by all free white male citizens of the Commonwealth, of the age of twenty-one years, who shall reside in the county, city, or borough, in which they respectively propose to vote, and shall have so resided for one whole year next before the time of election; other than those who shall have failed, in this Commonwealth, to pay any public tax or levy, or part thereof, within either of the two years next preceding the one in which they propose to vote; or paupers; or those under judgment of felony or other infamous crime; or soldiers, mariners, or marines in the service of the State, or of the United States: And that the right of suffrage may be exercised only by persons disposed for the prosperity and well-being of the Commonwealth, there shall be a tax of twenty-five cents per annum, levied on every free white man of the age of twenty-one years, to be collected and paid into the public treasury; and the Legislature shall annually set apart an amount of the property-tax equal to the whole amount of poll-tax so paid in; and these two suins shall be annually appropriated and constitute a principal fund, always to be preserved and vested in profitable stocks, or put to profitable uses, the interest and profit whereof, shall, in the best manner, be applied every year to the education of the youth of Virginia."

Mr. Leigh said, he perceived that it seemed to be the understanding of gentlemen, that under the rule reported by the Committee on rules of order, all propositions for amendments to the Constitution, must be made in the Convention itself, before they could be laid before the Committee of the Whole. Gentlemen, he saw, were acting on such an understanding. He had not so apprehended the meaning of the rule when it was adopted; on the contrary, he had supposed that members were at full liberty to move their proposed amendments in the Committee, without previously submitting them to the House. If this were not the just understaning of the rule, it ought to be known: and he now asked for information.

On motion of Mr. Mennis, the resolution containing the rule was read.

Mr. Doddridge said, that his understanding of the rule was, that when the Constitution in any of its parts, or the Bill of Rights, should be taken up in Committee of the Whole, it would then be in order for any gentleman to propose such amendments as related to the subject under consideration. If such a construction were not adopted, the Convention might have the whole political creed of every one of its members spread upon its minutes in the form of resolutions. The substance of the resolutions which had just been read, would have been properly presented in Committee of the Whole at the appropriate time. For instance: the great subject of the right of suf frage had been reported upon by the Legislative Committee, having been specified under three distinct resolutions. As each of these came before the Committee, every gentleman could propose to amend it in such way as to him seemed expedient, by striking out, for example, the property qualification, or that in relation to freehold, and so on. He trusted this course would be pursued, as it was obviously the most convenient. Mr. Leigh said, that he had so understood the rule: All that it forbade, was the dis cussion and decision of any question of amendment, before it should have been submitted and considered in Committee of the Whole.

Mr. Stanard observed, that the resolution offered by the gentleman from Chesterfield, (Mr. Leigh,) would remove all difficulty on this subject. It includes in its provisions, a permission for new propositions being offered in Committee of the Whole. This was, indeed, the very end and purpose of that resolution: that the Committee of the Whole, in this Convention, might have the same liberty in this respect, as belonged to a Committee of the Whole, on the state of the Commonwealth, in the House of Delegates. He called for the reading of Mr. Leigh's resolution; and it was read accordingly.

On motion of Mr. Leigh, the Convention then proceeded to the Order of the Day, and went into Committee of the Whole, Mr. P. P. Barbour in the Chair.

The Chairman stated, that the subjects assigned to the Committee for its consideration, were the existing Constitution of Virginia, together with the several reports from the Select Committees, proposing amendments thereto, and such other amendments, as had been offered by individual members: the Committee were at liberty to take up any one of these subjects, in such order as might be determined on.

Mr. Doddridge observed, that the report from the Committee on the Legislative Department, would, he presumed, be generally considered at first in order of importance, among the reports before the Committee, from the nature of the subjects on which it treated. But, according to the form of the resolution under which the Committee had been appointed, that upon the Bill of Rights had precedence; and he therefore moved, that the report of the Select Committee on the Bill of Rights, be now taken up.

The motion was agreed to, and that report was thereupon read at the Clerk's table; and the question being on concurring with the Committee in their report, it was decided in the affirmative, nem, con.

So the report was concurred in by the Convention.

Mr. Powell now suggested, as a question of order, whether, as the report had declared, that the Bill of Rights needs no amendment, and the Convention had adopted that report, it was to be understood as precluding all additions to the Bill of Rights; and thereby shutting out the resolutions, which had, on Friday last, been submitted and laid upon the table, by his friend from Norfolk, (Mr. Taylor.)

The Chair replied, that, as the Convention had just decided, that the Bill of Rights needs no amendment, the propositions to amend it, whether by diminution, alteration, or addition, would be out of order.

Mr. Taylor said he was very unexpectedly called to address the Chair; he had had no expectation that the subject of the resolutions which he had had the honor to submit, would come up in any shape to-day; and so uninformed was he, as to the forms of parliamentary proceeding, as not to have apprehended that the rules of order would lead to such a decision as had just been pronounced by the Chair. It was not certainly for him to question that decision; but he should have apprehended, that when the Convention, by adopting the report of its Committee, had decided that the Bill of Rights needs no amendment, it had not in effect, said, that all additions were inadmissible. If, however, he was mistaken in the apprehension, he felt persuaded, that there existed in this body, a disposition that would lead it rather to consent to re-consider its vote, than, by insisting upon it, to exclude from consideration, resolutions, which, whatever might be their merit, referred to questions of the deepest importance. He asked, therefore, from the candour and generosity of the House, that they would consent to a re-consideration, with a view to let in the resolutions, he had had the honor to submit.

Mr. Johnson said, that perhaps he had misapprehended, either to what resolutions the gentleman referred, or else their true character. If they were those resolutions which he had seen printed in the papers, as offered by the gentleman from Norfolk, he could not conceive that they were at all excluded from the consideration of the Committee, by its having adopted the report in relation to the Bill of Rights. Those resolutions proposed an amendment, not to the Bill of Rights, but to the Constitution of Virginia. They pertained, as he understood thein, to subjects reported upon by the Legislative Committee, and would be perfectly in order when the report of that Committee should be taken up for consideration.

The Chair observed, that it had expressed no opinion as to the nature or tendency of the resolutions, but had merely decided, that, if proposed as an addition to the Bill of Rights, they must be considered technically as an amendment to that instrument, and therefore out of order, inasmuch as the House had said the Bill of Rights should not be amended.

Mr. Doddridge now moved, that the report of the Legislative Committee be taken up and considered; and the motion was carried-Ayes 48-Noes 33.

Mr. Powell said, that he had thought there was a subject already before the Committee, viz: the question of re-consideration.

The Chair replied, that no express motion to that effect had been made, and the suggestion of the gentleman from Norfolk, had, as he understood, been waived in consequence of the remarks of the gentleman from Augusta.

Mr. Doddridge said, he had certainly so understood the matter, or he should not have made his motion: he trusted the vote would be re-considered.

Mr. Johnson said, that it was only necessary to lay the report of the Legislative Committee on the table; and he made that motion; which being agreed to, the report was laid upon the table accordingly. The vote, approving the report of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, was then re-considered, and the Bill of Rights itself was taken up, read at the Clerk's table, and afterwards read from the Chair by sections, for amendment.

No amendment being proposed by any other member of the Convention,

On motion of Mr. Campbell of Brooke, the resolutions offered on Saturday by Mr. Taylor were read, and the third resolution having been modified by the mover so as to read as follows; "Representation shall be uniform throughout the State," the whole were taken up for consideration in the following form:

1. Resolved, That the elective franchise should be uniform; so that, throughout the State, similar qualifications should confer a similar right of suffrage.

2. Resolved, That, among those entitled by the Constitution to exercise the elective franchise, there should be entire equality of suffrage; so that, in all elections, the suffrage of one qualified voter should avail as much as that of another qualified voter, whatever may be the disparity of their respective fortunes.

3. Resored, That representation shall be uniform throughout the State.

4. Resolved, That as individual suffrage should be equal, without respect to the disparity of individual fortune, so an equal number of qualified voters are entitled to equal representation, without regard to the disparity of their aggregate fortunes.

5. Resolved, That in all pecuniary contributions to the public service, regard should be had to the ability of individuals to contribute; and as this ability to pay, from dis

parity of fortune, is unequal, it would be unjust and oppressive to require each citizen to pay an equal amount of public taxes.

Mr. TAYLOR then rose and addressed the Committee in substance, as follows: Mr. Chairman,-As the resolutions just read were offered by me, parliamentary usage requires that I should explain and defend them. I should enter on this duty, under the most auspicious circumstances, with great diffidence and embarrassment. The incidents, which have just occurred in the presence of the Convention, are by no means calculated to diminish these feelings. I do not affect not to have bestowed upon these resolutions the consideration which is due to their own intrinsic importance; due to the intelligence of the body which I now address; due to the deep influence which all that is done here is likely to have on the destinies of our country: nor can I forget that self-respect forbids me to lay before such an assembly a collection of crude, undigested thoughts. But I am taken by surprise, both as to the time and the manner in which this subject has been brought up, and have not, therefore, marshaled my ideas, humble as they are, in a manner to exhibit them as I could have wished them to appear. Nevertheless, I shall not shrink from the duty which I conceive to be enjoined upon me by every sentiment of manhood and patriotism; but shall perform it to the best of my poor ability, with all the sincerity which the deepest conviction of their truth can demand, with the zeal which its great importance ought to inspire; and, believe me, Sir, with all that deference, not of manner or of speech alone, but that deep deference of the heart which I ought to feel and to acknowledge, in the presence of such an assembly.

Sir, I will own frankly, that I have scarce any thing of reasoning or of argument to bring forward in support of these resolutions. This, I hope, however, will not throw any discredit upon them: for, I confess to you, it is the very circumstance which recommended them to my adoption. There are some truths, so simple and self-evident, that their most perfect demonstration is furnished by the terms of the proposition itself. Axioms, or self-evident truths, carry conviction to the human mind, the moment they are announced. And, it may be safely affirmed of all propositions which the wit of man can suggest, that the probability of their truth, is in an inverse ratio, to the reasoning and proof required to sustain them. Just in proportion as any affirmation approaches the axiomatic character, in that same degree is the range of argument in its support, limited and restrained. If the resolutions I have submitted have any merit, it lies in this solely: the principles they contain are so evident and obvious, that they neither require nor admit of argument to sustain them. What I have to say, therefore, is rather by way of explanation than of argument: believing, as I do, that this will constitute their sufficient defence and best apology.

I pray the Convention to recollect that the resolutions refer to two distinct objects; the elective franchise and the principle of taxation; and that their purpose is to give to these two great principles a constitutional consecration..

The principle of taxation, and the elective franchise, at all times most important, especially in a country of free institutions like ours, have now a peculiar interest, from their bearing on the great and paramount question, which occupies every head, and throbs in every heart in this Convention: I mean the question of basis and apportionment of representation. They are presented mainly with a view to their bearing on that object.

When I arrived here, my opinions on these subjects, were not formed: the only sentiment in my heart, was a most ardent and sincere desire to know what was truth, and when found, to pursue it. I sought light every where; conversed with gentle men of various and opposite opinions; sought for facts in all directions, and listened to the reasoning which was founded on thein, with the honest intention of giving due effect to both. But I confess to you, Sir, that as I proceeded, my own judgment became bewildered in this process. Nor is such a result at all surprising; for, the mental, like the bodily vision, we all know, may be destroyed as well by the excess, as by the absence of light. My intellect, I own, was insufficient to take in so many conflicting and various principles, at a single glance; still less was it able to pursue them, through all their multiplied and endless combinations; least of all, was it capable of blending them into one mass, giving to each fact, and to each argument, its proper force, and deriving a result, which should be satisfactory to my own mind. Under circumstances so perplexing, I resorted to what I conceived to be the only remedy: one which rarely had deceived me: it was, to simplify, to disentangle this skein of fact and argument, to analyse the materials of which it was composed; to search for principles; to learn the reasons of them; and finally, to draw a just conclusion, to the best of my humble capacity. The result is embodied in those resolutions: which, if they shall answer no other purpose, may at least furnish channels into which the thoughts and arguments of other gentlemen may be directed; by which means the talent and intelligence of the House may be drawn out and concentrated. I certainly should not have offered them, had I not believed them true. But, Sir, I value truth more than consistency: I will, therefore, endeavour to subdue in my breast, that pride

of opinion, so natural to man; and am ready to abandon these resolutions the moment I shall be convinced of their fallacy. To have committed, and to have proclaimed, what shall afterwards prove to have been an error in judgment, is a venial offence; an offence, fully expiated by the mortification of confessing it (which I am ready to endure) but to persist after the judgment is convinced of its error, is an unpardon

able sin.

Four of the resolutions refer to the elective franchise: by the leave of the House, I will read them.

[Here Mr. T. read the first four resolutions.]

The Committee will perceive that all these several propositions grow out of one principle, and refer but to one object, the elective franchise, and the mode in which it is to be exercised. Permit me to preface what I have to say respecting them, by a very few general remarks.

All our institutions, whether State or Federal, in their character, are founded in the assumption of three political truths: 1. That a free Government is the best calculated to promote human happiness, if not universally in all countries and in all times, at least in the American States: 2. That the sovereignty resides, of right, and in fact, in the people: 3. That the best mode of administering Government is by agents, instead of the people personally. I shall not stay to enquire whether these assumptions be false or true: I do not indeed, for myself, hesitate to declare my unqualified belief that they are consonant with all the dictates of reason and of truth; and I believe that I express the sentiments of every individual in this Convention, when I make the declaration. But I allude not to these principles, either to justify or to condemn them; I only call the attention of the Committee to the fact, that all our institutions rest on these great principles of Representative Republics: Republican in this, that they repose the sovereignty solely in the people: Representative in this, that that sovereignty shall be exercised through the administration of agents, of representatives; and not personally, by the people. Nor is it my intention to enquire who are the people, in whom this sovereignty is supposed to reside? Some gentlemen think that they include every individual in the community, without regard to age or sex: others maintain that the people are, all who fight and pay; all who defend their country in the hour of peril, or contribute to supply its purse in "the piping times of peace:" while others, again, insist, that "people" means those only on whom the Constitution confers the right of exercising political power! (I used a wrong word; I will correct the language; I should have said not those on whom the Constitution confers, but in whom it recognizes the right of exercising political power.) Gentlemen may entertain as many different opinions on this point as they please; I meddle not with them now; the resolutions do not even approach these opinions. On the contrary, they pre-suppose that the Constitution has already determined by whom the elective franchise is to be exercised, and only attempt to regulate the mode of its action. The principle of the resolutions is as applicable to one suffragan (I know not if the term be strictly proper,) to one voter, as to another; and will be equally just, whether you shall adopt the plan of freehold suffrage, or any other, in its stead.

I have made these general remarks with a view of shewing that the elective franchise is an essential part of our system; that it furnishes the mode, and the only mode, whereby effect can be given to the principle of representative administration. The elective franchise looks to two objects: first, the persons who are to exercise it; that is, suffrage: secondly, to the effect of suffrage; that is, representation.

Suffrage, then shall it be uniform throughout the State? or shall it be diverse in dizers parts of the State? so that, one man shall have a right in one part of the State, which, in circumstances exactly similar, shall not be enjoyed by another, in a different part of the State? This question, it is the purpose of the first resolution to settle. The Bill of Rights declares that all elections shall be free: I would farther add and shall be uniform." Convenience recommends it. It will avoid the confusion of having different rules in different places; rules local and personal; instead of universal and uniform. Justice and equal rights require it. There can be no departure from the rules of uniformity, without conferring on some, immunities and privileges which are denied to others, in direct opposition to two other articles in this same Bill of Rights. The propriety of inserting such a resolution in your Constitution, ases from the fact, that the present Constitution has not so provided; but, on the contrary, establishes the very reverse. Its basis of representation, is the possession of freehold. In this, its rule may have been thought uniform; but there are portions of the State, in which the Constitution establishes a local rule, applying to that portion alone. In West Augusta, the existing Constitution recognized the right in "landholders" who were not freeholders. West Augusta, at the time the Constitution was adopted, comprehended a large extent of territory, from which many counties have since been formed. It then formed a barrier against Indian warfare; and their titles, founded on occupancy only, were held by the tenure of the rifle, and not by parchment. There were others, who were incapable of perfecting their title by the

existing law. In 1752, it was the policy of the Colony, to erect a barrier against the Indians, on our western frontier. With a view to this object, we invited within our boundary "foreign Protestants;" aliens, who could neither hold nor transmit lands. So, in the Borough of Norfolk, and in the City of Williamsburg, the right of suffrage was extended to individuals, in a manner different from what it is in the other portions of Virginia. These rights I hope to see extended to others similarly situated. The object of my resolution is, to remove these anomalies, and to establish one law, and one rule, for all who enjoy the privilege of voting at all. To establish such uniform rule, is the only object of the first resolution.

Suffrage being established, whether uniform or diverse, another enquiry presents itself of great delicacy and importance. What shall be the effect of suffrage? I mean not as it regards representation, but as between the voters themselves. Are all to be units? all of alike value? or, will you graduate the votes given? Will you regulate their value by the excess of the property the coter may own, over and above the standard which you shall have erected?

The resolution proposes, when you have fixed the qualification to be possessed by all voters, to make all the votes equal, without regard to any disparity of fortune among the voters and I pray the House to indulge me, while I attempt the development of the principle I advocate, by a particular application of it. But I premonish the House, that I offer an explanation on this subject, not because I suppose there exists among us any diversity of opinion, as to creating this uniformity within the same district. My object is, to ascertain principles, with a view to their ulterior application. Imagine a county containing three hundred qualified voters; of these, two hundred and fifty vote for A; the remaining fifty vote for B? Tell me which ought to be the representative of that county? The question may seem strange. Yet the House will perceive, that the decision of this question depends upon another, viz: whether you will graduate the votes given by the wealth of the voters, or whether you will make all the voters count as units, all of equal value. For explanation? Suppose of the two hundred and fifty voters for A, each owns a freehold worth one hundred dollars, and that the fifty who vote for B, besides possessing this qualification, own besides, each a large estate, say worth one thousand dollars. If numbers are to elect, A elected, by five to one: but, if wealth is to elect, if property is to be taken into view, not merely for the safety, but for the effect of elections, then B is elected; fifty thousand dollars is on B's side; but twenty-five thousand dollars on A's. If numbers elect, A is chosen, five to one; if wealth, then B is chosen, two to one. But, suppose you adopt a compound ratio, produced by multiplying wealth into numbers; what will then be the result? While A gets but twenty-five thousand two hundred and fifty, B gets fifty thousand and fifty. So that the result is still precisely the same; the effect is just what it would have been, if reference had been had to wealth alone.

Perhaps I may be told, this is a subject about which it is impossible for gentlemen to differ. Excuse me : it is the subject on which alone there is any great difference of opinion in the House. For the contemplated ratio, the compound of numbers and taration, so earnestly insisted on as the true basis of representation, is neither more nor less, however it may be disguised, than this very thing. Let me imagine an argument on this subject. Let me suppose the question between A's right and B's to come up here, and you to be the umpires between them; and then let me endeavour to imagine the argument in behalf of B, (having fifty votes.) The advocates of B would tell you that Government was formed chiefly, if not solely, for the protection of property: That there is a natural, inherent enmity between capital and labour: That the contest is interminable between persons and wealth, (for, strip the subject of the mystification, by which it is usually surrounded, and labour and capital mean no more!) That the two hundred and fifty voters who voted for A, though individually honest, are, through the ignorance and infirmity of human nature, not worthy of be ing intrusted with political power: Will they not appeal to experience, and insist that that touch-stone has tried what the nature of man is, and has decided that when the many possess the powe of exercising rapine upon the few, it has ever followed that they exercise such power and commit the depredation: That, if the Government were so constituted as to give the power of representation by numbers only, and so admit the two hundred and fifty to elect their representative, the effect would be, that as he would be bound to obey his constituents, the rapine would still take place, with this only difference, that it would be accomplished by the forms of legislation, instead of force, without any forin at all: That there can be no guarantee against the effect: That the guarantee afforded by the power of law, the sanctity of the Constitution, and the force of moral principle, however they may be found sufficient for the protection of life and of reputation, prove totally inadequate as a safeguard for property: That the only effectual, only sufficient guarantee, is to give to the fifty votes for B more effect than the two hundred and fitty votes for A: That, in a word, the only means of guarding property is to place the power of Government in the hands