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before trial or sentencing or pending appeal in a court

of the United States, and any judge of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions or Superior Court,

and

"(2) the term 'offense' means any criminal offense, other than an offense triable by court-martial, military commission, provost court, or other military tribunal, which is in violation of any Act of Congress and is triable by any court established by Act of Congress." SEC. 302. Section 3654 of title 18, United States Code, 11 is amended so that the final paragraph reads as follows:

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"Probation officers shall also serve as pretrial services

officers, and shall have the full range of duties of pretrial 14 services officers as specified in section 3153 of this title. 15 Whenever such court shall have appointed more than one 16 probation or pretrial services officer, one may be designated 17 chief probation and pretrial services officer and shall direct the 18 work of all pretrial services and probation officers serving in 19 such court."

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SEC. 303. The analysis of chapter 207 of title 18, United 21 States Code, is amended by striking out the final item and

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inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"3152. Pretrial services officers.

"3153. Duties of pretrial services officers.

"3154. Duties of Director of Administrative Office of United States Courts. "3155. Definitions."

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SEC. 304. For the purpose of carrying out the provisions

2 of this title, there are authorized to be appropriated for each

3 fiscal year such sums as are necessary, not to exceed

4 $20,000,000.

Mr. CONYERS. The Chair recognizes the distinguished senior Senator from North Carolina, the Honorable Sam Ervin, who, despite his many other duties, has worked with a great deal of dedication across the years on this very complex matter.

I think it is out of a sense of increasing appreciation for the work that he and his committee in the Senate have done that this subcommittee has begun to move in the direction we are today. We admit, quite frankly, to the distinguished Senator that this great body of work that has been compiled by you and your committee and staff has really been inspirational in moving us to commence these hearings today.

So it is with that honor that we very gratefully recognize you to proceed in your own way before this committee. Welcome.

TESTIMONY OF HON. SAM ERVIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; ACCOMPANIED BY MARK GITENSTEIN, STAFF COUNSEL

Senator ERVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate more than I can say the willingness of the Subcommittee on Crime of the Judiciary Committee of the House to hold hearings on this legislation, notwithstanding the lateness of the period of the session. It is a great privilege to appear before this committee chaired by its present chairman, who has also harked for so many years to make the provisions of the Bill of Rights a reality for all Americans.

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you.

Senator ERVIN. I am delighted to be here to discuss with you legislation which is near and dear to my heart, S. 754, the Speedy Trial Act of 1974. As you have stated, we in the Senate have been working on the speedy trial legislation for over 4 years. S. 754 is a product of that work.

However, this legislation belongs in a larger context. During the past decade, State legislatures as well as the Congress have concentrated their energies upon reform of the Nation's criminal justice systems; State, Federal, and local. The Federal Government alone has expended over $3 billion in this effort as a result of the Safe Streets Act of 1968. Thousands of criminal justice reform laws and tough new crime bills have passed the Congress and the State legislatures. Despite all of this effort, the crime rate continues to rise and our criminal justice systems, in particular our criminal courts, are still in an essentially dilapidated state. Legislators, the general public, and the criminal element know that swift punishment for criminal activity is unlikely, if not impossible, in most of this Nation. And they know that without swift justice, our entire effort to control crime is useless.

Since the FBI released its most recent crime figures indicating a dramatic new increase in crime, there has been a great deal of breastbeating and fingerpointing. Some even talk of the possibility of creating a national police force. Scare tactics will not stop crime-preventive detention, no-knock and minimum mandatory sentences did not affect the crime rate and neither will talk of a national police force. I say again that we will not begin to deal with crime until we begin to make our criminal justice system-in particular our courtsmore efficient. Speedy trial legislation attempts to achieve that goal. It

is no panacea but it is a beginning. Furthermore, we in the Congress must not simply point with horror at the State and local criminal courts. We should begin at home in the Federal criminal justice system.

Our Federal criminal justice system sets a very poor example for its sisters on the State and local level. A study by the Federal Judicial Center on delay in Federal criminal cases suggests that there is a speedy trial crisis in the Federal courts. It found that the average delay between arrest and indictment in the busier Federal courts was over 100 days and between indictment and trial over 250 days. This suggests that delay between arrest and trial may be as long as 350 days. Another study by the Center involving many of these same Federal courts suggests that the situation has not improved over the past 2 years. While during fiscal year 1970, 57 percent of all cases were over 3 months old at disposition, in fiscal year 1972, 59 percent of all cases were over 3 months old at disposition. Unfortunately, the study only measured the time between indictment and disposition and did not include the time between arrest and disposition. If those figures were included, the situation would look much worse.

A 1-year delay in the trial of many Federal criminal cases is simply unacceptable. It takes no great insight into the crime problem to know that when suspects are arrested, but not tried for months or years, there is no deterrent to continued criminal activity. A study by the National Bureau of Standards in 1970 found that most defendants commit crime on bail after they have been on pretrial release more than 60 days. Furthermore, when those defendants are finally brought to justice they know that the overworked prosecutor and court will have to accept their offer to bargain for a lesser sentence. This kind of plea bargaining is known as "giving away the courthouse for the sake of the calendar." The criminal always wins and society always loses in this bargain. The speedy trial crisis has made a mockery of the criminal laws enacted by Congress and of the Justice Department's attempt to enforce those laws.

There is no question in my mind that speedy trial will never be a reality until Congress makes clear to all that it will no longer tolerate delay. Unfortunately, while it is in the public interest to have speedy trials, the parties involved in the criminal process do not feel any pressure to go to trial. The court, defendant, his attorney, and the prosecutor may have different reasons not to push for trial, but they all have some reason. The overworked courts, prosecutors, and defense attorneys depend on delay in order to cope with their heavy caseloads. The end of one trial only means the start of another. To them, there is little incentive to move quickly in what they see as an unending series of cases. The defendant, of course, is in no hurry for trial, because he wishes to delay his day of reckoning as long as possible.

I believe, after years of studying this problem, that S. 754 can begin to end this seemingly hopeless morass. The bill is based upon the premise that the courts, undermanned, starved for funds, and utilizing 18th century management techniques, simply cannot cope with burgeoning caseloads. The consequence is delay and plea bargaining. The solution is to create initiative within the system to utilize modern management techniques and to provide additional resources to the courts where careful planning so indicates.

S. 754 would create that initiative within the Federal system by enacting time limit requirements for the initial stages in the criminal process. The time limits would be enforced by judges empowered to sanction prosecutors for delay by dismissing the indictment if trial does not occur within the limits and empowered to sanction defense counsel who engage in deliberate dilatory tactics. The time-limitsplus-sanctions system is related to the appropriations process in the Congress so that each court could count on sufficient resources to achieve the goals set out in the time limits by Congress.

The bill requires each Federal district court, in cooperation with the U.S. attorney and attorneys active in the defense of criminal cases in that district, to establish a plan for trying criminal cases within 90 days of arrest or receipt of summons. The bill takes effect over a 7-year period so that the goals of a 30-day limit on the period between arrest and indictment and a 60-day limit on the period between indictment and commencement of trial and of the dismissal sanction will not be in force until the seventh year after enactment.

Starting the seventh year after enactment the 30-day arrest-to-indictment and 60-day indictment-to-trial time limits will be enforced by a mandatory dismissal without prejudice. Although the Government will be able to reinstitute charges after such a dismissal it could do so only after it is able to demonstrate "exceptional circumstances." In the first 6 years after enactment, the time limits are phased in beginning with a 60-day-arrest-to-indictment and 180-day indictmentto-trial limit in the second year after enactment. Every few years the time limits are shortened and the sancations for failure to meet the time limits increase. During these intervening years a planning process for the district courts will be established to enable the districts to determine what additional resources, personnel, and facilities will be required to comply with the progressive time limitations. District plans which will detail these needs will be required at specified times during the 7-year phasing in of time limits. This, in turn, will enable Congress to consider the needs of each individual district, and of the whole Federal criminal justice system.

Along with its provision for speedy trials, S. 754 also authorizes the creation of demonstration "Pretrial Services Agencies" in 10 Federal districts, excluding the District of Columbia which is already served by the District of Columbia Bail Agency, performing many of the same functions. These agencies will make bail recommendations, supervise persons on bail, and assist them with employment, medical, and other services designed to reduce crime on bail. This provision will greatly enhance the operations of the Bail Reform Act of 1966.

In conclusion, I would like to anticipate and respond to an argument which has been made against this legislation. It is an argument which I am sure you will hear as you take testimony on this legislation. I have heard it for almost 3 years and I firmly believe that it must be rejected. In essence the argument is that the courts can handle the speedy trial problem themselves. Proponents of this position, usually Federal judges, point to the Supreme Court's promulgation in 1972 of rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

As a former judge and as a U.S. Senator with great respect for the Federal judiciary, I have attempted to keep in perspective testimony by judges who adamantly oppose speedy trial legislation. Any