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killed, 1,011 wounded, 1,216 missing. Beauregard reported the rebel loss at 269 killed, 1,533 wounded, in all 1,852. Johnston made the number of killed 378, but agreed with Beauregard in the general result. No notice was taken of some two or three hundred prisoners made by our army in the early part of the battle and sent to Washington. Beauregard claimed as prisoners not less than 1,600 Union soldiers, and estimated our loss at 4,500. Probably the nearest approximation to the exact truth now possible is, rebel loss over 2,000; Union loss over 3,000. Beauregard also claimed as the spoils of the day, 28 pieces of artillery, about 5,000 muskets, nearly 500,000 cartridges, a garrison flag, and 10 colors captured in the field or in the pursuit; and besides these, 64 artillery horses with their harness, 26 wagons and much camp equipage, clothing, and other property left behind.
Our limits do not admit of dwelling upon particular instances of valor and spirit on the part of the great majority of our officers and men, or of noticing the lack of these soldierly qualities and instincts, which were expected, as a matter of course, from all our troops. Neither are we able now to spare time in narrating well authenticated cases of barbarity, cruelty and outrage towards the dying and the dead, after the battle was over. The conduct of the rebels on this occasion was marked by ungovernable, blind fury, and was disgraceful in the last degree to themselves and our common humanity.*
* See Duyckinck's "War for the Union," vol. i., pp. 403-416 ; Sfinntor Wade's Report to the Senate, in
The effect of the disaster at. Bull Run was astounding. The news at first from the field of battle, as made known by reports and telegraphic communications, had been cheering, and promising certain and great victory. The next news told of utter rout and disgrace; and Monday and Tuesday, the 22d and 23d of July, saw the streets of the capital thronged with panic stricken crowds of those who had literally fled when no man pursued. In the great cities, and throughout the country, as the wildly exaggerated telegrams made known the overthrow of our army, the people were in a maze, and could with difficulty credit the unwelcome reports of disgraceful defeat. High-spirited and self-confident, never supposing defeat possible, men at the North ran into an opposite extreme, and for the moment looked upon what the rebels had done at Bull Run as a virtual guarantee of their final success* But the depression and discouragement, wonderful as they seemed, were only temporary. Bitter as was the lesson of that memorable week at the close of July, it was a salutary lesson. It showed loyal men what was before them; that it was no holiday undertaking of a few weeks or months to put down rebellion or trea son, organized as they were on a scale
behalf of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War; April 30th, 1862.
* Military critics (such as Major Barnard and others) are agreed, that General McDowell's plan of the battle was well laid and would have resulted in a decisive victory, had it not been for delays, above noted, on Friday and Saturday, and the escaping of Johnston's four or five thousand men from Patterson's watching, thereby causing a panic among a portion of the Union army just at the critical moment.
of magnitude and power undreamt of heretofore; and that, if the Union was to he sustained, it must be by united, steady, unflinching energy and devotion in its behalf. The resolution and spirit of Congress we have already noted (see p. 54). The people of the loyal states likewise speedily nerved themselves to avenge the losses at Bull
Run, and to hold up the hands of the government at any cost, in crushing the mad and desperate attempt to destroy the life and integrity of the nation.
We shall see, as we proceed in our narrative, how thoroughly the noble, manly qualities of our countrymen were roused up into efficient action in this their hour of trial.
FOREIGN RELATIONS AND POLICY —PRIVATEERING —TRENT AFFAIR.
Position of foreign nations — Course of England and France, how affecting the United States — Importance oi foreign relations — Secession efforts abroad— Feeling towards the United States in Great Britain and France
— Hostility to the Union — British government hastens to acknowledge belligerent character of Southern Confederacy — Queen's proclamation — How looked on in America — Neutrality enjoined — 111 success of the rebel agents abroad — Louis Napoleon's course — Diplomatic notes and courtesies — Friendly spirit of Russia
— Articles of Congress of Paris (1856) on privateering—Offer of the United States on the subject — Proviso of Earl Russell — Privateering carried on — The Savannah taken — Trial of the privateersmen; are they pirates or not ? — Davis's threats and acts —Government abandon the prosecution — Privateering only moderately successful — The Petrel and the St. Lawrence — The Jeff. Davis and her end — The negro Tillman's heroism — Public feeling at this date — Mason and Slidell new agents to go to Europe — Reach Havana — Sail in the Trent, English mail packet — Capt. Wilkes in San Jacinto stops the Trent and captures Mason and Slidell and their secretaries — Public applause — Attitude of the government — Excitement in England
— Rebel commissioners demanded — War apparently imminent — Mr. Seward's argument and decision — Mason and Slidell given up — Chagrin and disappointment of the rebels and their friends at home and abroad — Pungent remarks of the London Timet.
The position of foreign nations and the probable course to be pursued by them in regard to the United States, was a matter of very grave importance at the outbreak of the rebellion. England and France, especially, were so situated as to render their line
of action of the utmost moment, whether for good or evil, to the Great Republic. If, acting out the noble, manly part, which becomes sincere
friends and well wishers of our country, they should so direct their policy, and should assume such ground, as that the weight of their influence would be given to the support of the Union and the crashing out the rebellion, the case would be rendered more easy of settlement by means of the United States power on the land, where alone the rebels had succeeded in organizing any effective resistance against the authority 7.B. V.] ANXIETY AS TO COURSE OF FOREIGN NATIONS.
of the government. If, on the other hand, the great maritime nations, like England and France, should see fit, more or less openly to encourage the socalled confederacy in its ambitious designs, and in addition to recognizing its belligerent character, should aid in furnishing it not only with supplies of various sorts but also with the means of preying upon the commerce of the United States, they certainly had the power so to do, while holding a professedly friendly attitude to the government which they were virtually helping to undermine and destroy. And, in such an event, the rebellion would be all the more likely to protract its existence, if not finally to succeed in accomplishing its ends.
Of course, the government of the United States felt an unusually deep interest in the views which might find predominance among foreign nations, who were watching with profound concern the incipiency of our great national struggle; and was well aware how much depended upon the course which they might think best to adopt. It was consequently seen at once to be of the highest importance, that our country should be represented at foreign courts by the ablest and most energetic men which could be obtained. Happily, Messrs. Adams, Dayton, Clay, Motley, Marsh, and others were selected, and by their labors at their several posts, they soon gave evidence of the wisdom which had led to their appointment. Our country had abundant reason to be satisfied that her interests were committed to the hands of some of her noblest sons.
The leaders in the seceded states were also profoundly interested in the con dition of affairs abroad, and the manner in which their present attempt at a breaking up of the Union might be looked upon by the great powers of Europe. If England and France should favor their cause, directly, or at least indirectly, it would greatly facilitate matters, and would almost ensure success to the rebellion; but if the} should refuse entirely any countenance to this proposed rending in pieces of the Union, and should look upon the outbreak as an insurrection, which the lawful government of the land was able to and would in due time suppress, then, the hopes and expectations of the confederates would be sadly curtailed of their fair proportions, and their chances of final success very considerably diminished.
Fully alive to the importance and necessity of securing foreign sympathy and aid, the astute leaders in secession and revolution had given very careful attention to the subject from the beginning. Agents, admirably adapted to the work in hand, such as Yancey,* Host, Mann, and Butler King, had been sent abroad to leaven the public opinion, to excite prejudice against the government, to gain the ear of politicians and men in power, to misrepresent the origin and aim of the rebellion, to enlarge upon the advantages they had to offer, in a commercial point of view, to foreign nations, and such like; and it must be confessed, that, by persistent, unscrupulous statements, by activit)1 and zeal worthy of
* See McPherson's " History of the Rebellion," p. 27 a better cause, and by using the power of the press, a considerable portion of which was hostile to the Union, they had been able to produce a decided impression upon the public mind, and to excite hopes of the speedy intervention of European powers in American affairs.
But governments move slowly, as becomes the gravity of their position, and in modern times at least, they require to be well assured that the people will sustain them, before they take any step of great importance. England, for various reasons, had no special regard or affection for the United States. England was rather annoyed and displeased that so powerful a rival should have taken the position in wealth and rank which our country holds after so brief a period of national life. England was and is, from the nature of the case, not in love with republican institutions, and was and is willing to see them broken up and perish. Yet not all of England, by any means. There were ardent philanthropists and able statesmen, who were as capable as they were willing to cast aside foolish prejudices and jealousies, and to do their share towards enlightening others, towards battling for the right, and towards extending their sympathy and good will to the United States. And these could not be ignored; they made their voices heard; and with the help of several influential journals, they proved that the present fratricidal attempt of the secessionists was as wicked as it was unprecedented in the history of mankind. The English government, therefore, whatever its inclinations may have been, hesitated to venture upon
a step which, if wrongly taken, would be direful indeed in its consequences *
France, also, under the despotism of Louis Napoleon, was not altogether pleased at being called upon tn witness our rapid strides in national wealth and power. France, too, was more or less jealous of the United States, and was quite willing to stand by, and see the Union broken up, and its power and pride humbled; but there were friends of America in France, friends who did good service by their pens as well as in other ways, in behalf of our country's honor and good name; and more than this, France was ruled by a man who, however unscrupulous as a politician, was far too sagacious to commit himself hastily to an undertaking whose success was by no means assured; he had had too large experience in the uncertainty of political scheming to give aid to experiments which, so far as he could see, were as likely to be failures as anything else. Consequently, France was not willing, or prepared, to go to the lengths which the secessionists wished or expected; and France, like England, preferred to wait awhile, and see what the future might bring forth.
Doubtless, we think, the general disposition in Europe was, to consider secession and disintegration of the Union
* Mr. C. M. Clay, at the time en route for his em bassy at St. Petersburg, wrote a spirited letter to the London Timet, May 17th, setting forth the views and determination of Union men on the subject of rebellion and treason. Mr. Motley, also, our minister to Austria, published in the same journal, a week later, a calm, clear, convincing statement as to "The Causes of the American Civil War." Mr. John Stuart Mill, the well known and able advocate of freedom, published, some months later, an article in Fraser's Magazine on " The Contest in America." He was also seconded by men of the stamp of Richard Cobden, John Bright, etc.