rejects every thing, as fquaring with, or proving contrary to them a; is only fitted to mix and confound Things with Words, Reafon with Madness, and the World with Fable and Fiction; but not to interpret the Works of Nature.

APHORISM VI.

He who does not blend together, and bring into a Mass, all the vulgar Diftinctions of Things, and their Names, cannot perceive the Unity of Nature, nor obferve the true Lines of Things; and, of course, cannot interpret.

APHORISM VII.

He who has not in the first Place, and above every thing else, throughly examined the Motions of the human Mind; and with the utmoft Accuracy noted, and made a kind of Map of the Paths of Science, and the Seats of Error therein, will find all Things under a Mask, or as it were enchanted; and unless he breaks the Charm, can never interpret c.

APHORISM VIII.

He who only is vers'd in difcovering the Caufes of obvious and compounded Things, fuch as Flame, Dreams, Fevers, &c. but has no recourfe to fimple Natures; and first to thofe that are fuch in popular Efteem; then to thofe which are artificially reduced, and as it were fublim'd to a truer Simplicity; may perhaps, if he otherwife errs not, make fome tolerable Additions (bordering upon Difcoveries) to the Things already known: but will have no Success in conquering the inveterate and general Prejudices of the Age; and cannot be call'd an Interpreter d.

Is not this the Manner wherein Philofophers generally proceed?

APHORISM

Viz. He who does not obliterate, or as it were annihilate, in his Mind the vulgar Notions and Terms, which are feldom juft, precife and adequate, cannot perceive the Harmony and Confent of Things; nor obferve their true Differences, or Lines of Separation; after the Manner that one Country is diftinguished and feparated from another in Maps.

He who does not understand Mens Prejudices, Opinions, Kinds and Degrees of Knowledge, Errors, &c. can never remove, alter, improve, or redrefs them; and unlefs he finds a Way of entering and convincing the Mind of its Errors, falfe Notions, Superftitions, and Delufions, he can never greatly improve and increase the Mafs of found and ferviceable Knowledge.

The modern Improvements in the Subject of Light, may illuftrate this Aphorifm: For till Light was analyfed, or refolved, from its naturally compounded State, into fimpler Parts, or Rays of different Colours; no very great Difcovery was made therein. So that Sir Ifaac Newton, in this refpect, may be call'd the Interpreter; and be faid to have conquer'd the Prejudices that formerly prevail'd about the Doctrine of Light,

APHORISM IX.

He who would come duly prepared, and fitted, to the Business of Interpretation, must neither be a Follower of Novelty, Custom, nor Antiquity; nor indulge himself a Liberty of contradicting; nor fervilely follow Authority. He must neither be hafty in affirming, nor loofe and fceptical in doubting; but raife up Particulars to the Places affign'd them by their Degree of Evidence and Proof. His Hope must encourage him to labour, and not to reft; he must not judge of Things by their uncommon Nature, their Difficulty, or their high Character; but by their just Weight and Ufe. He must, in his own Particular, carry on his View with Concealment ; and yet have a due Regard for Pofterity. He must prudently obferve the first Entrance of Errors into Truths, and of Truths into Errors; without defpifing or admiring any thing. He must understand his own Talents and Abilities, or the Advantages of his own Nature. He must comply with the Nature of others. He muft, as with one Eye, furvey the Natures of Things, and have the other turn'd towards human Ufes b. He must diftinctly understand the mix'd Nature of Words; which is extremely capable both of prejudicing and affifting. He must lay it down to himself, that the Art of difcovering will grow up, and improve, along with Difcoveries themfelves. He must not be vain either in delivering or concealing the Knowledge he has acquired; but ingenuous and prudent; and communicate his Inventions without Pride or Ill-nature: and this in a strong and lively Manner, well defended against the Injuries of Time, and fit for the Propagation of Knowledge, without occafioning Errors; and, which is the principal Thing of all, it must be fuch as may felect and chufe for itself a prepared and fuitable Reader c.

APHORISM X.

The Interpreter thus qualified, should proceed in this Manner. He must first confider the State of Mankind; next remove the Obftacles in the Way of his Interpretation; and then, coming directly to the Work, prepare a History and regular Setts of Tables of Invention;

Shew

The Author explains the Meaning hereof, fo far as he thought neceffary, under Part I. Sect. VII. of the following Piece.

D

• Viz. The Ufes of Life, and the Service of Mankind in general.

If the Reader, therefore, fhould be fhocked, difgufted, or unentertained with the following Piece, he may please to examine himself, Whether he be of the Number of thofe for whom it was defign'd.

Shew the Ufes thereof, their Relations, Dependencies, and Subferviency to each other. He must reprefent how little real and ferviceable Knowledge Mankind is poffefs'd of; and how all juft Enquiry into Nature has been neglected. He must ufe Choice and Judgment in Jingling out and giving the first Place to juch Subjects of Enquiry, as are most fundamental or important; that is, fuch as have a principal Tendency to the Difcovery of other Things, or elfe to fupply the Neceffities of Life. He must likewife obferve the Prebeminency of Inftances; which is a Thing that greatly conduces to shorten the Work. And when thus provided, he muft again renew his Enquiries, draw out fresh Tables, and now, with a greater Ripeness of Knowledge, more fuccessfully enter upon, and perfect the Business of Interpretation: which will thus become eafy, and follow, as it were, fpontaneously; fo as in a manner to be feasonably anticipated by the Mind. And when he has done this, he will directly fee and enumerate, in a pure and native Light, the true, eternal, and most fimple Motions of Nature; from the regular and exact Progress whereof proceeds all that infinite Variety of the Universe. In the mean time, he nuft not, from the very Beginning of the Work, omit, with Affiduity, to obferve and fet down, many new and unknown Things, for the Service of Mankind; as it were in the Way of Interest, 'till they receive the Principal. And afterwards, being wholly intent upon the Discovery of human Ufesa, and the State of Things then prefent, he will regulate and difpofe all in a different Manner för Practice; affigning to the most fecret and hidden Natures, others that are explanatory thereof; and fuch as are fuperinducing to thofe that are most abfent. And thus at length he will, like another Nature, form fuck general Axioms of all Knowledge, Works, and Effects, as shall rarely err; and if they should, thefe Errors will appear but as Monsters in Nature, and yet leave the Art, by which they were found, unviolated in its Prerogative.

In this aphoriftical Manner, the Author proceeds thro' the Whole of the following Piece; which is no more than a continued String of Aphorifms; or fummary Expreffions of pure Matter of Science, in fimple

See above, Aph. IX.
Properties fuppofe.

Viz. Be enabled to give the Properties of one Body to another; or introduce Properties where they were not: As, to give an incombuftible Property to Wood; Inflammability to Water; Transparency to Metals; Malleability to Glafs; the Colour and Gravity of Gold to Silver, &c. which are at prefent esteem'd Things either impoffible or impracticable.

fimple Language, without foreign Ornament; and upon the footing of competent Experience and Obfervation. Hence aphoriftical Writings are rich and pregnant Things, capable of being unfolded, explained, illuftrated, and deduced into great Variety. Yet an Aphorifm differs from an Axiom; as a true and perfect Axiom is incapable of farther Improvement; but an Aphorifm ftill improvable: So that Aphorifms are a kind of imperfect Axioms, that ought to point and lead up to the perfect. And as Aphorifms thus approach to Axioms; we should not despair of raising an Axiomatical Philosophy upon the Strength of the following Sett.

INTRO

INTRODUCTION.

I.

T

:

HEY who confidently or magifterially pronounce State of the of Nature, as of a Thing already difcover'd, have ancient Phihighly injured Philofophy and the Sciences; and had lofophies. the Succefs, not only to enforce a Belief, but to ftop farther Enquiry. Others, whether from an Averfion to the ancient Sophifts, Inftability of Mind, or too large a Measure of Knowledge, affert, that nothing is knowable, and produce no defpicable Reafons for their Opinion; tho' they do not derive it from its true Principles and being carried away with Zeal and Affectation, they have exceeded all Bounds. The ancient Greeks, whofe Writings are loft, wifely held a middle Way, between the Arrogance of the former, and the Defpondency of the latter and tho' they were frequently complaining of the Difficulty of Enquiries, and the Darkness wherein Things are wrapp'd; yet they kept on their Courfe, tho' they champ'd the Bit; without lofing Sight of Nature; as if refolved not to difpute, but to try whether any thing were knowable 2. Yet even these, ufing only the Effort of the naked Understanding, did not apply the Rule; but placed all Things in Subtlety of Thought, and Fluctuation of the Mind.

2. The Thing we propofe, is to fettle the Degrees of Certainty; to Defign of the guard the Senfe by a kind of Reduction; generally to reject that Work Work. of the Mind which is confequent to Senfe; and to open and prepare a new and certain Way for the Mind, from the immediate Perceptions of the Senfes. And thus much was, doubtlefs, intended by those who have fo highly magnified the Art of Logic: which plainly fhews they fought for fome Affiftances to the Understanding; and held the natural Procedure, and fpontaneous Motion of the Mind fufpect. But this Remedy came too late, after the Mind was poffeffed, and polluted by Cuftoms, Le

a See hereafter, Sea. IV.

b Viz. By contriving Ways of fubmitting Things, in a proper manner, to the Senfes; that a true Judgment may be formed of them, when thus again brought under View.

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&ures,