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Opinion of the Court
domicile. See Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Emmerson, 271 U. S. 50, 53–55 (1926); cf. United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 21 (1960).
Burlington is left with the argument that Power Manufacturing Co. v. Saunders, supra, controls this case. But it does not. In Saunders, we considered Arkansas' venue rules, which restricted suit against a domestic corporation to those counties where it maintained a place of business, 274 U. S., at 491-492, but exposed foreign corporations to suit in any county, id., at 492. We held that the distinction lacked a rational basis and therefore deprived foreign corporate defendants of the equal protection of the laws. Id., at 494. The statutory provision challenged in Saunders, however, applied only to foreign corporations authorized to do business in Arkansas, ibid., so that most of the corporations subject to its any-county rule probably had a place of business in Arkansas. In contrast, most of the corporations subject to Montana's any-county rule probably do not have their principal place of business in Montana. Thus, Arkansas' special rule for foreign corporations was tailored with significantly less precision than Montana's, and, on the assumption that Saunders is still good law, see American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Starnes, 425 U. S. 637, 645, n. 6 (1976), its holding does not invalidate Montana's venue rules.
In sum, Montana's venue rules can be understood as rationally furthering a legitimate state interest. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana is accordingly
UNITED STATES V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 91–712. Argued April 1, 1992—Decided June 15, 1992 Respondent, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was forcibly kidnaped from his home and flown by private plane to Texas, where he was arrested for his participation in the kidnaping and murder of a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent and the agent's pilot. After concluding that DEA agents were responsible for the abduction, the District Court dismissed the indictment on the ground that it violated the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico (Extradition Treaty or Treaty), and ordered respondent's repatriation. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Based on one of its prior decisions, the court found that, since the United States had authorized the abduction and since the Mexican Government had protested the Treaty violation, jurisdiction was
improper. Held: The fact of respondent's forcible abduction does not prohibit his trial
in a United States court for violations of this country's criminal laws. Pp. 659-670.
(a) A defendant may not be prosecuted in violation of the terms of an extradition treaty. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407. However, when a treaty has not been invoked, a court may properly exercise jurisdiction even though the defendant's presence is procured by means of a forcible abduction. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436. Thus, if the Extradition Treaty does not prohibit respondent's abduction, the rule of Ker applies and jurisdiction was proper. Pp. 659–662.
(b) Neither the Treaty's language nor the history of negotiations and practice under it supports the proposition that it prohibits abductions outside of its terms. The Treaty says nothing about either country refraining from forcibly abducting people from the other's territory or the consequences if an abduction occurs. In addition, although the Mexican Government was made aware of the Ker doctrine as early as 1906, and language to curtail Ker was drafted as early as 1935, the Treaty's current version contains no such clause. Pp. 663-666.
(c) General principles of international law provide no basis for interpreting the Treaty to include an implied term prohibiting international abductions. It would go beyond established precedent and practice to draw such an inference from the Treaty based on respondent's argument that abductions are so clearly prohibited in international law that there
was no reason to include the prohibition in the Treaty itself. It was the practice of nations with regard to extradition treaties that formed the basis for this Court's decision in Rauscher, supra, to imply a term in the extradition treaty between the United States and England. Respondent's argument, however, would require a much larger inferential leap with only the most general of international law principles to support it. While respondent may be correct that his abduction was “shocking” and in violation of general international law principles, the decision whether he should be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside
the Treaty, is a matter for the Executive Branch. Pp. 666–670. 946 F. 2d 1466, reversed and remanded.
REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, post, p. 670.
Solicitor General Starr argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Mueller, Deputy Solicitor General Bryson, Michael R. Dreeben, and Kathleen A. Felton.
Paul L. Hoffman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Ralph G. Steinhardt, Robin S. Toma, Mark D. Rosenbaum, John A. Powell, Steven R. Shapiro, Kate Martin, and Robert Steinberg.*
* Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson filed a brief for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as amicus curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Government of Canada by Axel Kleiboemer; for the United Mexican States by Bruno A. Ristau and Michael Abbell; for the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic et al. by Harold Hongju Koh, Michael Ratner, Peter Weiss, and David Cole; for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York by Sidney S. Rosdeitcher; for the International Human Rights Law Group by Paul Nielson and Steven M. Schneebaum; for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights by Ruth Wedgwood; for the Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee by David S. Weissbrodt; and for Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez by Patrick Q. Hall and Charles L. Goldberg
Kenneth Roth and Stephen M. Kristovich filed a brief for Americas Watch as amicus curiae.
Opinion of the Court
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
The issue in this case is whether a criminal defendant, abducted to the United States from a nation with which it has an extradition treaty, thereby acquires a defense to the jurisdiction of this country's courts. We hold that he does not, and that he may be tried in federal district court for violations of the criminal law of the United States.
Respondent, Humberto Alvarez-Machain, is a citizen and resident of Mexico. He was indicted for participating in the kidnap and murder of United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) special agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar and a Mexican pilot working with Camarena, Alfredo ZavalaAvelar.1 The DEA believes that respondent, a medical doctor, participated in the murder by prolonging Agent Camarena's life so that others could further torture and interrogate him. On April 2, 1990, respondent was forcibly kidnaped from his medical office in Guadalajara, Mexico, to be flown by private plane to El Paso, Texas, where he was arrested by DEA officials. The District Court concluded that DEA agents were responsible for respondent's abduction, although they were not personally involved in it. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602–604, 609 (CD Cal. 1990).
1 Respondent is charged in a sixth superseding indictment with: conspiracy to commit violent acts in furtherance of racketeering activity (in violation of 18 U. S. C. $$371, 1959); committing violent acts in furtherance of racketeering activity (in violation of $ 1959(a)(2)); conspiracy to kidnap a federal agent (in violation of $$ 1201(a)(6), (c)); kidnap of a federal agent (in violation of 1201(a)(5)); and felony murder of a federal agent (in violation of $$ 1111(a), 1114). App. 12–32.
2 Apparently, DEA officials had attempted to gain respondent's presence in the United States through informal negotiations with Mexican officials, but were unsuccessful. DEA officials then, through a contact in Mexico, offered to pay a reward and expenses in return for the delivery of respondent to the United States. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp., at 602-604.
Opinion of the Court
Respondent moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that his abduction constituted outrageous governmental conduct, and that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to try him because he was abducted in violation of the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978,  United States-United Mexican States, 31 U. S. T. 5059, T. I. A. S. No. 9656 (Extradition Treaty or Treaty). The District Court rejected the outrageous governmental conduct claim, but held that it lacked jurisdiction to try respondent because his abduction violated the Extradition Treaty. The District Court discharged respondent and ordered that he be repatriated to Mexico. 745 F. Supp., at 614.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the indictment and the repatriation of respondent, relying on its decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F. 2d 1341 (CA9 1991), cert. pending, No. 91-670. 946 F. 2d 1466 (1991). In Verdugo, the Court of Appeals held that the forcible abduction of a Mexican national with the authorization or participation of the United States violated the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico.3 Although the Treaty does not expressly prohibit such abductions, the Court of Appeals held that the “purpose” of the Treaty was violated by a forcible abduction, 939 F. 2d, at 1350, which, along with a formal protest by the offended nation, would give a defendant the right to invoke the Treaty violation to defeat jurisdiction of the District Court to try him. The Court of Appeals further held that the proper remedy for
3 Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez was also indicted for the murder of Agent Camarena. In an earlier decision, we held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to a search by United States agents of VerdugoUrquidez' home in Mexico. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259 (1990).
4 The Court of Appeals remanded for an evidentiary hearing as to whether Verdugo's abduction had been authorized by authorities in the United States. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F. 2d, at 1362.