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have had an understanding of the actual intent of Congress than judges who must consider the legal implications of the transaction over half a century after it occurred.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the decision of this case.

JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting.

Section 17 of the Pueblo Lands Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 641-642, provides in full:

"No right, title, or interest in or to the lands of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico to which their title has not been extinguished as hereinbefore determined shall hereafter be acquired or initiated by virtue of the laws of the State of New Mexico, or in any other manner except as may hereafter be provided by Congress, and no sale, grant, lease of any character, or other conveyance of lands, or any title or claim thereto, made by any pueblo as a community, or any Pueblo Indian living in a community of Pueblo Indians, in the State of New Mexico, shall be of any validity in law or in equity unless the same be first approved by the Secretary of the Interior."

This awkward and obscure provision is a striking illustration of the fact that statutory phraseology sometimes is "the consequence of a legislative accident, perhaps caused by nothing more than the unfortunate fact that Congress is too busy to do all of its work as carefully as it should." Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U. S. 73, 97 (1977) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Section 17's opaque language has given rise to not just two conflicting interpretations, but to literally a multitude of proffered readingseach of which attempts to rationalize the ambiguous words, phrases, and clauses and to explain away apparently incon

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sistent or inoperative language, and each of which ultimately fails to meld the language into a coherent whole.' This muddle is perhaps best illustrated by the fluctuating construction given to § 17 by the Department of the Interior over the past 60 years. See infra, at 270–275. And while the Court offers up its own attempt to "harmoniz[e]" the anomalies of § 17, ante, at 252, it must ultimately concede that some aspects of § 17 "remai[n] a puzzle even under [its] interpretation," ante, at 253, n. 27.

I would have thought that the Court, in attempting to drain this statutory bog, would turn naturally to the canons of construction that have governed Indian-law questions for the past two centuries-canons designed specifically to resolve ambiguities in construing provisions such as § 17, and which grow directly out of the federal trust responsibilities that define the conduct of Congress, executive officials, and the courts with respect to Indian tribes. Instead, the Court wholly ignores these canons and boldly pronounces its own revisionist interpretation of the statute that goes far beyond even the Government's current reading. Under the Court's view, Congress intended by § 17 to give the 19 Pueblo Tribes a power possessed by no other Indian tribe-the power to alienate their unalloted tribal lands freely without any restrictions, subject only to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, and without any guidelines respecting the

'See, e. g., Brief for Petitioner 16-32; Brief for Respondent 12-32; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 11-16; Brief for Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. as Amicus Curiae 9–16; Brief for Public Service Co. of New Mexico as Amicus Curiae 11-18; Brief for State of New Mexico as Amicus Curiae 3-7; Brief for Pueblo of Taos as Amicus Curiae 5-21; Brief for Pueblo de Acoma as Amicus Curiae 11-13; Brief for All Indian Pueblo Council et al. as Amici Curiae 7–20.

"See, e. g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206, 225 (1983); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U. S. 681, 684-685 (1942); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17 (1831). See generally F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 220-228 (1982) (Cohen).

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manner, scope, requirements, or timing of the Secretary's supervision.

I dissent. I believe § 17 more plausibly is read simply as an attempt by Congress to reaffirm and clarify the full applicability to the Pueblo Tribes of general federal restraints against alienation of Indian lands and the exceptions thereto. This interpretation better reflects the structure of the Pueblo Lands Act and the spirit in which it was enacted. The Court's interpretation, on the other hand, flies in the face of both the Pueblo Lands Act and of legislation enacted prior to and after the Act; misconstrues the legislative history; overlooks evidence concerning the origins and consistency of the administrative interpretation to which the Court now purports to defer; and flouts the fiduciary relationship owed to Indian tribes and the canons of construction that serve to preserve that relationship.

I

As the Court acknowledges, § 17 must be examined in light of "its contemporary legal context."" Ante, at 252. Alienation of Indian lands, in 1924 as now, was governed by the principles of the Nonintercourse Act, which provides that "[n]o purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution." Congress ceased entering into treaties with Indian tribes in 1871, but the Nonintercourse Act has continued to define the essential characteristics of Indian title in this country: that all questions concerning Indian property are pre-empted by federal law, and that interests in

'Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, § 12, Rev. Stat. § 2116, 25 U. S. C. § 177.

'Appropriations Act of Mar. 3, 1871, § 1, Rev. Stat. § 2079, 25 U. S. C. §71. See also FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U. S. 99, 118-124 (1960).

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Indian lands can be conveyed only pursuant to explicit congressional authorization."

Since 1871, Congress has permitted interests in unallotted Indian lands to be conveyed in two ways: first, through specific statutes authorizing alienation of particular tribal lands; and second, through general statutes authorizing the transfer of limited interests in Indian lands subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. A number of statutes in this second category were enacted at the end of the 19th century and early in the 20th century, and authorized such limited conveyances as leases for farming, grazing, and oil, gas, and mineral development; rights-of-way for highways, railways, and utilities; and sales of timber.' These statutes typically placed strict limits on the Secretary's authority by, inter alia, prescribing the price and term of years for which interests could be conveyed, providing for the collection of special taxes and royalties for the benefit of the affected tribes, placing restrictions on the geographic scope of conveyances, establishing procedural safeguards for the tribal owners, and requiring the promulgation of rules and regulations by which the Secretary would exercise his authority.

'See, e. g., Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 667–670 (1974); United States ex rel. Hualpai Indians v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co., 314 U. S. 339, 347 (1941). See generally Cohen 510-522.

'See id., at 516, and nn. 48-51; id., at 517 (summarizing legislation). 'See, e. g., Act of Feb. 28, 1891, §3, 26 Stat. 795, 25 U. S. C. § 397 (grazing and mining leases); Act of Aug. 15, 1894, § 1, 28 Stat. 305, 25 U. S. C. § 402 (farming leases); Act of Mar. 2, 1899, § 1, 30 Stat. 990, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 312 (railroad, telephone, and telegraph rights-ofway); Act of Mar. 3, 1901, §3, 31 Stat. 1083, 25 U. S. C. § 319 (telephone and telegraph rights-of-way); Act of Mar. 11, 1904, §§ 1, 2, 33 Stat. 65, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 321 (pipelines); Act of Mar. 3, 1909, 35 Stat. 781, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 320 (reservoirs); Act of June 25, 1910, § 7, 36 Stat. 857, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 407 (timber sales); Act of June 30, 1919, § 26, 41 Stat. 31, as amended, 25 U. S. C. § 399 (oil and gas leases); Act of May 29, 1924, 43 Stat. 244, 25 U. S. C. § 398 (mining leases).

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Congress had extended the Nonintercourse Act to the Territory of New Mexico in 1851, but from shortly after the Civil War until 1910, the territorial courts, sustained by this Court, barred application of the Act to the Pueblos on the grounds that they were not really "Indians." See, e. g., United States v. Joseph, 94 U. S. 614 (1877); United States v. Lucero, 1 N. M. 422 (1869). As the Court subsequently conceded, however, this interpretation was erroneous: with respect to "the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands," the Pueblos always have been "Indians in race, customs, and domestic government" and "like reservation Indians in general." United States v. Sandoval, 231 U. S. 28, 38-39, 41 (1913). Accordingly, the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that the Pueblos have the same status as all other federally recognized Indian tribes and that the 1851 Act clearly and fully extended the Nonintercourse Act to them."

In order to reassert its authority over the Pueblos, Congress in the New Mexico Enabling Act of June 20, 1910, provided as a condition for statehood that "all lands... owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes . . . shall be and remain subject to the . . . absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United States," and that "the terms 'Indian' and 'Indian country' shall include the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and the lands now owned or occupied by them." 10

Act of Feb. 27, 1851, §7, 9 Stat. 587: "[A]ll the laws now in force regulating trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, or such provisions of the same as may be applicable, shall be, and the same are hereby, extended over the Indian tribes in the Territories of New Mexico and Utah."

'See, e. g., United States v. Chavez, 290 U. S. 357, 360-365 (1933); Pueblo of Santa Rosa v. Fall, 273 U. S. 315, 320–321 (1927); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432, 439-443 (1926).

10 Act of June 20, 1910, § 2, 36 Stat. 559, 560. See also N. M. Const., Art. XXI, § 2 (adopted Jan. 21, 1911) ("The people inhabiting this state do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and title. . . to all lands lying within said boundaries owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes, the right or title to which shall have been acquired through the