however, indicated that this same balance would be struck regardless of the type of speech involved."

IV

We have never considered whether the Gertz balance obtains when the defamatory statements involve no issue of public concern. To make this determination, we must employ the approach approved in Gertz and balance the State's interest in compensating private individuals for injury to their reputation against the First Amendment interest in protecting this type of expression. This state interest is identical to the one weighed in Gertz. There we found that it was "strong and legitimate." 418 U. S., at 348. A State should not lightly be required to abandon it,

"for, as Mr. Justice Stewart has reminded us, the individual's right to the protection of his own good name

'The dissent states that "[a]t several points the Court in Gertz makes perfectly clear [that] the restrictions of presumed and punitive damages were to apply in all cases." Post, at 785, n. 11. Given the context of Gertz, however, the Court could have made "perfectly clear" only that these restrictions applied in cases involving public speech. In fact, the dissent itself concedes that "Gertz... focused largely on defining the circumstances under which protection of the central First Amendment value of robust debate of public issues should mandate plaintiffs to show actual malice to obtain a judgment and actual damages...." Post, at 777 (original emphasis).

The dissent also incorrectly states that Gertz "specifically held," post, at 779, 793, both "that the award of presumed and punitive damages on less than a showing of actual malice is not a narrowly tailored means to achieve the legitimate state purpose of protecting the reputation of private persons post, at 779, and that "unrestrained presumed and punitive damages were 'unnecessarily' broad... in relation to the legitimate state interests," post, at 793-794. Although the Court made both statements, it did so only within the context of public speech. Neither statement controls here. What was "not . . . narrowly tailored" or was ""unnecessarily' broad" with respect to public speech is not necessarily so with respect to the speech now at issue. Properly understood, Gertz is consistent with the result we reach today.

'reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty. The protection of private personality, like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. . . .' Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U. S. 75, 92 (1966) (concurring opinion)." Id., at 341.

The First Amendment interest, on the other hand, is less important than the one weighed in Gertz. We have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance. It is speech on "matters of public concern""

'This Court on many occasions has recognized that certain kinds of speech are less central to the interests of the First Amendment than others. Obscene speech and "fighting words" long have been accorded no protection. Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 483 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568, 571-572 (1942); cf. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 591–592 (1952) (advocating violent overthrow of the Government is unprotected speech); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 716 (1931) (publication of troopship sailings during wartime may be enjoined). In the area of protected speech, the most prominent example of reduced protection for certain kinds of speech concerns commercial speech. Such speech, we have noted, occupies a “subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values." Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 456 (1978). It also is more easily verifiable and less likely to be deterred by proper regulation. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U. S. 748, 771-772 (1976). Accordingly, it may be regulated in ways that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expression. Ohralik, supra, at 456; Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U. S. 557, 562-563 (1980).

Other areas of the law provide further examples. In Ohralik we noted that there are "[n]umerous examples. . . of communications that are regulated without offending the First Amendment, such as the exchange of information about securities, corporate proxy statements, the exchange of price and production information among competitors, and employers' threats of retaliation for the labor activities of employees." 436 U. S., at 456 (citations omitted). Yet similar regulation of political speech is subject to the most rigorous scrutiny. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U. S. 45, 52-53 (1982); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 279, n. 19

that is "at the heart of the First Amendment's protection." First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 776 (1978), citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 101 (1940). As we stated in Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138, 145 (1983), this "special concern [for speech on public issues] is no mystery":

"The First Amendment 'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 484 (1957); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 269 (1964). [S]peech concerning public affairs is more than selfexpression; it is the essence of self-government.' Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 74-75 (1964). Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the ""highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values," and is entitled to special protection. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U. S. 886, 913 (1982); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 467 (1980).”

In contrast, speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern. Id., at 146-147. As a number of state courts, including the court below, have recognized, the role of the Constitution in regulating state libel law is far more limited when the concerns that activated New York Times and Gertz are absent. In such a case,

(1964); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 14 (1976). Likewise, while the power of the State to license lawyers, psychiatrists, and public school teachers—all of whom speak for a living-is unquestioned, this Court has held that a law requiring licensing of union organizers is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945); see also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U. S. 29, 44 (1971) (opinion of BRENNAN, J.) ("the determinant whether the First Amendment applies to state libel actions is whether the utterance involved concerns an issue of public or general concern").

'As one commentator has remarked with respect to "the case of a commercial supplier of credit information that defames a person applying for

"[t]here is no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-government; and there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of selfcensorship by the press. The facts of the present case are wholly without the First Amendment concerns with which the Supreme Court of the United States has been struggling." Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Ore. 361, 366, 568 P. 2d 1359, 1363 (1977). Accord, Rowe v. Metz, 195 Colo. 424, 426, 579 P. 2d 83, 84 (1978); Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 661, 318 N. W. 2d 141, 153, cert. denied, 459 U. S. 883 (1982).

While such speech is not totally unprotected by the First Amendment, see Connick v. Myers, supra, at 147, its protections are less stringent. In Gertz, we found that the state interest in awarding presumed and punitive damages was not "substantial" in view of their effect on speech at the core of First Amendment concern. 418 U. S., at 349. This interest, however, is "substantial" relative to the incidental effect these remedies may have on speech of significantly less constitutional interest. The rationale of the common-law rules has been the experience and judgment of history that "proof of actual damage will be impossible in a great many cases where, from the character of the defamatory words and the circumstances of publication, it is all but certain that serious harm has resulted in fact." W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 112, p. 765 (4th ed. 1971); accord, Rowe v. Metz, supra, at 425-426, 579 P. 2d, at 84; Note, Developments in the LawDefamation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875, 891-892 (1956). As a result, courts for centuries have allowed juries to presume that some damage occurred from many defamatory utter

credit" the case before us today-"If the first amendment requirements outlined in Gertz apply, there is something clearly wrong with the first amendment or with Gertz." Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1212, 1268 (1983).

ances and publications. Restatement of Torts §568, Comment b, p. 162 (1938) (noting that Hale announced that damages were to be presumed for libel as early as 1670). This rule furthers the state interest in providing remedies for defamation by ensuring that those remedies are effective. In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and punitive damages-even absent a showing of "actual malice.""

V

The only remaining issue is whether petitioner's credit report involved a matter of public concern. In a related context, we have held that "[w]hether . . . speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by [the expression's] content, form, and context. . . as revealed by the whole record." Connick v. Myers, supra, at 147-148.

'The dissent, purporting to apply the same balancing test that we do today, concludes that even speech on purely private matters is entitled to the protections of Gertz. Post, at 786. Its "balance," however, rests on a misinterpretation. In particular, the dissent finds language in Gertz that, it believes, shows the State's interest to be "irrelevant." See post, at 794. It is then an easy step for the dissent to say that the State's interest is outweighed by even the reduced First Amendment interest in private speech. Gertz, however, did not say that the state interest was "irrelevant" in absolute terms. Indeed, such a statement is belied by Gertz itself, for it held that presumed and punitive damages were available under some circumstances. 418 U. S., at 349. Rather, what the Gertz language indicates is that the State's interest is not substantial relative to the First Amendment interest in public speech. This language is thus irrelevant to today's decision.

The dissent's "balance,” moreover, would lead to the protection of all libels-no matter how attenuated their constitutional interest. If the dissent were the law, a woman of impeccable character who was branded a "whore" by a jealous neighbor would have no effective recourse unless she could prove "actual malice" by clear and convincing evidence. This is not malice in the ordinary sense, but in the more demanding sense of New York Times. The dissent would, in effect, constitutionalize the entire common law of libel.