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Opinion of SCALIA, J.
plied with the so-called “narrowing” requirement imposed by the line of cases commencing with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972). The constitutional "error" whose harmlessness is at issue, then, concerns only the inclusion of the "coldness” factor in the weighing of the aggravating factors against the mitigating evidence petitioner offered. It has been my view that the Eighth Amendment does not require any consideration of mitigating evidence, see Walton V. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 656 (1990) (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment)—a view I am increasingly confirmed in, as the byzantine complexity of the death penalty jurisprudence we are annually accreting becomes more and more apparent. Since the weighing here was in my view not constitutionally required, any error in the doing of it raised no federal question. For that reason, I would affirm the death sentence.
LUJAN, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR v.
DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
No. 90–1424. Argued December 3, 1991–Decided June 12, 1992 Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 divides responsibil
ities regarding the protection of endangered species between petitioner Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce, and requires each federal agency to consult with the relevant Secretary to ensure that any action funded by the agency is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence or habitat of any endangered or threatened species. Both Secretaries initially promulgated a joint regulation extending § 7(a)(2)'s coverage to actions taken in foreign nations, but a subsequent joint rule limited the section's geographic scope to the United States and the high seas. Respondents, wildlife conservation and other environmental organizations, filed an action in the District Court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the new regulation erred as to $ 7(a)(2)'s geographic scope and an injunction requiring the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate a new rule restoring his initial interpretation. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's dismissal of the suit for lack of standing. Upon remand, on cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court denied the Secretary's motion, which renewed his objection to standing, and granted respondents' motion, ordering the
Secretary to publish a new rule. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. 911 F. 2d 117, reversed and remanded.
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III-B, concluding that respondents lack standing to seek judicial review of the rule. Pp. 559-567, 571-578.
(a) As the parties invoking federal jurisdiction, respondents bear the burden of showing standing by establishing, inter alia, that they have suffered an injury in fact, i. e., a concrete and particularized, actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest. To survive a summary judgment motion, they must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts to support their claim. Standing is particularly difficult to show here, since third parties, rather than respondents, are the object of the Government action or inaction to which respondents object. Pp. 559-562.
(b) Respondents did not demonstrate that they suffered an injury in fact. Assuming that they established that funded activities abroad threaten certain species, they failed to show that one or more of their members would thereby be directly affected apart from the members' special interest in the subject. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 735, 739. Affidavits of members claiming an intent to revisit project sites at some indefinite future time, at which time they will presumably be denied the opportunity to observe endangered animals, do not suffice, for they do not demonstrate an “imminent” injury. Respondents also mistakenly rely on a number of other novel standing theories. Their theory that any person using any part of a contiguous ecosystem adversely affected by a funded activity has standing even if the activity is located far away from the area of their use is inconsistent with this Court's opinion in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U. S. 871. And they state purely speculative, nonconcrete injuries when they argue that suit can be brought by anyone with an interest in studying or seeing endangered animals anywhere on the globe and anyone with a professional interest in such animals. Pp. 562-567.
(c) The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondents had standing on the ground that the statute's citizen-suit provision confers on all persons the right to file suit to challenge the Secretary's failure to follow the proper consultative procedure, notwithstanding their inability to allege any separate concrete injury flowing from that failure. This Court has consistently held that a plaintiff claiming only a generally available grievance about government, unconnected with a threatened concrete interest of his own, does not state an Article III case or controversy. See, e. g., Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U. S. 126, 129–130. Vindicating the public interest is the function of the Congress and the Chief Executive. To allow that interest to be converted into an individual right by a statute denominating it as such and permitting all citizens to sue, regardless of whether they suffered any concrete injury, would authorize Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” Art. II, $3. Pp. 57 -578.
SCALIA, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and IV, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III-B, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE and THOMAS, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which SOUTER, J., joined, post, p. 579. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post,
Opinion of the Court
p. 581. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 589.
Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Assistant Attorney General Hartman, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Robert L. Klarquist, David C. Shilton, Thomas L. Sansonetti, and Michael Young.
Brian B. O'Neill argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Steven C. Schroer and Richard A. Duncan.*
JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and IV, and an opinion with respect to Part III-B, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE THOMAS join.
This case involves a challenge to a rule promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior interpreting $ 7 of the Endangered
*Terence P. Ross, Daniel J. Popeo, and Richard A. Samp filed a brief for the Washington Legal Foundation et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the City of Austin et al. by William A. Butler, Angus E. Crane, Michael J. Bean, Kenneth Oden, James M. McCormack, and Wm. Robert Irvin; for the American Association of Zoological Parks & Aquariums et al. by Ronald J. Greene and W. Hardy Callcott; for the American Institute of Biological Sciences by Richard J. Wertheimer and Charles M. Chambers; and for the Ecotropica Foundation of Brazil et al. by Durwood J. Zaelke.
A brief of amici curiae was filed for the State of Texas et al. by Patrick J. Mahoney, Dan Morales, Attorney General of Texas, Will Pryor, First Assistant Attorney General, Mary F. Keller, Deputy Attorney General, and Nancy N. Lynch, Mary Ruth Holder, and Shannon J. Kilgore, Assistant Attorneys General, Grant Woods, Attorney General of Arizona, Winston Bryant, Attorney General of Arkansas, Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General of Florida, Michael E. Carpenter, Attorney General of Maine, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Robert J. Del Tufo, Attorney General of New Jersey, Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, Lee Fisher, Attorney General of Ohio, and Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General of Vermont, Victor A. Kovner, Leonard J. Koerner, Neal M. Janey, and Louise H. Renne.
Opinion of the Court
Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 87 Stat. 892, as amended, 16 U. S. C. $ 1536, in such fashion as to render it applicable only to actions within the United States or on the high seas. The preliminary issue, and the only one we reach, is whether respondents here, plaintiffs below, have standing to seek judicial review of the rule.
I The ESA, 87 Stat. 884, as amended, 16 U. S. C. $ 1531 et seq., seeks to protect species of animals against threats to their continuing existence caused by man. See generally TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153 (1978). The ESA instructs the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate by regulation a list of those species which are either endangered or threatened under enumerated criteria, and to define the critical habitat of these species. 16 U. S. C. $$ 1533, 1536. Section 7(a)(2) of the Act then provides, in pertinent part:
“Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary [of the Interior), insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical.” 16 U. S. C. § 1536(a)(2).
In 1978, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), on behalf of the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce respectively, promulgated a joint regulation stating that the obligations imposed by $ 7(a)(2) extend to actions taken in foreign nations. 43 Fed. Reg. 874 (1978). The next year, however, the Interior Department began to reexamine its position. Letter from Leo Kuliz, Solicitor, Department of the Interior, to Assistant Secretary, Fish and Wildlife and Parks, Aug. 8, 1979. A revised joint regulation, reinterpret