CHAPTER XI

PETERSBURG AND APPOMATTOX

"I BEGIN to see it. You will succeed. God bless you all." Such was the message of Lincoln to his trusted general, when he learned of the crossing of the James. It marks the beginning of the second stage of Grant's campaign against Lee, in which the object and methods were widely different from the earlier ones. If Grant could not win a decisive victory outside of Richmond and so destroy the fighting power of the enemy, then obviously the proper course of action was to hold Richmond and Lee's army in a vise-like grip while the other armies of the Union conquered the sources of supplies and contracting, like the anaconda, would eventually strangle the Confederacy. This was the policy of the next nine months, and that it was carried on with so complete a success must be attributed to the quality of Grant's patriotism which made him willing to endure criticism and reproach, while his subordinates were winning laurels for themselves in environing fields of action.

Petersburg is an outpost of Richmond, located twenty-two miles to the south, on the lower bank of the Appomattox, which is navigable for large vessels up to that point. At this time it had a

population of less than twenty thousand, but its importance was derived from the fact that it was a railroad centre. From the east came the Norfolk and Petersburg Railroad now under Union control, but from the south came the important Weldon Railroad connecting with Raleigh, Goldsboro and Wilmington, the latter one of the few remaining Atlantic ports available for blockade-runners with their much-needed supplies; to the west ran the Southside Railroad to Lynchburg, and the food for the Army of Northern Virginia, as well as the city of Richmond, was brought in large measure over these two roads. In addition to the connecting railroad from Petersburg there were two other railroads to Richmond, still under Confederate control; one ran southwest to Danville and Greensboro, crossing the Southside Railroad at Burkesville, and the other ran northwest to Gordonsville, connecting with the rich Valley of the Shenandoah. It was evident that the cutting of these railroads meant famine in Richmond and eventually surrender, and the strategy of the concluding campaigns is based upon an appreciation of this situation.

In the opening months of the siege, both armies were reduced in numbers. Although Lee had received heavy reinforcements during his retreat south and had now united with Beauregard, he had detached over 25,000 men for operations in the Shenandoah under Early, and there were times when the total force under his immediate command was less than 50,000. Likewise Grant had been

compelled to provide for the defense of Washington and eventually for an offensive movement under Sheridan, so as to reduce his main army to less than 90,000. Notwithstanding the exhaustion of his forces, he was not content with the slow processes of siege. The week after the assault on Petersburg, the Second and Sixth Corps were moved to the left in an effort to cut the Weldon road, but this movement was not well conducted and Hill thrust himself between the two corps inflicting considerable loss. At the same time, Wilson led two cavalry divisions around Petersburg and destroyed large sections of the Weldon, Lynchburg and Southside Railroads. Further offensive operations were blocked by the heat of midsummer; for a period of forty-six days there was no rain and the soldiers suffered greatly.

It was at this time that Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pleasants, of the Ninth Corps, conceived the idea of a mine for the purpose of forcing an opening in the entrenchments of Petersburg. His regiment was composed in large measure of miners of the Schuylkill region. For four weeks his men were engaged in constructing a vast gallery, over 510 feet in length, with branch galleries under the Confederate lines containing eight magazines, each with 1,000 pounds of powder. As the work was in front of the Ninth Corps, Burnside was placed in charge of the operation. Originally he selected Ferrero's negro division to make the assault, but as these troops were raw, this arrangement was not approved by Meade and

Grant. By the singular device of the lot among the other division commanders, Burnside then selected Ledlie's division for the charge, a choice which proved an evil chance. Meanwhile Grant had sent the Second Corps with the cavalry to the north side of the James intending to divert Lee's attention from the point of attack. After some heavy skirmishing, the Second Corps returned to the lines of Petersburg in time to assist in the assault. The Confederate engineers anticipated an attack by mining, but their counter-mine was on a different level from the gallery of attack, and so the plan was not discovered.

It was intended to spring the mine at half-past three on the morning of July 30th, but a defect in the fuse delayed the operation until two brave officers entered the gallery and changed the splicing. It was twenty minutes of five when the explosion occurred, making a crater one hundred and fifty feet long, sixty feet wide and twenty-five feet deep, located about one hundred yards from Burnside's line. Up to this moment the plan was completely successful; not only were the lines broken, but also the battery, and three hundred men in Elliott's salient had been buried in the debris. For a time the unexpectedness of the blow had paralyzed the defenders. This was the time for vigorous offensive operations. It was expected that Ledlie would lead his men through the opening and take possession of Cemetery Hill beyond, an elevation which commanded Petersburg.

But Ledlie did not accompany his division and was in no position to give directions to his men. The assaulting column rushed into the crater and stayed there for over an hour without formation or leadership. While this mass of men was huddled in and about the opening which engineering skill had made, the great opportunity was passing. Lee had brought up reinforcements in men and artillery and had reformed his position in the rear so as to make it unassailable. Eventually Grant went in person and on foot to the scene of the assault and found so much disorder and confusion and so little perception of the next thing to be done, that he ordered the column to withdraw. Another golden chance was thus wasted, this time at the cost of 3,500 men, and one of the most wisely conceived enterprises of the siege was brought to naught. The practical effect of this disaster was the retirement of Burnside and Ledlie from active command, and in the later stages of the campaign, the Ninth Corps was commanded by General John G. Parke.

During the next four months public interest centered in the Valley of the Shenandoah. At the time of the grand advance in May, as a collateral movement, Sigel had led a column southward in the Valley, which had been defeated at Newmarket. General Hunter was then appointed in his place and in June he advanced with some success, defeating a strong force of Confederates under Jones at Piedmont, and threatening Lynchburg. To save this important city, Lee had detached Early from his