1877 Dec. 4. "to the terms and covenants and conditions in the said indenture "fully described." The indenture of 18th June 1869 here referred to does not appear to have been produced at the trial, and is not on the record. What it was we do not know. But it seems plains that money advanced on the security of that indenture could not, without more, be substantial consideration for the beneficial lease of 1870. For the recovery of the alleged balance of twelve thousand six hundred and fifty rupees the defendants must be content to rest on the foundation of the indenture of June 1869, whatever that is worth, unless they can shew that the lease upon which they now rely was substituted for it in such a manner, and under such circumstances as could serve to bind the plaintiffs. This they do not attempt to do. The allegation that the guardians were unable to carry on the cultivation of the estate does not disclose any valuable consideration for the lease, but only affords a reason why they, the guardians, should let the estate instead of keeping it in hand. Neither does the bare fact, if true, of their having no funds or income sufficient for the maintenance of the minors help the defence, because the lessees do not undertake to advance money for this purpose; and it is only from the rent received that the maintenance is to be derived, The District Judge in his judgment says "he is inclined to "think that the proceedings in the testamentary case show that "there was an urgent necessity for an advance of money, the pro"ceedings taken for sequestration by Pallaneappa Chetty prove "that if the widows had not entered into some such arrangement as they did, the estate would have been torn in pieces by "creditors, and lost to the children altogether." We do not know to what extent, if at all, the facts disclosed and the evidence given on the former proceedings referred to, were taken to be admitted as between the parties to the present suit. The record is silent on this point. But the defendants do not themselves pretend that there were any other advances made by them as consideration for the making of this lease than those represented by the outstanding balance of twelve thousand six hundred and fifty rupees secured on the footing of the indenture of 1869, and they do not make any suggestion that the lease granted to them was for the purpose of saving the estate from the hands of the creditors. Indeed it is extremely difficult to see how it could have been a means to that end. By granting the lease, the lessors did not become better able than they were before to pay off existing liabilities on the estate except to the extent of the rent received, which was not, as appears by the recitals of the lease itself a full cultivating rent. And we find nowhere any hint of any arrangement by which cre ditors, third parties, were barred of right of recourse to the property. On the whole of the case we are of opinion that the lease which the plaintiffs impeach was such a dealing with the plaintiffs' (who were all the time minors) interests in the subject of the lease, as the lessors had no legal power to effect, and that the defendants have established no ground upon which they can be allowed to hold the lease as security for the payment of the twelve thousand five hundred and sixty rupees, balance of alleged advances, or of any other sum. The judgment of the District Court must, therefore, be set aside, the lease declared invalid and inoperative as against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs must recover possession of their shares of the estate from the defendants, with costs up to date, and the following account must be taken :— First, of monies received by way of rent to the use of the plaintiffs with simple interest at 9 per cent on each payment. Second, of annual profits made by defendants from the usufruct of the estate after allowing all reasonable and necessary expenditure actually incurred, with interest on each annual amount at 9 per cent simple interest. Decree to be given for the balance of these two accounts according to the side on which it appears to stand. 1877 Dec. 4: December, 5th. C. R. Kandy, 4533. Van Langenberg for appellant. The court held as follows : Plaintiff claims Rs. 41.69 being the estimated value of ser- Liability of vices due from defendant in assisting at the repairs of the wall of tenants of the dewale. The commissioner non-suited plaintiff on the ground dewalagama that defendant is only jointly liable with the other holders of land lands. under the dewale. The Supreme Court however is of opinion that defendant is liable to be sued alone in respect of his services the value of which will have to be established in evidence. 1877 Dec. 6. No court of justice ought to allow it self to be put in motion by any other person than of December, 6th. Present:-PHEAR, C. J. In the matter of Inspector A. Sourjah of Galle against Deonis Matara. The following order of PHEAR, C. J., explains the facts of the case : This matter presents some peculiar features, and calls for, I the parties think, some comment from the court. themselves or their quali On the 6th August 1877, Inspector A. Sourjah as complaified agents in nant presented two plaints in the Police Court at Galle namely a open court; plaint, and every at- (a) charging one Deonis with the theft of 1 dessert knife, tempt to in- 1 small pair of scissors and two lead pencils, the property of the fluence or to Oriental Hotel at Galle, value Rs. 2.50. call to ac count a judge of any degree for his judicial acts by private or official correspondence, is in a high degree reprehensible, and may amount (b) charging one Carolis Appu with theft of a jet sleeve link, the property of Mr. A. Mitchell value 50 cents. The Police Magistrate refused to issue summons on these plaints for a reason which he endorsed upon them : 8th August, summons refused. (a) A J. P. enquiry is pending, No. 17285 for the theft of the property. (b) 8th August 1877. Summons refused. A J. P. enquiry is pending No. 17288 for the theft of the property: Upon this apparently an irregular correspondence took place to contempt between the Superintendent of Police, Galle, and the Police Magisof court. trate. The Superintendent of Police then communicated with the Inspector General of Police at Colombo and through him with the Queen's Advocate, who rightly advised (in a letter addressed to the Inspector General of Police on the 23rd August) "that the "proper course for a complainant to pursue when à Police Magistrate "refuses to entertain his plaint is to appeal to the Supreme Court." With a view probably to obtaining an opportunity of taking the course thus advised with reference to the Magistrate's order of the 8th August, notwithstanding that the time for appeal as against it has elapsed, Inspector Sourjah as complainant on the 28th August, again presented a repetition of plaint (a) bearing even the old date 6th August. Upon this on the same day the Magistrate endorsed the following order: "28 August. Referred to original decision on "8th August, as I think this is a repetition of the plaint "formerly rejected on the 8th August to which order was made "and on record." "If complainant is dissatisfied with the order of court on "that plaint, he had his right of appeal. The second application "while the J. P. case is still pending is most improper and a most "wrongful waste of the Magistrate's time." Two days latter, i. e. on the 30th August, the Superintendent of Police sent the Police Magistrate the following letter. No. 1731. The Police Magistrate Galle. Sir, I have the honor to forward the accompanying Petition of appeal and to request that it may be transmitted to the Hon'ble the Supreme Court. I am &c, S. D. Graham S. P. S. P. And a lengthy petition of appeal, purporting to be the petition of Inspector Sourjah to the Supreme Court and complaining of the Magistrate's refusal to issue summons on the plaint, presented by him on the 28th, seems to have acccompanied, or been enclosed in, the letter. It is plain that it was improper on the part of the Superintendent to interfere in the matter by letter as he did, or even otherwise personally. The petitioner Inspector Sourjah ought to have made his application to the Police Court in regular course. The Magistrate would have been justified in declining to treat judicially an application thus irregularly made and ought to have done so. However the Magistrate unfortunately did not do so, but following the bad example set to him, himself wrote back to the Superintendent of Police a formal letter declining to receive the petition and giving reasons founded on the merits of the case for not receiving it. Thereupon on the 1st September, the Superintendent of Police sent a letter to the Registrar of the Supreme Court, of which the following is the first passage. I have the honor to solicit the favor of your kindly submitting the accompanying petition of appeal to the Hon'ble the Judges of the Supreme Court, and trust that I may be permitted further to submit the annexed copies of correspondence which will I hope explain the case. The remainder of the correspondence is with the Inspector General of Police at Colombo. However if you consider it necessary for reference, I will apply for it to be sent to you. And the petition of Inspector Sourjah which the Magistrate declined to receive acccompanied this letter. If it was merely intended to procure that the matter of this appeal, notwithstanding the Magistrate's refusal to forward it, should be brought before the Supreme Court for judicial determination, then plainly the Superintendent of Police thus repeated in respect to the Supreme Court the impropriety of which he had previously been guilty towards the Police Conrt with considerable aggravation. The 1877. Dec. 6. 1877 Dec. 6. judges of the Supreme Court, however, at first misled by the Superintendent of Police's letter and his reference to a mass of correspondence, understood him to desire to submit to them for advice or for a formal adjustment a matter of difference between himself and the Police Magistrate, and as a step towards effecting a settlement they thought it right to send to the Police Magistrate the papers which the Registrar had received from the Superintendent of Police and to request him to be good enough to report thereon. This the Magistrate did very fully in a letter to the Registrardated the 10th September. Various circumstances after this time concurred, to prevent the judges from giving immediate attention to this matter, lying as it appeared to do outside the regular judicial business of the Court, and it was only quite recently that it was discovered how entirely the action taken by the Superintendent of Police had disguised its true character. On this state of facts, it has been thought best that Sourjah's petition of appeal should be treated as if it were now come before. the Court in due course on an application for leave to present the appeal directly, instead of through the Police Court, and this day has been fixed for the hearing of the application, of which notice has been given to the petitioner. Meanwhile however, viz., on the 7th September, the charge of theft against Deonis was repeated by Inspector Sourjah and a conviction obtained. There remains then now no action to be taken on the appeal, even if admitted, and therefore no necessity for our determining the question raised in the petition of appeal in regard to the exercise of the Magistrate's judicial discretion in refusing to issue process. I therefore say nothing as to whether he was justified in law or not. But plainly the steps which have led up to this application have been from beginning to end irregular. Neither the police court nor any other court of justice ought to allow itself to be put in motion by or to listen to any other person than the parties themselves, or their qualified agents in open court. Courts of justices are to be put in motion by a regular prescribed method of proceeding in public, and every attempt to influence or to call to account a judge of any degree for his judicial acts by private or official correspondence is in a high degree reprehensible and may indeed amount to contempt of court. Disregard of this rule, as this case abundantly exemplifies, may give rise to much unseemliness, and besides opens the door to very great mischief. In favor of the poor and weak against the wealthy and strong, this court will sometimes, though even then with caution, treat a petition made directly by the petitioner himself, through the post, as if |