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SERMON LXV.

JUSTIFICATION.

THE DUTY OF BELIEVING.

ROMANS iii. 28.

Therefore we conclude, that a man is justified by faith, without the deeds of the Law: more correctly rendered,

Therefore we conclude, that Man is justified by faith, without works of Law.

In the last discourse, I attempted to show, that in consequence of the redemption of Christ, Man is justified freely by the grace of God. The grace of God is the source, the moving cause, of this blessing to mankind. The next subject of consideration, before us, is the Means, by which man, in the economy of redemption, becomes entitled to this blessing. These, in the text, are summed up in the single article, Faith; which is here declared to be the instrument of justification. To elucidate this truth is the design, with which I have selected the present theme of discourse.

But before I enter upon the doctrine in form, it will be neces sary to remind you, that an Objection is raised against it at the threshhold; which, if founded in truth, would seem to overthrow it at once. It is this that faith is so far from being of a moral nature, as to be necessary, and unavoidable: man being absolutely passive in believing, and under a physical impossibility of doing

otherwise than he actually does; whether in believing, or disbelieving. Of course, it is further urged, An attribute, governed wholly by physical necessity, can never recommend us to God; much less become the ground of so important a blessing, as justification.

It will be easily seen, that, so long as this objection has its hold on the mind, and is allowed its full import, the doctrine of justification by faith can never be received, unless in a very imperfect and unsatisfactory manner. If faith is a thing, over which we have no control; if we believe only under the influence of a physical necessity, and, whether we believe or disbelieve, it is physically impossible for us to do otherwise; then it is plain, that Faith is so far from being praise-worthy, amiable, and capable of recommending us to God, as to merit, and sustain, no moral character at all. According to this scheme therefore, faith and unbelief, being equally and absolutely involuntary and unavoidable, can never constitute a moral distinction between men. Faith can never be an object of the approbation; nor unbelief of the disapprobation of God. Much less can we be praise-worthy in believing, or blameable in disbelieving. Still less can we on one of these grounds be rewarded, and on the other punished. Least of all can we, in consequence of our faith, be accepted, and blessed for ever; and, in consequence of our unbelief, be rejected, and punished with endless misery.

All these things, however, are directly and palpably contradictory to the whole tenour of the Gospel. In this, faith is approved, commanded, and promised an eternal reward. Unbelief, on the contrary, is censured, forbidden, and threatened with an everlasting punishment. Faith, therefore, is the hinge, on which the whole evangelical system turns. If ye believe not, that I am he; ye shall die in your sins; He, that believeth on the Son, hath everlasting life; and he, that believeth not, shall not see life; are declarations, which, while they cannot be mistaken, teach us, that all the future interests of man are suspended on his faith; and are, at the same time, declarations, to which the whole Evangelical system is exactly conformed. If, then, our faith and disbelief are altogether involuntary, and the effect of mere physical necessity; God has annexed everlasting life and everlasting death, not to any moral character in man, but to the mere result

of physical causes. A consequence so monstrous ought certainly not to be admitted. The Scriptures, therefore, must be given up, if this scheme is true.

I have now, I presume, shown it to be necessary, that, before I enter upon the discussion of the doctrine, contained in the text, this objection should be thoroughly examined, and removed. To do this, will be the business of the present discourse.

In opposition to this objection, then, I assert, that Faith, and its opposite, disbelief, are, in all moral cases, voluntary exercises of the mind; are proper objects of commands and prohibitions; and proper foundations of praise and blame, reward and punishment. This doctrine I shall endeavour to prove by the following arguments; derived both from Reason and Revelation; because the objection, which I have been opposing, has been incautiously admitted, at times, by Christians, as well as openly, and triumphantly, alleged by Infidels.

1st. Faith is every where commanded in the Scriptures.

This is his commandment, that we believe on the name of his Son, Jesus Christ. 1 John iii. 23. Now after that John was put in prison, Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom of God, and saying, The time is fulfilled; and the Kingdom of God is at hand. Repent ye and believe the Gospel. Mark i. 14, 15. In these two passages, we have the command to believe the Gospel, delivered by Christ in form; and the declaration of the Evangelist, that it is the commandment of God, that we believe on the name of his Son Jesus Christ. Whatever, then, we understand by faith; it is the object of a command, or law, which God has given to mankind; a thing, which may be justly required, and of course a thing, which they are able to render as an act of obedience, at least in some circumstances. God cannot require what man is not physically able to perform. But all obedience to God is voluntary. Nothing is, or can be, demanded by him, which is not in its nature voluntary; nor can any thing, but the will of Intelligent beings, be the object of moral law. No man will say, that a brute, a stone, or a stream, can be the object of such law. Faith therefore, being in the most express terms required by a law, or command, of God. must of

course be a voluntary exercise of the mind, in such a sense, that

it can be rightfully required.

Further, the language of the first of these passages most evidently denotes, that the command to believe on the name of Jesus Christ is one of peculiar and pre-eminent importance. This is his commandment: as if there were no other; or no other, which in its importance may be compared with this. Here St. John teaches us, that faith is pre-eminently required by God, in a manner distinct from that, in which he requires other acts of obedience generally. Of course, faith is not only justly required of mankind by God; but is required in a manner more solemn, than many other acts, universally acknowledged to be voluntary.

Accordingly, a peculiar sanction is annexed to the law, requir ing our faith. He that believeth shall be saved; and he that believeth not shall be damned.

The reward and the penalty, here announced, are the highest which exist in the Universe; and, therefore, directly indicate the obedience and the disobedience to be of supreme import. Nothing can be a stronger proof, that, in the eye of God, faith and unbelief are voluntary, or moral exercises of man.

But it may be alleged, that the faith, enjoined in these commands, is not a mere speculative belief; and, therefore, not the faith, which, in the general objection opposed by me, is asserted to be physically necessary and involuntary. I readily agree, that the faith, here enjoined, is saving faith; and that this is not mere speculative belief. But such belief is an indispensable part of saving faith; and so absolutely inseparable from it, that without such belief saving faith cannot exist. Saving faith is always a speculative belief, joined with a cordial consent to the truth, and a cordial ap probation of the object, which that truth respects. When, therefore, saving faith is commanded; speculative belief, which is an inseparable part of it, is also commanded. It is not, indeed. required to exist by itself; or to be rendered without the accordance of the heart. But, whenever saving faith is required, speculative belief is absolutely required. Of course speculative belief is at least in some degree, in our power; and may be rendered as an act of obedience to God.

To him, who believes in the inspiration of the Scriptures, these passages, and many others like them, furnish complete proof, that faith, whether saving or speculative, is an act of the mind, which is in such a sense voluntary, as to be the proper object of a command, or law; that it may be justly required of mankind; and that it cannot be either refused, or neglected, without guilt. 2dly. The universal consent of mankind furnishes ample proof, that faith is, in many instances, a voluntary, or moral, exercise. The evidence, which I propose to derive from this source, lies. in the following general truth; That in all cases, where mankind have sufficient opportunity thoroughly to understand any subject, and are under no inducement to judge with partiality, their universal judgment is right. As I presume this truth will not be doubted; I shall not attempt to illustrate it by any arguments. That the present case is included within this general truth is certain. Every man, who thinks at all, knows by his own personal experience, and by his daily intercourse with other men, whether his own faith, and their's, be voluntary in many instances, or not; I say, in many instances; because, if the assertion be admitted with this limitation, it will be sufficient for my purpose. If, then, mankind have determined, that faith is sometimes voluntary; the doctrine, against which I contend, must be given up.

The Language of mankind very frequently expresses their real views in a manner, much more exactly accordant with truth, than their Philosophical discussions. Men make words, only when they have ideas to be expressed by those words, and just such ideas, as the words are formed to express. If, then, we find words in any language, denoting any ideas whatever, we know with certainty, that such ideas have existed in the minds of those, by whom the words were used. Whenever these ideas have been derived from experience and observation, we also know, that they were real, and not fantastical; and are founded, not in imagination, but in fact. In all languages, are found words, denoting the same things with the English terms, candour, fairness, reasonableness, impartiality, and others, generally of the like import. The meaning of all these terms is clearly of this nature; that the persons, to whom they are justly applied, use their fa

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