1. Libel under the non-importation acts. Alleged excuse of distress repelled. Condemnation pro- nounced. The New-York, 2. Necessity, which will excuse a violation of the laws of trade, must be urgent, and proceed from such a state of things as may be supposed to produce on the mind of a skilful mariner, a well- grounded fear of the loss of ves- sel and cargo, or of the lives of the crew. Id. 68 3. Decree of restitution affirmed, with a certificate of probable cause of seizure, in an instance cause, on further proof. The San Pedro,
4. Libel for a forfeiture of goods im- ported, and alleged to have been invoiced at a less sum than the
actual cost, at the place of ex- portation, with design to evade the duties, contrary to the 66th section of the Collection Law, ch. 123. Restitution decreed upon the evidence as to the cost of the goods at the place where they were last shipped; the form of the libel excluding all inquiry as to their cost at the place where they were originally shipped, and as to continuity of voyage. The United States v. 150 Crates of Earthen Ware, 232 5. The courts of the United States have exclusive cognizance of ques- tions of forfeiture, upon all sei- zures made under the laws of the U. States, and it is not competent for a state court to entertain or de- cide such question of forfeiture. If a sentence of condemnation be definitively pronounced by the proper court of the United States, it is conclusive that a forfeiture
is incurred; if a sentence of ac- quittal, it is equally conclusive against the forfeiture: and in either case, the question cannot be again litigated in any com- mon law forum. Gelston v. Hoyt, 246. 311 6. Where a seizure is made for a supposed forfeiture, under a law of the United States, no action of trespass lies in any common law tribunal, until a final decree is pronounced upon the proceed- ing in rem to enforce such for- feiture; for it depends upon the final decree of the court pro- ceeding in rem, whether such seizure is to be deemed right- ful or tortious, and the action, if brought before such decree is made, is brought too soon.
7. If a suit be brought against the seizing officer for the supposed trespass, while the suit for the forfeiture is depending, the fact of such pending may be pleaded in abatement, or as a temporary bar of the action. If after a de- cree of condemnation, then that fact may be pleaded as a bar; if after an acquittal, with a certifi- cate of reasonable cause of seiz-
ure, then that may be pleaded as a bar. If after an acquittal with- out such certificate, then the offi- cer is without any justification for the seizure, and it is definitively settled to be a tortious act. If, to an action of trespass in a state court for a seizure, the seizing officer plead the fact of forfeiture in his defence, without averring a lis pendens, or a condemnation, or an acquittal with a certificate of reasonable cause of seizure, the plea is bad; for it attempts to put in issue the question of 14. forfeiture in a state court.
A forfeiture attaches in rem, at the moment the offence is com- mitted, and the property is in- stantly devested. Id. 311 The statute of 1794, ch. 50. s. 3. prohibiting the fitting out any ship, &c. for the service of any foreign prince or states, to cruize against the subjects of any other foreign prince, &c. does not apply to any new government, unless it has been acknowledged by the United States, or by the govern- ment of the country to which such new state previously belonged. A plea setting up a forfeiture under that statute, in fitting out a ship to cruize against such new state, must aver such recogni tion, or it is bad. Id. A plea justifying a seizure under this statute, need not state the particular prince or state by name, against whom the ship was intended to cruize. Id. 329 The 7th section of the statute of 1794 was not intended to apply, except to cases where a seizure or detention could not be en- forced by the ordinary civil pow er, and there was a necessity, in the opinion of the president, to employ naval or military power for this purpose. Id. 331.334 The definitive sentence of a court of admiralty, or any other court of peculiar and exclusive juris
16. Supposing that the third article of
the constitution of the United States, which declares that "the judicial power shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," vests in the United States exclusive jurisdiction of all such cases, and that a murder committed in the waters of a state, where the tide ebbs and 20. flows, is a case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; yet con- gress have not, in the 8th sec- tion of the act of 1790, ch. 9. "for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States," so exercised this power as to confer on the courts of the Uni- ted States jurisdiction over such murder. The United States v. Bevans, 336. 387 17. Quare, Whether courts of com-
mon law have concurrent juris- diction with the admiralty over murder committed in bays, &c. which are enclosed parts of the sea ? Id. 387 18. Congress having, in the 8th sec- tion of the act of 1790, ch. 9. 21. provided for the punishment of murder, &c. committed upon the high seas, or in any river, ha- ven, basin, or bay, out of the ju- risdiction of any particular state," it is not the offence committed, but the bay, &c. in which it is committed, that must be out of 24. the jurisdiction of the state. Id.
19. The grant to the United States, in the constitution, of all cases of VOL. III.
admiralty and maritime jurisdic- tion, does not extend to a cession of the waters in which those cases may arise, or of general jurisdiction over the same. Con- gress may pass all laws which are necessary for giving the most complete effect to the ex- ercise of the admiralty and ma- ritime jurisdiction granted to the government of the union: but the general jurisdiction over the place, subject to this grant, ad- heres to the territory as a por- tion of territory not yet given away; and the residuary powers of legislation still remain in the state. Id. 389 Congress have power to provide for the punishment of offences, committed by persons on board a ship of war of the United States, wherever that ship may lie. But congress have not ex- ercised that power in the case of a ship lying in the waters of the United States; the words "with- in any fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine, or in any other place or district of country under the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States," in the third section of the act of 1790, ch. 9. not extending to a ship of war, but only to objects in their na- ture fixed and territorial. Id.
Texts on the admiralty jurisdic- tion. Note a, b, Resolution of 1632, upon the cases of admiralty jurisdiction. Note a, Agreement of the judges of the king's bench and the admiralty of 1575. Note a, 377 Case of the King v. Bruce. Note a, 391
A question of fact under the non- importation laws. Defence set up on the plea of distress, re-
to take lands by descent in the State of New-Jersey. Id. 12 A person born in England, before, the declaration of independence, and who always resided there, and never was in the United States, cannot take lands in Ma- ryland by descent. Id. 13 By the acts of Maryland of 1780, ch. 45. and 49. the equitable in- terest of British subjects in lands were confiscated, and vested in the State, without office found, prior to the treaty of 1783, so that the British cestui que trust was not protected by the stipu- lations in that treaty against fu- ture confiscations, nor by the stipulation in the treaty of 1794, securing to British subjects, who then held lands in this country, the right to continue to hold them. Id.
An alien may take, by purchase, a freehold or other interest in land, and may hold it against all the world except the King, and even against him until office found; and is not accountable for the rents and profits previ- ously received. Craig v. Leslie,
589 Where W. R. claimed title to lands in Kentucky, derived from a warrant issued in 1774, by the governor of Virginia, on which a grant issued in 1788, to W. S. who was a native subject of the King of Great Britain, and who left Virginia prior to the year 1776, and has never since re- turned to the United States; held, that W. S. took a legal title to the lands under the warrant and grant, which not having been devested by any act of Virginia prior to the treaty of 1794, was rendered absolute and indefeasi- ble by the 9th article of that trea- ty. Craig v. Radford, 594. 599
« 上一頁繼續 » |