criminality of his enterprize, justly apprehensive of its failure, and at the head of a divided, disheartened, impoverished people, could not be a match for all the sovereigns in Christendom, who were to take the field with minds strengthened by the rectitude of their intentions, animated by rational hopes of success, cheered by the unanimity and ardor of the nations whom they led, while they were furnished with resources adequate to every possible emergency. The power of the French was far more formidable last year than it is at present: and yet they were beaten, and their ruler dethroned and exiled. But whatever they have lost in position, or in resources, the allies have gained. We therefore conclude with the enlightened representatives of the allied sovereigns, and a vast majority of the population of their respective countries, that the task of laying Napoleon low in the dust, will not be found difficult— especially if the French people call to mind the benefits which the presence of their king would obviously insure to them.

Were Mr. Whitbread compelled to look Lord Ellenborough in the face with the gospels in his hand, would he declare that he thought all right that has lately been done at Paris, and every thing wrong that has been done at Vienna? Would Sir Francis Burdett, in a similar predicament, allege that Napoleon would be a more beneficent ruler of the French, than Louis? Will any man of common sense say, that the population, the finances, and the general disposition of the French are such, that all the rest of Europe cannot overpower them? Nowhere but here, are Bonaparte's principles justified, his crimes palliated: none but British subjects ever task their ingenuity for arguments in support of his cupidity and usurpations. He alone, of all the declared enemies of Old England, now in existence, has presumed to threaten to invade these islands, and to subject their inhabitants to pillage and slavery; yet, to talk of invading France for the purpose of averting almost any kind or degree of danger, is held by our fastidious morality— our benevolent policy-sufficient to fix an indelible stain on the national character! When but vaguely reported, that some of the conditions of the treaty of Fontainebleau, that were favora

Napoleon, had not been duly fulfilled, ministers were closely questioned, and both houses of parliament harassed with notices and motions day after day; but an ample refuta

tion of our government's having in any way contributed to Napoleon's chagrin-indeed sufficient evidence of no cause of serious complaint having been furnished by any of the allies, soon reached the country; and though it was known that all the more valuable conditions of the treaty of Paris-all those on which the safety and the repose of Europe hinged, had been openly violated by Napoleon, all was profound silence !-We should like to have a change of administration for a short time, were it only to see whether it would not convert the curiosity and loquacity of opposition, into reserve and comparative taciturnity; and whether they would not, in the course of something less than one lunation, allow Napoleon to be, what they know he is, a systematic deceiver with whom they could not treat an incorrigible tyrant, against whom every friend to national independence is bound to lift up his hand. But a wish for any such change is at present vain. Ministers were very firm in their seats when Napoleon reached Paris: and their able management of the war which his mad adventure has occasioned, will render them immoveable.-There seems, by the way, to be somewhat less reason now than there was a week ago, for desiring to see such an experiment made-the party seem to be softening into moderation of their own accord. On voting thanks the other day to the Duke of Wellington, not one of them called the war both unjust and unnecessary. Sir F. Burdett went out of his way only to say, that it was unjust : and Mr. Whitbread contented himself with saying, he did not think it was necessary: so that each was one half more rational than on former occasions-and we congratulate the public on their reformation, however temporary. The story that goes about of Mr. Whitbread's having expressed a wish to have Bonaparte styled a first-rate commander in the very same vote that recorded his signal defeat and disgrace, is perhaps, only a fiction. We have read of the boaster's deeds at Borodino, Leipsic, and Laon, as well as at Waterloo; and really we do not think him the first captain of the age-nor yet the second, or third, or fourth.

This glance at the conduct of parties, has made us lose sight of the question proposed, which was something about a change, not of the administration here, but of the government at Paris. Of the reasons assigned for our being unsuccessful in the pre

ent contest, the extraordinary jealousy of the French of all foreign interference is one. Now we are persuaded that this virtue is, in a great measure, an imputed one. They are not the French, but our orators, who feel so strongly, and express so earnestly, the indignation of the enemy at other nations trying to keep them at home, when they are disposed to make inroads into adjacent countries. On looking back to the events of the last twenty-five years, we see ample reason for concluding, that there is no modern people that can more easily reconcile itself to a hostile visitation, than that of which we speak. La fortune de guerre-même la plus malheureuse, furnishes them only with an opportunity of evincing their proverbial unconcern about the evils of life. At no time when their country has been invaded, have they given signs of a mortification nearly equal to that which our countrymen would have experienced on our soil being polluted by foreign contact; and for this reason, the military ostentation and national vanity of the French, constitute no such powerful and permanent principle of action, as that which is produced by the union of our military pride with the independent feeling which we owe to the uninterrupted possession of valuable civil rights. The only dread now in the minds of the French military seems to be that of the fair chance there is of their being again heartily drubbed at their own doors in the presence of their wives and sweethearts; and the giddy Parisians are known never to fear any thing seriously, except being excluded from the theatres, or overtaken by rain on a holiday.

But not only are the French said to be the only power that can bring about a revolution in their own country; not only will they be prodigiously out of temper, if their territory be invaded, and their capital entered; we must not, we are told, interfere with them in any thing-least of all, in the choice of their form of government, and of their supreme ruler. All this, we conscientiously deny. The allies cannot recede-not solely because their honor is pledged, but because their safety is in danger. Napoleon, whom the immoral Lucien first gave to France, and who has latterly been presented to them by the guilty hands of the perjured Ney, must not continue to be a reproach to the name of royalty. And it would be a species of madness in the allies to leave to the French multitude, the

choice of their own ruler. They might, for aught we know, look at home, and choose the infant Napoleon, or the arch-jacobin Carnot; or they might cast their eyes abroad, and fix on the President Madison, or on some of our radical reformers-any one of whom would be as much to be dreaded, by this country at least, as even Napoleon himself. Nothing that has at any time passed, can justify a deference to the undirected choice of the French On the contrary, their judgment of what would contribute the most even to their own interests, has uniformly been erroneous -the offspring of passion, not of reason. And as for their number, the consideration of that furnishes no good reason for abstaining from interference with them in the choice of a sovereign. It is great, to be sure; but the sum of the numbers of the inhabitants of other countries who are in danger from their machinations, is far greater, and therefore more deserving of consideration.

On the principle of self-preservation, the allies are justified in all they have proposed to do, either to the tyrant or his tools all of whom must abide by the decision of the high tribunal of congregated Europe, whether they like it or not.

The world is too wise to be guided, in a case of this nature, by the abstract reasonings of mere publicists. We must not bind ourselves to act literally and solely upon any principle yet established; for never till now did all Europe, and all its high interests, come at once to be weighed and settled. We must proceed on maxims suited to all imaginable future exigencies; and, regardless of all that can be said or done, try by a strenuous use of the means Providence has put in our power, to promote, substantially, the general welfare-considering well, as we advance, both what the condition of affairs is now, and what it would be best that it should be hereafter. The most desirable condition will obviously be that of secure peace. But this never can be enjoyed, while a mighty monarchy situated almost at the centre of Europe, is under the control of one man, or of a set of men, whose principles are known to be dangerous and their professions hollow. Hence the necessity of having a person of integrity at the head of affairs in France; and of that distribution of general influence, which the allied sove

reigns have proposed as the great and final object of the present struggle.*

Parliament, now on the eve of being prorogued, has been far less occupied in debate since Napoleon's extraordinary usurpation, than most people had expected. Nay, the opposition have contrived much less business for ministers-they have introduced fewer extraneous discussions into either house--not merely than at the commencement of any former war, but during any ordinary session. The reason is obvious. One half of them openly and unreservedly approve of the conduct which the allies are pursuing; while the other, unable any longer "to make the worse appear the better reason," hold themselves bound only not to be quite silent.-Never did this country enter upon any war, with an assent so general and so cordial, on the part of either the people, or the parliament. The London and Westminster reformers have been able to excite no outcry-no murmur-even in the most obscure corner: and the majorities in both houses, on the discussion of the Prince Regent's message, respecting the treaties he had entered into with his Majesty's allies, are great beyond all precedent. But if the war was popular some weeks ago, when there was some chance of Napoleon's first effort being successful; what must it be now, when he has been completely beaten, and compelled to slink back among an astonished incensed people? Mala res, spes multò asperior.

The Catholic claims have been very injudiciously brought under consideration: and, of course, rejected. They ought to be so, since they are palpably extravagant; and since the claimants do not choose to speak of the legislature of the country, on all occasions, in becoming language. But the claims urged by the Catholics will always be extravagant, and they themselves will never employ respectful language towards Parliament,

In the prompt and powerful co-operation of Prussia, we already see the beneficial effects of some of the arrangements made at Vienna. But to whom will the great dispensators of States allot Elba ? Their gratitude, their just discrimination, would be emphatically marked, by offering it above all places on earth, with a title which the Prince Regent cannot give, to the Duke of Wellingtonat length the terror of the abandoned Corsican, as well as of his baffled marshals and generals.