Instinctive actions, said William, if any may with propriety be so denominated, are those to which the mind is as if were imperiously incited, without any previous deliberation or inducement to a particular determination, but influenced by the circumstance or incident of the moment; as for instance, in seeing a child fall, the hand is intuitively extended, impelled by an involuntary motive, or a sensation of humanity which incites the action. This, being neither a voluntary or deliberate action proceeding from an act of judgment or chain of reasoning, nor a compulsory action, or one performed in consequence of an obligatory duty to obey the will of another, may be properly stiled an instinctive or natural action. This necessarily leads to an enquiry into what is denominated the moral sense; but for the sake of regularity, we will proceed to examine the nature of compulsory actions, or those which we are obligated to perform in compliance with the will of others.

Compulsory actions, said Charles, may be divided into those which proceed from the duty of religious or moral obligation, the duty of civil subordination, and of coercion or positive compulsion. Man being acknowledged 'a religious

animal,' must have religious inducements to action, or intuitive feelings which impel him to seek after the attainment of some good, by the worship of some object capable of bestowing it. How far man, unaided by any light but that which he possesses in himself, or derives from the circumstances in which he is placed or the objects around him, is able to judge to whom his sense of religious obligation is to be directed, may be learnt from the history of mankind. But at present our attention is not called to religious subjects: we are merely considering man as a moral agent, incited to action by the principles on which the constitution of his mind is founded, to ascertain the basis of the laws of the moral world, that we may be enabled to form a better judgment of the principles of political institutions or the nature and advantages which result from the obligations of civil subordination.

Compulsory actions, said Sir Edward, as considered in reference to moral obligation, leads us to enquire what ideas are implied by the term.

Obligation, said William, properly signifies being bound to perform particular actions, or to avoid something prohibited. Obligation relates

to some principle or principles which are considered as laws to be obeyed; according to which actions are to be performed, certain dispositions to be cherished, and others to be avoided. It implies what is necessary to be done in order to obtain a certain end, a due sense of propriety.' 'Obedience or conformity to the commands of another, assumes the character of duty. Duty respects that species of obligation which is due to another, and implies a conformity to his injunctions or his interests;' in which sense we may consider those compulsory actions of moral obligation which proceeds from the duty of parental obedience and of attention to legal institutions.

The duty of civil subordination, said Sir Edward, is entailed upon every man on his entrance into society, and delegated to his offspring with their rights and privileges. It is of imperious obligation, as it is necessary to the support, protection and well-being of every civil institution.

Those compulsory actions which result from the necessity of obedience to legal establishments arise from restrictions essential to the happiness of society, and the protection of individuals in

the secure possession of their property, rights and privileges.

The absolute rights of man originate in the natural liberty of mankind."

The social and relative rights of man, result from and are posterior to the formation of states and societies.'

'

It is not necessary for us to treat of the diversified rights of men, either personal or real, original or adventitious; as this enquiry would lead us to the more profound mazes of political science; and we only proposed to glance at the elementary parts, to discern its connexion with the fundamental principles of moral obligation, or the intimate union of morality with politics.

CONVERSATION II.

On the Fundamental Principles of Moral

Obligation.

HAVING, said Sir Edward, made some

remarks upon the nature of actions, we may now consider the principles from which they proceed.

The principles of the mind, said Charles, which incite to action, are different in different men, and even in the same man at different periods of his life. Every action, in a greater or less degree, proceeds from various modifications of the two grand influential principles, Benevolence, and Selfishness. Benevolence is the most exalted, refined and ennobling spring of action, approximating man by the elevation of mind and corresponding conduct inpires, toward the