2. CORPORATIONS ARY. 308(6)-OFFICERS-SAL The principal shareholders of a corporation of which complainant became the manager held the offices of secretary and treasurer, and each drew a salary of $12,000. It was agreed that plaintiff should share in the net profits. Thereafter the treasurer resigned. Held that, unless it was shown that the original agree ment was to deduct $24,000 per year in any event, complainant, until the corporation had acted, was entitled to have the salary of the incoming treasurer computed on a basis of what his services were reasonably worth. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1341, 1342; Dec. Dig. 308(6).] 3. CORPORATIONS 308(6)-OFFICERS-Pow ERS OF. Where complainant was to receive a percentage of the net profits of a corporation, a principal stockholder and officer of the corporation could not as against complainant, without any corporate action, charge items against the corporation which should be deducted from the net profits. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1341, 1342; Dec. Dig. 308(6).1 Appeal from Court of Chancery. Bill for accounting by Clifford W. Smith against Bedell Brothers, a corporation which was referred to a master. From a decree overruling exceptions to his report, defendant appeals.. Affirmed. a matter of fact, did your brother do considerable work in connection with the Newark store? A. Very little. Q. Very little work? A. Yes, sir. Q. Did you do the same amount of work in connection with the Newark store as you did previously? A. I did extra work. Q. You did his very little extra work. Is that it? A. That is right." The minutes show that when Alfred retired from the business on August 15, 1912, W. E. Bedell was, by resolution, appointed treasurer in his place; but they do not show that the corporation took any action in reference to his salary, Mr. Bedell said in his evidence that they showed that he was to receive his brother's salary, but it is conceded that he is mistaken. the money value of the services rendered did not exceed $1,000 per annum. There is a conflict between the evidence of Mr. Smith and Mr. Bedell. Mr. Smith says that after Alfred left he did most of the work Alfred had been doing, and that he knew nothing about Mr. W. E. Bedell's intention to keep on charging the $12,000 as an expense until after he left defendant's employ. On the other hand, W. E. Bedell says that complainant's work was not increased, and that he knew, or had the means of knowing, that he (W. E. Bedell) was going to draw his brother's salary. The burden of proof is on the defendant, and I do not think it has sustained it. As the evidence stands, it would seem that We The following is the opinion of Vice Chan- over which the account extends W. E. Bedell cellor Stevens: [2] The question raised by the first exception is whether, in computing complainant's share of the net profits, $24,000 should be deducted from the gross earnings, or only $12,000. Smith says that the original agreement (made, as I have said, in 1906) was, "I was to receive a compensation of $55 per week, and in addition The two broth10 per cent. of the net profits.' ers "were each to draw $12,000 a year salary." Mr. W. E. Bedell's testimony is only that Alfred was to draw $12,000 per annum as treasotherwise than as Mr. Smith states it. urer. He does not state the original agreement for a percentage of net profits. Then, an unhave, then, these facts: First, an agreement derstanding, had at the same time, that the two Bedells should receive $12,000 each for their retirement of A. M. Bedell and an election of services as president and treasurer. Then, a W. E. Bedell to the treasurer's office, no salary being fixed. Then, the fact that the value of the service to be performed did not exceed a small fractional part of $12,000. And then, the further fact that for the six months' period drew his brother's salary without any corporate action giving it to him. Under these circumstances, it would seem that, even if we concede that the corporation could give the treas[1] The complainant was manager of the urer (as against Mr. Smith's contract right to Newark store. He was to receive a salary of have net profits) any sum it pleased, in excess $2,860 per annum, and in addition 10 per cent. of what his services were fairly worth, the acof the net profits. By the agreement made tion must at least have been that of the corwith complainant in 1906, when the company poration, and not that of W. E. Bedell, indibegan business, it was agreed that Alfred and vidually, even though he had the controlling Walter Bedell, the owners of the company's interest. Unless it be shown that the original stock, were each to receive a salary of $12,000 agreement was to deduct $24,000 in any event, per annum. I have requested counsel to exam- then, when Alfred withdrew, his salary stopine the minutes of the company to ascertain ped. Until the company otherwise ordered, the whether these salaries were fixed by a resolu- incoming treasurer could only, as against comtion. He informs me that no resolution on the plainant, be entitled to receive what his servsubject can be found. It therefore does not ex-ices were reasonably worth. pressly appear whether these salaries were attached to the office of president and treasurer, or whether they were arbitrary sums awarded to the owners of the business under the name of salary, for the purpose of determining complainant's compensation. Being the only stockholders, they would have been entitled to the profits under any name. That the salaries were personal to the owners is fairly to be inferred from the way in which the business was managed. This is what W. E. Bedell says in reference to his brother Alfred's work: "Q. As This case comes up on exceptions to the master's report; the bill being for an account. [3] The second exception relates to the inclusion of buyers' salaries in the statement showing net earnings. The Bedells had a business in New York controlled by another corporation. They employed buyers therein, who were paid by that corporation, and, up to the last half of complainant's connection with defendant, by that corporation only. These buyers bought also for the Newark store, which had in addition a buyer of its own. Up to the time of the last accounting-that is, for a period of seven years-no part of the New York buyers' salaries had been put into the account. After the complainant resigned, the statement rendered contained, by direction of W. E. Bedell, a charge of one-quarter of these salaries. The evidence shows that in computing net profits there were arbitrary assumptions made on both sides of the account; there had been "an established method of accounting for net profits." Mr. W. E. Bedell says that, from the time complainant entered defendant's employ until the time he severed his connection with it, there was no change made in regard to any existing arrangement. Now, as the Newark store received a benefit from the services rendered by the employés of the New York store, it would have been quite proper for the defendant company to have agreed to pay the New York concern what their buyers' services were worth. But they had not done so; and I do not think it was competent for Mr. Bedell alone, without corporate action previously taken, to direct his bookkeeper to charge one-quarter of the salaries that had, up to that time, been paid by the New York store. The third exception is without merit. The defendant, according to the evidence, had requested complainant to do some extra work in their Brooklyn store and had made a payment to him for this work. It was extra compensation for extra work done elsewhere and has no place in this account. Coult & Smith, of Newark, for appellant. Jacob L. Newman, of Newark, for respondent. PER CURIAM. The decree appealed from will be affirmed for the reasons stated in the opinion filed in the court below by Vice Chancellor Stevens. (84 N. J. Eq. 285, 507) SEIDEL et al. v. MILLS et al. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. May 7, 1915.) 1. COVENANTS 122-ACTIONS-EVIDENCESUFFICIENCY. Evidence held insufficient to establish a neighborhood settlement imposing restrictions on the use of lots in a subdivision which would preclude future owners from erecting separate residences on two single lots owned by them. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Covenants, Cent. Dig. § 224; Dec. Dig. 122.] 2. COVENANTS 79(1) Robert D. Mills was threatening to erect two separate houses on his adjacent two lots, one of which later was conveyed to the defendant Pauline R. Hovey. The theory of the bill is that a large tract of land, embracing the lots of the complainants and defendants, was originally laid out and mapped, and a "neighborhood settlement" for the benefit of all future lot owners was established, according to which a scheme of restrictions was created, and that all future owners of these lots have the benefit of this general scheme. The principles which have been laid down in many cases, of which in this state De Gray v. Monmouth Beach Club House Co., 50 N. J. Eq. 329, is the leader, supply the theory of the complainants' case. I am entirely unable to discover any existing scheme or neighborhood settlement which establishes any right in the owner of the complainants' house and lot to prevent, by injunction, the erection of separate residences on the two lots belonging to the defendThe result is that the complainants' bill must be dismissed. ants. [1, 2] The following are the main considerations which lead to the result above stated: The whole tract, known as Eldorado, was used as an amusement park until about 1894. Upon a foreclosure of mortgages a master in chancery caused the tract to be laid out in streets and lots, 217 in number. The lots are uniformly 25 feet wide, and except where the lines of the tract required them to be longer or shorter, they are uniformly 100 feet in depth. The map is filed in the Hudson county register's office, and lots were sold at auction according to the map. No restrictions as to buildings were made in the master's deed or were indicated on the map. In 1895 about half a dozen persons who had purchased the majority of the lots, constituting a large tract, filed a map modifying the master's map, widening some streets, and making some other changes, but leaving the tract still divided into lots 25 feet in width, and making no suggestion of any restriction in respect of buildmade 22 deeds, of which 15 were made to indiings. These joint owners, from 1895 to 1900, viduals, who, presumably, in many instances, at least, bought with the intention of building. One of these deeds conveys five lots; three deeds convey three lots each; and eight deeds convey pairs of lots, and three deeds convey single lots 25 feet by 100. The most of these deeds contain elaborate restrictions, including some form of restriction in regard to the number of buildform of covenant used with certain variations ings to be erected upon the land conveyed. The is set forth in the case of Walker v. Renner, 60 N. J. Eq. 493, in which case the Court of Errors and Appeals construed the covenant as it appeared in that case so as to leave the owner of a pair of lots free to erect a separate residence on each. No general scheme to prohibit the erection of residences on separate lots can possibly be discovered from an examination of these deeds of the joint owners, if, indeed, under the circumstances of this case, a general scheme Appeal from Court of Chancery. could be created in that way. In the three inBill by Franklin B. Seidel and others stances in which single lots were conveyed, the restriction prevented the erection of more than against Robert D. Mills and others. From one residence. Where the five lots were conveya decree for defendants, complainants ap-ed the restriction was that the lots were not to peal. Affirmed. be subdivided, "and that no more than one residence is to be erected upon the same." On May 1, 1900, the joint owners made seven deeds, conveying different parcels of this tract to the Eldorado Realty Company. One parcel, containing over a dozen lots, was conveyed by one of these deeds with no restrictions whatever. Seventeen lots were conveyed by another deed, with restrictions against nuisances only. Twenty or 30 lots, including gores, were conveyed without any restriction whatever. By two separate deeds, The complainant owns and resides in a two- what is evidently the most valuable and desirfamily house erected upon a plot 33 feet and 4 able portion of the property for residences was inches wide by 100 feet deep. The defendant' conveyed, and the restrictions as to buildings For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes NANTS-ENFORCEMENT. RESTRICTIVE COVE A grantee of land is not, because the grantor in subsequent conveyances inserted restrictive covenants, entitled to the benefit of such restrictions. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Covenants, Cent. Dig. §§ 78-80, 82; Dec. Dig. 79(1).] The suit is to enjoin the erection of more than one house on two lots of land adjacent to each other, each lot being 25 by 100 feet. Heard on bill, answer, replication, and proofs taken in open court. The following is the opinion of Stevenson, V. C.: are very different, and this difference constitutes a very important fact in this case. In one of these two deeds conveying a large number of lots, including the lot and a third of the complainants, and the two lots of the defendants, and many adjacent lots, the restriction was that "no more than one residence is to be erected upon one lot." In the other of the two deeds above mentioned, conveying a large number of lots, the restriction is that: "None of the single lots hereby conveyed is to be subdivided, and that no more than one residence is to be erected upon any two lots." on the same." These four lots were reconveyed and came to the hands of three parties, each owning a lot and a third, and upon each of these plots, 33% feet by 100, dwellings have been erected. The complainant's property is one of these parcels, and upon the parcel 331⁄2 by 100 furthest from the complainant, the proprietor has erected what practically amounts to two residences having a party wall. One of the conveyances of the joint owners was before the Court of Errors and Appeals in the case of Walker v. Renner, supra. By deed dated October 2, 1905, the Eldorado Company conveyed to one Van Zile a lot and a half, which were under the rule, one house to one lot, and imposed the restriction that the "plot" thereby conveyed should not be subdivided, and "that no more than one residence is to be erected upon the same." I understand that in several instances the form of covenant was used which was construed in the case of Walker v. Renner, under which the purchaser was free to erect a separate residence on each lot of 25 by 100 feet. The complainants insist that after that decision was rendered the form of covenant was slightly changed so as to be without ambiguity. Walker v. Renner was decided in June, 1900, and the conveyances which I have referred to, and others, show that the original scheme indicated by the deeds to the Eldorado Company above mentioned was not consistently followed. The crux of this case can only be discovered by considering the dates of the conveyances under which these litigating parties now hold. The first conveyance made by the Eldorado Company is the foundation of the complainant's title, being the deed above mentioned to Cora we have seen, departed from the supposed scheme by initiating the division of four lots into three parcels, upon each of which only one residence might be erected, although all four lots were under the restriction in the deed to the Eldorado Company, which allowed one residence on each lot 25 by 100 feet. If, under the circumstances, these seven deeds could have the effect to create a general "scheme" with respect to the erection of residences for the benefit of all further grantees about which matter I express no opinion-it would seem that the plan or scheme was that the Eldorado Company should hold the less desirable lots free from any restriction as to buildings, and that the remainder of the lots should be divided into two classes for one of which the restriction should be that no more than one residence should be erected upon any one lot 25 by 100 feet, and for the other, the restriction should be that the lots should go in pairs, and that no more than one residence should be erected upon any two lots. The important fact is that the complainants' lot and a third and the defendants' two lots are both subject to this original suggested scheme, imposing the restriction that no more than one residence should be erected upon one lot 25 by 100. The Eldorado Company began in the year 1900 making conveyances of the lots which they had acquired from the joint owners. A brief abstract of over 50 of these deeds has been put in evi-Schneider, dated July 4, 1903. This deed, as dence, exhibiting the restrictions inserted therein with respect to buildings. These restrictions vary widely. If we may assume that by the seven deeds to the Eldorado Realty Company a scheme was established for having some lots unrestricted and others restricted by the rule, one building to one lot, and still others restricted by the other rule, one building to two lots, it is perfectly plain that the Eldorado Realty Company disregarded this scheme in many instances. The deeds from the company indicate that, while the company may have generally followed the two rules of restriction indicated by the two deeds above mentioned, it did not hesitate to depart from those rules whenever it saw fit. On July 14, 1903, the company conveyed one lot and a half of the adjacent lot to one Butz, imposing the restriction in the deed that "the lots conveyed are not to be subdivided and that no more than one residence is to be erected upon the said two lots." Lot 59, one-half of which Butz acquired, was conveyed to the Eldorado Company by the deed above mentioned, which imposed the restriction of one residence to two lots, and lot 60, the whole of which Butz acquired, was conveyed by the deed which imposed the restriction of one residence to one lot. By another deed, also dated July 4, 1903, the Eldorado Company conveyed to Butz lot 58 and balf of lot 59, which were included in the deed restricting one residence to two lots, and inserted in the conveyance the restriction, "that the plot hereby conveyed is not to be subdivided, and that no more than one residence is to be erected upon the same." By deed dated December 10, 1903, the Eldorado Company conveyed four lots to Samuel Mitchel, all of which were under the restriction of one residence to two lots in the deed of the joint owners to the company, and the provision was inserted in the conveyance to Mitchel that "no more than one residence is to be erected upon less than one lot and a half." By deed dated July 4, 1903, the company conveyed four lots to Cora Schneider, all of which were under the rule of one residence to one lot as laid down in the deed to the company, but the restriction inserted in this conveyance to Cora Schneider was that "no more than three residences are to be erected up If the land of the complainant has attached to it an equitable right with respect to the number of residences which can be erected upon the defendant's lots, that right was in existence when the deed from the Eldorado Realty Company to Cora Schneider was made. At that time, however, July 4, 1903, the defendants' lots were still vested in the Eldorado Company, and the only intimation of any "scheme" or plan, embracing those lots and relating to the erection of residences upon them, was found in the deed to the company of May 1, 1900, which subjected all the lots of the complainant and the defendants to the restriction of one residence for one lot of 25 by 100 feet. The defendant's title is based upon a deed from the Eldorado Realty Company to one Joseph C. Blanch, dated July 1, 1904. The construction of the covenant in regard to the erection of buildings upon the land is not determined by the decision of the Court of Errors and Appeals in the case of Walker v. Renner. The deed describes the land as two separate lots, but the "s" was not filled in after the word "lot" in the restrictive covenant, so that the same reads: "The lot hereby conveyed is not to be subdivided and that no more than one residence is to be erected upon the same." I do not, however, deem it necessary to enter upon the question debated by counsel as to the construction of this covenant in the light of the decision of the Court of Errors and Appeals in Walker v. Renner. Nor does it seem to me to be necessary to determine whether or not there is so much doubt about the true construction as to forbid any injunctive action on the part of this court, in accordance with a well-settled rule. The case, it seems to me, is controlled by the proposition that even though, as between the Eldorado Realty Company and the defendants, the wider restriction was imposed upon the defendants' property than that which was imposed by the deed to the Eldorado Company, such wider restriction could not operate for the benefit of the complainant, who was a stranger whose title had been severed the year before from the tract of the Eldorado Realty Company. At most, this restrictive covenant in the deed to Blanch could avail for the benefit of the grantor's remaining property, and might be a part of a new "scheme" in relation to the erection of buildings on the defendant's two lots and other property of the grantor. Although the grantor, the Eldorado Company, probably appears from an examination of all its 50 deeds or more to have intended to widen the scope of the one-house, two-lot restriction, by imposing the same restriction upon lots which were under the one-house, one-lot restriction, there is nothing about this case which shows that such wider scheme was an actual fact, and was imposed upon the defendant's lots in the hands of the Eldorado Realty Company when that company made its deed, including the complainant's lot to Cora Schneider. The whole case of the complainant, in my judgment, breaks down at this point. the grantor sees fit to insert in subsequent con- Weller & Lichtenstein, of Hoboken, for appellants. J. W. Rufus Besson, of Hoboken, for appellees. PER CURIAM. The decree of the Court of Chancery will be affirmed, for the reasons given by Vice Chancellor Stevenson. Some comment is made in the brief (there was no oral argument) as to certain features, with respect to which it is claimed the court below misapprehended some of the facts. We find it unnecessary to consider this claim specifically, for, assuming it to be well founded, there is nothing in the case to impair in any way the correctness of the result reached. It must not be understood that I concede that there ever was any scheme or "neighborhood settlement" which enables the complainant, in this I case, to obtain an injunction restricting the defendant in respect to the erection of buildings on his lands. If there ever was any scheme, which helps out the complainant's case under the principles laid down in De Gray v. Monmouth Beach Club House, it seems to me quite plain that such scheme permitted the Eldorado Company, after it had made its conveyance to Cora Schneider which involved the complainant's land, to convey its remaining lots with very different restrictions as to buildings, provided the restrictive rule dividing its lots into two classes imposed by the two deeds to it of the joint owners should not be infringed. Of course, I am assuming, without admitting, that these two deeds to the Eldorado Company, if the scheme therein indicated had been strictly adhered to, would have brought_the_complainant's case within the rule of the De Gray Case. The complainant's argument would have more plausibility if it appeared that the company, having acquired these two classes of lots under these two different restrictions, had proceeded consistently by its deeds to impose the one-house, two-lots rule upon all the lots which it conveyed and which in the deed to it were under the one-house, one-lot rule. The Eldo-2. HUSBAND AND WIFE rado Realty Company, as we have seen, undertook to make a third class of restricted lots un (85 N. J. Eq. 455) COLONIAL BUILDING & LOAN ASS'N v. GRIFFIN et al. (No. 38/324.) new re der a third and radically different rule, accord- (Court of Chancery of New Jersey. Dec. 17, 1. HUSBAND AND WIFE ~171(1) DEBT OF husband's debt is good, and her title in equity A wife's mortgage executed to secure the can be foreclosed. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 671, 672, 674, 721, 950, 951; Dec. Dig. 171(1).] WIFE-VALIDITY. 85(1)-NOTES OF Notes executed by a wife as part consideration for the purchase of a saloon sold by the payee to her husband, in absence of anything to bring them within the second proviso of section 5 of the Married Women's Act (3 Comp. St. 1910, p. 3226), relating to indorsements or guaranties, etc., of married women, were void. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 336, 337; Dec. Dig.. 85(1).] 3. HUSBAND AND WIFE 213-MORTGAGEPERSONS ENTITLED TO FORECLOSE. Where a husband delivered void notes executed by his wife for part of the purchase money of a saloon, and was himself liable to pay the balance of the consideration, the notes and the mortgage executed by the wife to secure the husband's debt gave the mortgagee before assignment a good right in equity to foreclose the mortgage to pay such debt, and the assignee of such debt had the same right to foreclose. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 787-790; Dec. Dig. 213.] 4. MORTGAGES 248 ASSIGNEE OF FORECLOSURE. RIGHT In such case the assignee of the mortgage took the debt of the Lasband to sustain his right For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes under the mortgage, even though such debt might GAGES-VALIDITY--DURESS. MORT A mortgage executed by a wife to secure notes representing her husband's liability for the purchase of property, executed after she had refused to sign it and after her husband became angry and told her that it was only a matter of form, and that he would take care of the notes, and after persuasion on the part of the husband, and because she was afraid to anger him, was not invalid because executed under duress. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 674, 678, 950, 951; Dec. Dig. 171(6).] made by the said defendant mortgagor to Max Sandt and assigned by said Sandt to Macklin. The bill sets forth the making of the mortgage by said mortgagor and her husband to one Sandt on October 7, 1912, to secure the payment of a note of $2,500, which mortgage was duly recorded, and also the assignment of the mortgage by Sandt to the defendant Macklin by assignment, dated March 31, 1914, recorded April 1, 1914. The defendant Margaret answered the bill, and also filed an answer by way of cross-bill against the defendant Macklin setting up: That her husband, Joseph, was negotiating for the purchase of a saloon in Jersey City from the said Sandt; that he had been engaged in the 6. HUSBAND AND WIFE 171(6) — MORTGA- saloon business in lower Jersey City, and was GES-VALIDITY-MISREPRESENTATION. desirous of securing the store at the junction In such case, and where there was no show-of Communipaw avenue and Grand street, and ing that the mortgagee joined in such representa- desired her to go to New York, "as it would be tion or had any knowledge of it, and on the as- necessary for her to sign some papers before he sumption that both husband and wife knew that could obtain possession of the said saloon at the under the Married Women's Act the notes and junction of Communipaw avenue and Grand mortgage created reciprocal rights and liabilities, street, Jersey City; that she demurred to exe the mortgage was not invalid on the ground of cuting any papers, informing her husband that, misrepresentation. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 674, 678, 950, 951; Dec. Dig. 171(6).] 7. EQUITY 153-PRESUMPTIONS. Upon a bill to foreclose a mortgage executed by defendant and her husband, not alleging the acknowledgment of the mortgage, and an answer by way of cross-bill not asserting that it was not acknowledged, which allegation should be pleaded by one seeking to take advantage of it, the court would assume that prior to recording the mortgage was duly acknowledged as required by law, and that the only grounds upon which the wife sought relief were those stated in her cross-bill. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. §§ 386-389; Dec. Dig. 153.] 8. ACKNOWLEDGMENT ~55(2)—Married WoMAN-CONCLUSIVENESS OF CERTIFICATE. as she had no interest in the transaction of the purchase of the saloon, she did not think that she ought to be present at the negotiations or sign any papers. Upon her husband receiving her refusal he became greatly offended, and charged her with standing in his way of taking advantage of a good opportunity. Not desiring to destroy her husband's success in business, she consented to attend the negotiations for the purchase of the saloon." She then says: That she went with her husband to an office in the downtown section of New York, which she was informed was a law office; "that there were present the lawyer, whom she did not know, her Max Sandt, and she was requested by her hushusband, and a person she was informed was band and the lawyer to sign some notes, which she was informed her husband was to give to said Max Sandt to secure the purchase price of Where a wife executed a mortgage to se- said saloon, and at the same time she was recure purchase-money notes representing her hus-quested to sign a mortgage to secure the payband's indebtedness, and acknowledged the mortgage in due form of law on a private examination separate from her husband, and where the mortgagee had no knowledge of any alleged coercive acts of the husband and was not a party to them, the wife could not assert that prior to such examination her husband had exerted undue influence upon her. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Acknowledgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 303-314; Dec. Dig. 55(2).] Bill to foreclose by the Colonial Building & Loan Association against Margaret Griffin and George I. Macklin, with cross-bill by the defendant Griffin against the defendant Macklin. Decree for complainant, and answer by way of cross-bill stricken out. Joseph F. Farmer, of Jersey City, for complainant. John F. Marion, of Jersey City, for defendant Griffin. Treacy & Milton, of Jersey City, for defendant Macklin. ment; she again refused to sign said notes and mortgage, and her husband became very angry, and told her it was only a matter of form, that he would take care of the notes, and after considerable pursuasion on the part of her husband, and because of her fear to anger him, she consented to execute the necessary papers; that she did not sign a mortgage to secure a preexisting debt of her husband's, but, on the contrary, she was induced to sign as maker a series of promissory notes (the exact amounts and dates she does not now recall), and that the mortgage she gave to Max Sandt was to secure sald notes, and not to secure a debt of her husband's as by reference to said mortgage will to the said Sandt as part of the consideration for more fully appear; that said notes were given the said saloon sold by the said Sandt to her husband, and that she never directly or indirectly received any money, property, or thing of value for her own use or benefit, or for the use, benefit, or advantage of her separate estate, and that she never paid any of said notes as they came due, or was she ever requested to, nor had she ever paid any interest on any mortgage, or was she ever requested to, and that said notes and said mortgage are invalid according to section 5 of the Married Women's Act and the amendments thereto." GRIFFIN, V. C. The complainant filed its bill to foreclose, making the defendant Margaret Griffin a party as mortgagor, and also making the defendant George I. Macklin The defendant Macklin now seeks to strike a defendant as the assignee of a mortgage out the part of the answer filed by way of |