things are not understood so as they exist; but according to the quality of the understanding of him that inquires after them. Such is wisdom. No man from this world can understand it, such as it really is; though every one strives according to the quality of his understanding, that he may perceive it if he can. Wisdom may entirely comprehend us, such as we are, though we may not wholly comprehend that, such as it is in itself; because wisdom is God. He seeth all our works, both good and evil, before they are done, or for this purpose, thought. But he compels us not to this, that we must necessarily do the good; nor prevents us from doing evil; because he has given us freedom. I can teach thee also some examples, by which thou mayest the easier understand this speech. What! thou knowest the sight, and the hearing, and the taste they perceive the body of man, and yet they perceive it not alike. The ears perceive so that they hear, but they perceive not yet the body entirely as it is; our sense of feeling must touch it, and feel that it is the body. We cannot feel whether this be black or white, fair or not fair; but the sight at the beginning turns to these points; and as the eyes look on things, they perceive all the appearance of the body.

On human nature and

its best in

terests.

BOOK
V.

But I will give thee some further explanation, that thou mayest know that which thou wonderest at.'

"He said, "It is that man understands only that which he separately perceives in others. He perceives separately through his eyes; separately through his ears; separately through his nostrils; separately by his reason; separately by his wise comprehension. There are many living things that are unmoving, such as shell fish are; and these have yet some portion of perception; or they would not else live, if they had no grain of perception. Some can see, some can hear, some taste, some smell; but the moving animals are more like man, because they have all that the unmoving creatures have, and also more too. This is, that they obey men. They love what loves them, and hate what hates them; and they fly from what they hate, and seek what they love. But men have all that we have before mentioned, and also add to them the great gift of reason. Angels have a still wiser understanding.

"Hence are these creatures thus made, that the unmoving shall not exalt themselves above the moving ones, nor contend with them; nor the moving ones above men; nor men above angels; nor angels strive against God.

"But this is miserable, that the greatest part of men look not to that which is given to them, that is, reason; nor seek that which is above them, which is what angels and wise men have; this is a wise understanding. But most men now move with cattle, in this, that they desire the lusts of the world like cattle. If we now had any portion of an unhesitating understanding, such as angels have, then we might perceive that such an understanding would be much better than our reason. Though we investigate many things, we have little ready knowledge free from doubt. But to angels there is no doubt of any of those things which they know, because their ready knowledge is much better than our reasoning; as our reasoning is better than the perceptions of animals. Any portion of understanding that is given to them, is either to those that are prone or to those that are erect. But let us now elevate our minds as supremely as we may towards the high roof of the highest understanding, that thou mayest most swiftly and most easily come to thine own kindred from whence thou camest before. There may thy mind and thy reason see openly that which they now doubt about; every thing, whether of the

Divine prescience, which we have been discoursing on, or of CHAP. our freedom, or of all such things.'

,"94

WHAT an easy flow of reasoning, on topics, which the Aristotelian schoolmen afterwards bewildered without improving!

If it be interesting to read the philosophical reasonings of great men on the sublime subject of Deity, and on that which constitutes the supreme good, it is peculiarly so to observe how Alfred treats of it, when we recollect the age he lived in, and the barbaric minds with which he was surrounded. He has enlarged so copiously on the suggestions of Boetius, added so much to his text, inserted so much vigour of reasoning, and also thrown it so much more into dialogue, that it claims our attention as another specimen of his original composition. He argues and thinks like a platonic philosopher.

II.

Divine

nature.

"I would ask thee first one thing. Whether thinkest thou On the that any thing in this world is so good as that it may give us full happiness? I ask this of thee. I do not wish that any false likeness should deceive you and me, instead of the true comfort; for no man can deny that some good must be the most superior. Just as there is some great and deep fountain, from which many brooks and rivers run. Hence men say of some advantages, that they are not complete good, because there is some little deficiency in them, which they are not entirely without. Yet every thing would go to naught, if it had not some good in it.

"From this you may understand, that from the greatest good come the less goods; not the greatest from the less; no more than the river can be the spring and source, though the spring may flow into a river. As the river may return again to the spring, so every good cometh from God, and returns to him; and he is the full and the perfect good; and there is no

94 Alfred, p. 144–146.

95 The reader may compare, with the king's effusion, Boetius, lib. iii. prosa 10.