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an independent contractor, and not an employee; and that in cases of this character the courts of this State, and of England, and the industrial boards and courts in the United States, have determined that a man in Tuttle's relationship, as defined by these eight elements, is an independent contractor. The eight elements are as follows:

(1) Furnishing own equipment. own equipment, horses, etc.

Tuttle used his

(2) Compensation by amount of work done. Tuttle received $2 per thousand for the logs he hauled.

(3) Control of working hours. Tuttle worked when he wished to and not otherwise. He could start work any time of the day.

(4) Control of the amount of work done. Tuttle could determine the size of the loads he hauled.

(5) Control of the manner of the work. Tuttle got his logs where he wished and was under no control while hauling.

(6) Freedom from supervision. Tuttle did not live in camp under the supervision of the foreman or other persons. He did not have to unload his logs as did the employees of the company.

(7) Control and care of equipment. Tuttle controlled and cared for his own team and equipment.

(8) Right to hire substitute or assistant. Tuttle could have sent a substitute or another man with another team if he had one.

It is urged by appellants that the distinction of the common law, between an employee and an independent contractor, exists under the workmen's compensation act, and it has been so held in other jurisdictions, citing Massachusetts, California, Illinois, and rulings of State boards; also Curtis v. Plumtre (Court of Appeals of England), 6 B. W. C. C. 87, and the following Michigan cases are also cited: De Forrest v. Wright, 2 Mich. 368; Riedel v. Moran, Fitzsimons Co., 103 Mich. 262 (61 N. W. 509); Wright v. Manufacturing Co., 124 Mich. 91 (82 N. W. 829, 50 L. R. A. 495); Lenderink v. Village of Rockford, 135 Mich. 531 (98

N. W. 4); Burns v. Paint Co., 152 Mich. 613 (116 N. W. 182, 16 L. R. A. [N. S.] 816); McBride v. Shingle Co., 173 Mich. 248 (138 N. W. 1077), and numerous cases in foreign jurisdictions.

The appellee calls attention to section 5, part 1, of the workmen's compensation law of this State (Act No. 10, Extra Session 1912, 2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 5423 et seq.), which provides that the following shall constitute employers subject to the provisions of the act:

"Every person, firm, and private corporation, including any public service corporation, who has any person in service under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written.

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The appellee further contends that there is not only sufficient evidence in the record upon which the accident board could properly find claimant's husband was "in service under a contract of hire," but also that under the rules of law he was a servant as distinguished from an independent contractor; that the testimony of Mr. Slade, the woods superintendent, is to the effect that there was a contract of general employment. The following Michigan cases are cited by appellee: Lewis v. Brick Co., 164 Mich. 489 (129 N. W. 726); Ripley v. Priest, 169 Mich. 383 (135 N. W. 258). And the following authorities are cited from other jurisdictions: Kniceley v. Railroad Co., 64 W. Va. 278 (61 S. E. 811, 17 L. R. A. [N. S.] 370, and note); State, ex rel. Virginia & Rainy Lake Co., v. District Court, 128 Minn. 43 (150 N. W. 211). The opinion in the last-cited case is quoted from at length.

Appellee's counsel urges that the eight elements set up by the appellants are not supported by the record, or are not controlling. We quote from appellee's brief:

"(1) Furnished own equipment. Tuttle used his own team and company sleighs. Under Lewis v. Brick

Co., supra, and State, ex rel. Virginia & Rainy Lake Co., v. District Court, supra, this factor is immaterial Furnishing his own team was analogous to the laborer who used his own lights and explosives in the Lewis Case, and the woodsman using his own tools in the Minnesota Case.

"(2) He was compensated by the amount of work done. Piecework does not constitute the laborer who does it an independent contractor. Lewis v. Brick Co., and State, ex rel. Virginia & Rainy Lake Co., v. District Court, supra; Kniceley v. Railroad Co., supra; Ripley v. Priest, supra.

"(3) Control of own working hours. This is not true. He could only work when and where the jammers were set. He could only haul one load a day, and that is all any one could haul from the camps to the mill in Cheboygan. He could only get a load when the loading crew gave it to him, and they could refuse him a load if the company wished.

"(4) Control of the amount of work done. See Lewis v. Brick Co., and the other cases cited. Like any other laborer he could quit. The employer could also discharge him. In the Lewis Case the court held the plaintiff to be a servant notwithstanding "They (the laborers) furnished lights and explosives, or the cost of them, and were generally masters of their time and the efforts they should make.'

"(5) Control of the manner of work. The statement in appellants' brief, "Tuttle got his logs where he wished and was under no control while hauling,' is not borne out by the record as to getting the logs where he wished. He could only get logs at the skidways where the jammers were set. He did not control the manner of work done. Embury-Martin Lumber Company's woods superintendent testified:

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"'Q. And where they loaded was under your direction was it? "'A. Yes, sir; they couldn't load any other place only where we had our jammers set to load.'

"As to control while hauling, no one controlled any of the drivers either by the month, day, or thousand, except when loading or unloading. There is no difference in this respect between admitted employees of the lumber company, paid by the month, and Mr. Tuttle.

"'Q. You said the man handled the load himself after the load was on the sleighs?

"A. Yes, sir; after he left the skidway-after he got on his load, why, that was his load to go with-he handled that to the mill.

"'Q. That was so of those who hauled by the thousand as well as those that worked by the day?

"A. Yes, sir.

"'Q. So far as that was concerned, there wasn't any difference between the two classes of men?

"'A. Not in regard to handling the load.'

"(6) Freedom from supervision. This is not true. At the only points where drivers came in contact with any necessity of supervision, they were controlled and directed. They could only get loads where the jammers were set; they loaded the sleighs with their own teams under the direction of the employer's foreman or top loader; the employer's servants fastened the load on the sleighs; he drove over roads built and maintained by the employer to its mills at Cheboygan, where he was directed where to place the load for unloading. None of the drivers, either by the thousand or day or month, unloaded or were required to assist in unloading. They could be controlled by the power of the employer to discharge. There is no testimony in the record to bear out the statement in appellants' brief, 'he did not have to unload his logs as did the employees of the company,' if by employees is meant drivers by the month. As far as living in the company's camps are concerned, living in camps or out of them does not bear on the question. The control of the means which the employer has over a servant does not go to the extent of controlling anything but the doing of the work which he has been engaged to do. One may be and is a servant of another without the control of the employer over his meals, lodging, and personal conduct outside of working hours. I have failed to find any case anywhere, or any semblance of authority for the statement, that there is any rule of law that control of anything except the work itself, in which the laborer is engaged, has any bearing whatever on the question. As far as doing the work was concerned, that is, hauling logs to Cheboygan from these camps, there was no

difference whatever between those who were paid by the day or month and Mr. Tuttle. Both were employed generally, although the rate of pay was different.

"(7) Tuttle owned the team he used and as owner had the right to manage it, subject to the directions of the employer while doing the employer's work. He drove the team in loading and went ahead and backed up as directed by his employer's foreman. Any pieceworker who uses his own tools naturally cares for them. Tuttle's tools were a team of horses.

"(8) Right to hire substitute or assistant. This statement that Mr. Tuttle could have sent a substitute or another man with another team is not borne out by the record in any manner whatsoever. The contract between himself and the employer hereinbefore stated was for Tuttle to haul logs. No one else was mentioned. He, himself, personally, with his team was hired to haul logs. * * * He asked for work and it was given to him. He had no more right to send a substitute or employ assistants at his employer's expense than a ditch digger has who sends a man in his place. If the employer accepts the substitute, of course he would have to pay him, but the contract gave Tuttle no such privilege. If it did, however, Tuttle was killed and not a substitute or assistant. The testimony in the record that some men had more than one team hauling, or brought a load in and were paid for it, is beside the point. In one instance they made arrangements before hauling, and in others they were volunteers whose labor was accepted and paid for."

In the recent case of Gall v. Detroit Journal Co., 191 Mich. 405 (158 N. W. 36), we had occasion to examine this question, and many authorities in our own court and some from other jurisdictions are cited in the opinion of Mr. Justice PERSON. There is a vast amount of learning upon this subject. In the examination of this question, our attention has been called to more than 100 cases in other jurisdictions. The copious note to Richmond v. Sitterding, 65 L. R. A. 445 (101 Va. 354), and the notes to Messmer v. Bell & Coggeshall Co., 133 Ky. 19 (19 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1), and Cockran v.

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