ΤΟ

A

ADMIRALTY.

59

1. Libel under the non-importation
acts. Alleged excuse of distress
repelled. Condemnation pro-
nounced. The New-York,
2. Necessity, which will excuse a
violation of the laws of trade,
must be urgent, and proceed
from such a state of things as may
be supposed to produce on the
mind of a skilful mariner, a well-
grounded fear of the loss of ves-
sel and cargo, or of the lives of
the crew. Id.
68
3. Decree of restitution affirmed,
with a certificate of probable
cause of seizure, in an instance
cause, on further proof. The
San Pedro,

78

4. Libel for a forfeiture of goods im-
ported, and alleged to have been
invoiced at a less sum than the

actual cost, at the place of ex-
portation, with design to evade
the duties, contrary to the 66th
section of the Collection Law,
ch. 123. Restitution decreed
upon the evidence as to the cost
of the goods at the place where
they were last shipped; the form
of the libel excluding all inquiry
as to their cost at the place
where they were originally
shipped, and as to continuity of
voyage. The United States v. 150
Crates of Earthen Ware, 232
5. The courts of the United States
have exclusive cognizance of ques-
tions of forfeiture, upon all sei-
zures made under the laws of the
U. States, and it is not competent
for a state court to entertain or de-
cide such question of forfeiture.
If a sentence of condemnation be
definitively pronounced by the
proper court of the United States,
it is conclusive that a forfeiture

is incurred; if a sentence of ac-
quittal, it is equally conclusive
against the forfeiture: and in
either case, the question cannot
be again litigated in any com-
mon law forum. Gelston v. Hoyt,
246. 311
6. Where a seizure is made for a
supposed forfeiture, under a law
of the United States, no action
of trespass lies in any common
law tribunal, until a final decree
is pronounced upon the proceed-
ing in rem to enforce such for-
feiture; for it depends upon the
final decree of the court pro-
ceeding in rem, whether such
seizure is to be deemed right-
ful or tortious, and the action, if
brought before such decree is
made, is brought too soon.

Id.

313

7. If a suit be brought against the
seizing officer for the supposed
trespass, while the suit for the
forfeiture is depending, the fact
of such pending may be pleaded
in abatement, or as a temporary
bar of the action. If after a de-
cree of condemnation, then that
fact may be pleaded as a bar; if
after an acquittal, with a certifi-
cate of reasonable cause of seiz-

10.

11.

12.

13.

ure, then that may be pleaded as
a bar. If after an acquittal with-
out such certificate, then the offi-
cer is without any justification for
the seizure, and it is definitively
settled to be a tortious act. If,
to an action of trespass in a state
court for a seizure, the seizing
officer plead the fact of forfeiture
in his defence, without averring
a lis pendens, or a condemnation,
or an acquittal with a certificate
of reasonable cause of seizure,
the plea is bad; for it attempts
to put in issue the question of 14.
forfeiture in a state court.

Id.

314

A forfeiture attaches in rem, at
the moment the offence is com-
mitted, and the property is in-
stantly devested. Id. 311
The statute of 1794, ch. 50. s.
3. prohibiting the fitting out any
ship, &c. for the service of any
foreign prince or states, to cruize
against the subjects of any other
foreign prince, &c. does not apply
to any new government, unless it
has been acknowledged by the
United States, or by the govern-
ment of the country to which such
new state previously belonged.
A plea setting up a forfeiture
under that statute, in fitting out
a ship to cruize against such new
state, must aver such recogni
tion, or it is bad. Id.
A plea justifying a seizure under
this statute, need not state the
particular prince or state by
name, against whom the ship was
intended to cruize. Id. 329
The 7th section of the statute of
1794 was not intended to apply,
except to cases where a seizure
or detention could not be en-
forced by the ordinary civil pow
er, and there was a necessity, in
the opinion of the president, to
employ naval or military power
for this purpose. Id. 331.334
The definitive sentence of a court
of admiralty, or any other court
of peculiar and exclusive juris

328

16. Supposing that the third article of

the constitution of the United
States, which declares that "the
judicial power shall extend to all
cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction," vests in the United
States exclusive jurisdiction of
all such cases, and that a murder
committed in the waters of a
state, where the tide ebbs and 20.
flows, is a case of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction; yet con-
gress have not, in the 8th sec-
tion of the act of 1790, ch. 9.
"for the punishment of certain
crimes against the United States,"
so exercised this power as to
confer on the courts of the Uni-
ted States jurisdiction over such
murder. The United States v.
Bevans,
336. 387
17. Quare, Whether courts of com-

mon law have concurrent juris-
diction with the admiralty over
murder committed in bays, &c.
which are enclosed parts of the
sea ? Id.
387
18. Congress having, in the 8th sec-
tion of the act of 1790, ch. 9. 21.
provided for the punishment of
murder, &c. committed upon the
high seas, or in any river, ha-
ven, basin, or bay, out of the ju-
risdiction of any particular state,"
it is not the offence committed,
but the bay, &c. in which it is
committed, that must be out of 24.
the jurisdiction of the state. Id.

22.

23.

387 25.

19. The grant to the United States,
in the constitution, of all cases of
VOL. III.

admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion, does not extend to a cession
of the waters in which those
cases may arise, or of general
jurisdiction over the same. Con-
gress may pass all laws which
are necessary for giving the
most complete effect to the ex-
ercise of the admiralty and ma-
ritime jurisdiction granted to the
government of the union: but
the general jurisdiction over the
place, subject to this grant, ad-
heres to the territory as a por-
tion of territory not yet given
away; and the residuary powers
of legislation still remain in the
state. Id.
389
Congress have power to provide
for the punishment of offences,
committed by persons on board
a ship of war of the United
States, wherever that ship may
lie. But congress have not ex-
ercised that power in the case of
a ship lying in the waters of the
United States; the words "with-
in any fort, arsenal, dockyard,
magazine, or in any other place
or district of country under the
sole and exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States," in the third
section of the act of 1790, ch. 9.
not extending to a ship of war,
but only to objects in their na-
ture fixed and territorial. Id.

390

357.361

365

to take lands by descent in the
State of New-Jersey. Id. 12
A person born in England, before,
the declaration of independence,
and who always resided there,
and never was in the United
States, cannot take lands in Ma-
ryland by descent. Id. 13
By the acts of Maryland of 1780,
ch. 45. and 49. the equitable in-
terest of British subjects in lands
were confiscated, and vested in
the State, without office found,
prior to the treaty of 1783, so
that the British cestui que trust
was not protected by the stipu-
lations in that treaty against fu-
ture confiscations, nor by the
stipulation in the treaty of 1794,
securing to British subjects, who
then held lands in this country,
the right to continue to hold
them. Id.

13

An alien may take, by purchase,
a freehold or other interest in
land, and may hold it against all
the world except the King, and
even against him until office
found; and is not accountable
for the rents and profits previ-
ously received. Craig v. Leslie,

589
Where W. R. claimed title to
lands in Kentucky, derived from
a warrant issued in 1774, by the
governor of Virginia, on which
a grant issued in 1788, to W. S.
who was a native subject of the
King of Great Britain, and who
left Virginia prior to the year
1776, and has never since re-
turned to the United States; held,
that W. S. took a legal title to
the lands under the warrant and
grant, which not having been
devested by any act of Virginia
prior to the treaty of 1794, was
rendered absolute and indefeasi-
ble by the 9th article of that trea-
ty. Craig v. Radford, 594. 599