BOOK V. Alfred's metaphysics. various kinds, and then sowed it with different seeds of trees and herbs. "Grant now, O LORD 86, to our minds that they may ascend to Thee, from the difficulties of this world; that from the occupations here they may come to Thee. With the opened eyes of our mind may we behold the noble fountain of all good! THOU ART THIS. Give us then a healthy sight to our understanding, that we may fasten it upon THEE. Drive away this mist that now hangs before our mental vision, and enlighten our eyes with Thy light. For THOU art the brightness of the true light. Thou art the soft rest of the just. Thou causest them to see it. Thou art the beginning of all things, and their end. Thou supportest all things without fatigue. Thou art the path and the leader, and the place to which the path conducts us. All men tend to THEE."87 ONE of the most curious parts of Alfred's Boetius is his metaphysical reasoning. WHEN he comes to the fifth book, he leaves off translating his author, and indulges his own meditations on chance, free will, the Divine prescience, providence, the perceptions of animals; on the dif ference betwixt human reason and the understanding of angels; and on the Divine nature. THAT an Anglo-Saxon, when his whole nation was so illiterate, and both public and private affairs so disturbed, should attend at all to metaphysical studies is extraordinary; but that Alfred, the king whose life was so embarrassed by disease and warlike tumult, should have had either leisure or inclination to cultivate them, and should have 86 This, which is the best part of the metrum of Boetius, is literally thus: "Grant my mind, O Father! to ascend to thine august seat. Grant it to survey the source of good; grant it, with the attained light, to fix the visible eyes of its intellect on thee. Cast off the clouds and weight of this terrestrial mass, and shine on it in thy splendour; for THOU art serenity; thou art rest to the pious. behold thee is our end, O origin, supporter, leader, path, and termination !" Ibid. To 87 Alfred, p. 77-80. May we not say, without exaggeration, that Alfred has improved upon his original? II. reasoned upon them with so much concise good CHAP. sense as the following extracts will show that he did, is not the least surprising circumstance in his character. But a sagacious judgment attended him in every thing that he attempted. How clearly has Alfred apprehended, and with what congenial enlargement and philosophy of mind has he in his own way stated and condensed the reasoning, more diffused and not so clear, of Boetius, on chance. The sentence in italics is rather implied than expressed, in Boetius. 8. 88 "It is nought when men say that any thing happens by On chance. chance, because every thing comes from some other things or causes, therefore it has not happened from chance; but if it came not from any thing, then it would have occurred from chance.' "Then,' said I, whence first came the name?' Then quoth he, My darling, Aristotle mentioned it in the book that is called Fisica.' Then said I, 'How does he explain it?' He answered, Men said formerly, when any thing happened to them unexpectedly, that this was by chance. As if any one should now dig the earth, and find there a treasure of gold, and should then say that this happened by chance. But yet, I know that if the digger had not dug into the earth, and no man before had hidden the gold there, he would by no means have found it. Therefore it was not found by chance.'" 89 COULD any reasoner have put this philosophical doctrine more correctly or concisely? 90 In the fifth book, we have Alfred's thoughts on the liberty of human actions. They are founded on the suggestions of Boetius 0; but he not only selects from his original what he liked on this subject, and compressed what he found diffused, into a small and expressive compass, but he states it so much in his own manner, as to show that he had 89 Alfred, p. 139. 88 See Boet. lib. v. prosa 1. BOOK On the freedom of the will. Why men have freedom of will. well considered the subject, and has given us his genuine sentiments upon it.— "I would ask thee, whether we have any freedom or any what we should do, or what we should not do? or does power, the Divine pre-ordination or fate compel us to that which we wish? "Then said he, We have much power. There is no rational creature which has not freedom. He that hath reason may judge and discriminate what he should will, and what he should shun; and every man hath this freedom, that he knows what he should will and what he should not will. Yet all rational creatures have not a like freedom. Angels have right judgments, and good will, and all that they desire they obtain very easily, because they wish nothing wrong. But no creature hath freedom and reason, except angels and men. Men have always freedom; and the more of it as they lead their minds towards divine things. But they have less freedom when they incline their minds near to this world's wealth and honours. They have no freedom, when they themselves subject their own wills to the vices; but, so soon as they turn away their mind from good, they are blinded with unwiseness.' " 91 ALL the good sense of this much-agitated discussion seems to be condensed in these clear and forcible passages. ALFRED, instead of translating the subsequent observations of Boetius, has inserted the following questions, and their answers from his own mind. The answer contains an illustration, that strongly shows his own high-mindedness as a king, in loving to have free men in his court. "I said, "I am sometimes very much disturbed.' Quoth he, 'At what?' I answered: "It is at this which thou sayest, that God gives to every one freedom to do evil, as well as good, whichsoever he will; and thou sayest also, that God knoweth every thing before it happens; and thou also sayest, that nothing happens, but that God wills, or consents to it; and thou sayest that it shall all go as he has appointed. Now, I wonder at this: why he should 91 Alfred, p. 140. consent that evil men should have freedom that they may do evil, as well as good, whichsoever they will, when he knew before that they would do evil. "Then quoth he, I may very easily answer thee this remark. How would it now look to you, if there were any very powerful king, and he had no freemen in all his kingdom, but that all were slaves?' "Then said I, ' It would not be thought by me right, nor also reasonable, if servile men only should attend upon him.' "Then quoth he, 'It would be more unnatural, if God, in all his kingdom, had no free creature under his power. Therefore he made two rational creatures free; angels and men. He gave them the great gift of freedom. Hence they could do evil as well as good, whichsoever they would. He gave this very fixed gift, and a very fixed law with that gift to every man unto his end. The freedom is, that man may do what he will; and the law is, that he will render to every man according to his works, either in this world or in the future one; good or evil, whichsoever he doeth. Men may obtain through this freedom whatsoever they will; but they cannot escape death, though they may by good conduct hinder it, so that it shall come later. Indeed, they may defer it to old age, if they do not want good will for good works.' "Then said I, Thou hast well removed that doubt.'" 92 THIS Solution of the difficulty proposed, shows that Alfred was the true king of an English people. He felt from his own great heart, that the Divine Sovereign must prefer to govern freemen rather than slaves; because such were his own sentiments as a king. The force of his answer rested on this noble feeling. If it be derogatory to the dignity of an earthly monarch, to have only slaves for his subjects, how much more unnatural would it be, that the King of kings should have no creatures with free will. THE following passages on the same metaphysical subject are also Alfred's own compositions, which he inserts instead of the reasoning of Boe92 Alfred, p. 141, 142. CHAP. II. BOOK V. On the Divine Foreappointment. tius. They obviously express his own feelings, and investigations, and the arguments by which his doubts were satisfied. — "But I am yet grieved with much more trouble, even to sadness. "What is thy grief about? "It is about the Divine Pre-ordination. Because we heard it, some while since, said, that all shall happen as God, at the beginning, had appointed, and that no man can change it. Now methinketh, that he errs, when he honoureth the good, and also when he punishes the evil; if it be true, that it was so shaped by him, that they cannot do otherwise. We labour unnecessarily when we pray, and when we fast, or give alms, if we have no more merit from it, than those that in all things proceed according to their own will, and run after their bodily pleasures." THE answer begins by a reference to Cicero, whom Boetius had cited for the argument, for which Alfred had substituted his own difficulty. But he deviates immediately into reasoning of his own. "I tell thee, if this be true, we ought to say, that it was an unnecessary commandment in the divine books, that God should order man to forsake evil and do good: and, again, the saying which he expressed, that the more a man laboureth the greater reward he shall receive. I wonder why thou hast forgotten all that we spoke about before. We said before, that the Divine Providence wrought every good and no evil, nor appointed any to be made, nor ever made any; but that indeed we are directed to good. "It is thought evil by common people that He should avenge or punish any one for his evil. "But, did we not also say in this same book, that God had appointed freedom to be given to men, and made them free; and that if they held this freedom well, he would greatly dignify them with everlasting power; and that if they misused this freedom, that he would then punish them with death? "He has appointed, that if they sin in any thing through this freedom, they shall, by penitence, compensate for it, to recover that freedom; and if any of them will be so hard-hearted, |
