Refinement of feeling, said Charles, results from the process of mind in pursuits distinct from mere sensation. Expansion of intellect therefore produces refinement in the affections, elevation in the devotional feeling, and the most extended benevolence.

Motives of benevolence and piety, a sense of duty, and literary, scientific and religious knowledge, greatly accelerate the progress of the mind towards spirituality. Whatever calls off the attention of the mind from mere sensation or the pleasures nearly allied to it, contributes to its progressive refinement,' and approximation to the beatitude of etherial nature.

CONVERSATION VII.

On the Moral Responsibility of Man, and the Liberty of Human Actions.

IN considering man as a moral agent,

said Charles, or as a being responsible for his actions, we must contemplate him as possessing mental faculties peculiarly distinct from animal nature. The power and vividness of perceptions received through the medium of the senses, directing the judgment, determining the will, and influencing the action, does not constitute the essential difference between man and inferior animals; since those are in some degree susceptible of similar impressions, as is evident from observations upon common domestic animals; many of whom possess judgment sufficient to enable them to deduce probable consequences of present actions from remembrance of the past,

according to previous impressions on the memory. Their power of discrimination may, in many instances, be discerned, but only as applicable to their present, never to their future good. Man alone possesses the privilege of considering actions in reference to futurity-of investigating their nature, and inferring their probable consequences-of discerning the intimate and necessary union between cause and effect of deciding on the merit or demerit of actions, according to their utility, the degree of approbation they excite, or the moral degradation or turpitude which occasioned them. Hence it appears from the light of reason and nature, that man alone is a moral, responsible agent ; since he alone possesses capacities which enable him to regulate his actions, according to their tendency, to promote his future good.

The moral responsibility of man, said the Vicar, renders every action a point of serious moment, because it is one ip a chain which will convey its effect to futurity. This consideration demonstrates the vast importance of moral conduct; as a deviation from virtue, rectitude, and propriety, not only affects the present, but has a necessary connexion with and influence upon the future.

Man, in his probationary state, said Charies, is surrounded with innumerable incitements to evil. The passions and propensities of his material nature require the constant regulation and direction of his intellectual. The strength of mind which produces virtue is not acquired instantaneously, but proceeds from gradual, progressive and assiduous culture. The constitution of our frame, and the laws of our nature, will not admit the sudden impartation of principles that demand the previous process of the understanding in the attainment of distinct and appropriate ideas of the nature and real and essential properties which constitute moral good and evil.

The desire to attain virtue, mental elevation and extensive knowledge, may, from a lively perception of their utility, and a strong conviction of their necessity to happiness, and even to respectability in this life, be in a moment inspired; but this attainment can only be by regular and progressive steps, according to the constitution and laws of our nature in every other respect. The desire occasions attention to the means; the means, steadily pursued, lead to the end. In every degree of progress in mental culture, the inseparable union between cause and

effect exists; as independantly of the cause, the effect cannot, in any instance, be produced.

This evinces, said Sir Edward, the importance and imperious necessity of mental culture, in producing moral virtue and giving strength and solidity to motives which from the power of habit frequently operate upon the mind, unconnected with deliberation, and sometimes even without its consciousness.

The progress of a moral agent in virtue, said Charles, is in exact proportion to the improvement, establishment, and ascendancy of virtuous principles and habits. The more direct, constant, and uncontroulable the influence of these principles and affections upon the choice, the less inclination and the less power there is to resist the feelings of benevolence, piety, justice, and truth.'

Elevation of moral conduct therefore evidently proceeds from elevation of moral principles. It is consequently of the highest importance to youth, that they should early acquire exalted and ennobling principles of action, which may direct their minds, influence their conduct, elevate