JER, 第 4 卷Hanyang Economic Research Institute in collaboration with Hanyang University College of Business and Economics, 1999 |
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第 1 到 3 筆結果,共 20 筆
第 87 頁
... contract renegotiation may prevent two parties from signing an otherwise efficient contingent contract . JEL Classification : Transaction Cost ( D23 ) , Contract Law ( K12 ) , Transactional Relations ( L14 ) 1 Introduction What ...
... contract renegotiation may prevent two parties from signing an otherwise efficient contingent contract . JEL Classification : Transaction Cost ( D23 ) , Contract Law ( K12 ) , Transactional Relations ( L14 ) 1 Introduction What ...
第 88 頁
... contract . This paper attempts to provide a simple analytical framework in which this trade - off can be studied . Consider a simple procurement problem that ... contract renegotiation is cost- 88 Contingent versus Noncontingent Contracts.
... contract . This paper attempts to provide a simple analytical framework in which this trade - off can be studied . Consider a simple procurement problem that ... contract renegotiation is cost- 88 Contingent versus Noncontingent Contracts.
第 94 頁
... contract in which Ph ( Ch + W ) / fh ( WL ) and P1 = − ( W1 – L3 ) satisfies both the seller's incentive constraint ... contracts , the liability ( W ) that the 94 Contingent versus Noncontingent Contracts.
... contract in which Ph ( Ch + W ) / fh ( WL ) and P1 = − ( W1 – L3 ) satisfies both the seller's incentive constraint ... contracts , the liability ( W ) that the 94 Contingent versus Noncontingent Contracts.
內容
Takamitsu Sawa | 5 |
Richard G Sheehan and Mark Wohar Tax Rates | 11 |
Sudipto Dasgupta Andrew J Yates Optimality and Lindahl Equilibrium | 37 |
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abatement cost assume assumption buyer coefficient constraint consumption cost function decreases default probabilities demogrant effects equation equilibrium ERSITY estimates ex post efficient ex post incentive ex post individually exists expenditure firms follows Gresik Hanyang University high-skilled workers incentive compatible incentive efficient mechanism income tax income taxation increases independent of valuations industrial zone inflation Journal of Economic Korea labor supply land rents land value tax Lemma Lindahl Lindahl equilibrium mechanism coordinator municipal bond negative money-supply shock noncontingent contract optimal income optimal tax output parameters percent positive post incentive efficient post individually rational premia price discrimination price vector production profit R&D intensity recovery rate renegotiation residential risk averse risk premium SAN DIEGO seller Seoul steel industry supply shocks Table tax rate Theorem trade unskilled workers valuation wage rate wage tax x(SL yields zero