| 1815 - 892 頁
...correspondent, consistently with his own principles, supposes, that in the interval of nearly seven years, between the making of the will and the death of the testator, alterations should have been made; and particularly, that as one son's capital had received a considerable... | |
| United States. Supreme Court - 1830 - 584 頁
...Virginia at the time when the present will took effect, (it having been repealed by the legislature between the making of the will and the death of the testator), it becomes a material inquiry, how far the jurisdiction and doctrines of the court of chancery respecting... | |
| New Jersey. Court of Chancery - 1896 - 776 頁
...also, between a lapsed and a void devise. In the former case the devisee dies in the intermediate time between the making of the will and the death of the testator, but in the latter case the devise is void from the beginning, as if the devisee be dead when the will... | |
| James Kent - 1830 - 556 頁
...brfirrrrn a lapsed and a void devise. In the former case, the devisW dies in the intermediate time between the making of the will and the death of the testator ; but, in the latter case, the devise is void from the beginning, as if the devisee be dead when the... | |
| 1871 - 982 頁
...death of the testator, there is an interval of only five years, bnt I have had many cases in which, between the making of the will and the death of the testator, there has boen an interval of twenty or thirty years. A man may add a great deal to an estate during... | |
| Great Britain. Court of Chancery, James William Mylne, Benjamin Keen (Reporter) - 1835 - 898 頁
...death of the testator, and is confined to the children then living. The words " may be born," provided for the birth of children between the making of the will and the death. The cases of Sprackling v. Ranier, and Ringrose v. BramJiam are direct authorities to this point. To... | |
| William Robert Augustus Boyle - 1837 - 646 頁
...not a lapsed legacy. A legacy is said to be lapsed where the devisee dies in the intermediate period between the making of the will and the death of the testator; but here the only existing person, capable of taking under this description in the will at the time... | |
| 1838 - 626 頁
...born after the testator's death are not entitled, the words " may be born" applying to the interval between the making of the will and the death of the testator. Starrs v. licnbou-, 1 Law J. (NS) Chanc. 201, sc 2 M. & K. 46. A testator bequeaths his residuary personal... | |
| 1852 - 632 頁
...not take any benefit under the will. He expressly stated, in fact, that the words " may be born " are to provide for the birth of children between the making of the will and the death. The question did not arise, whether the codicil gave any interests to children existing at the time... | |
| Thomas Jarman - 1844 - 820 頁
...but in contemplation of the possible event of its being reduced to a single object in the interval between the making of the will and the death of the testator. It is submitted, therefore, that the cases of Swaine v. Kennerley, and Hart v. Durand, may be considered... | |
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