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CH. XV.]

1864.

SHERMAN'S DARING PLAN.

It was at this time, during the latter part of September, that Jeff. Davis went to Macon, Georgia, and, aware of the terrible blow which had already been struck, and of the necessity of doing something to counteract it, made a speech, which Pollard calls "ill tempered and swollen," and which was probably more unwise than any thing he had done for a long time. He announced a line of policy which was in imitation of Sherman's flanking movements, and in accordance with which Hood was to get to the rear of Atlanta, break up the communications of Sherman, and thus compel him to retreat again into Tennessee. By so in discreet exposure of his plans, Davis enabled Sherman to take measures fully to meet them; and, as Grant says, in his report, "he exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the army that had so often defeated it."

Davis and his co-workers, however, did not appreciate the daring boldness and energy of the man they had to deal

Gen. Sherman still defiantly holds Atlanta. He can and must be driven from it. It is only for the good people of Georgia and the surrounding states to speak

the word, and the work is done. We have abundant

provisions. There are men enough in the country

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liable to and able for service to accomplish this result. To all such I earnestly appeal to report promptly to their respective commands, and let those who cannot go see to it that none remain who are able to strike a blow in this critical and decisive hour. The security of your wives and daughters from the insults and outrages of a brutal foe shall be established soon, and be followed by a permanent and honorable peace. The claims of home and country, wife and children, uniting with the demands of honor and patriotism, summon us to the field."

485

with, and the course which they determined upon was exactly that which Grant and Sherman desired. The latter was entirely unwilling to remain simply on the defensive at Atlanta, and expend his energies in guarding the road to Chattanooga and Nashville; and so he formed the bold plan of cutting loose from his bases and destroying effectually the railroad to Chattanooga; thence, mainly subsisting on the rich country in the interior of Georgia, he meant to march through the state directly to the sea.

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Accordingly, the damage done to the railroad having been repaired, Sherman took the preliminary steps for 1864. carrying out his plan, keeping watch meanwhile of Hood and his ceedings. The early part of November was spent in sending to Chattanooga, the sick and wounded and surplus stores; in bringing to Atlanta the con valescents, furloughed men and ord nance supplies; and in getting everything in most complete readiness for the march of the army. Before pro ceeding, however, to give a narrative of Sherman's great march, we must briefly record what Hood undertook to do, under the vain delusion noted above.*

From Jacksonville Hood s army marched in a northwesterly direction to Guntersville, on the Tennessee River, which they reached on the 22d of Oc

* Gen. Grant, in his report, (p. 44) says, very forci bly: "Hood, instead of following Sherman, continuea his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under which be seemed to be acting."

tober, and thence, after some delays, Columbia and Spring Hill, Forrest's made their way to Florence, in the cavalry pressing hard upon the column. vicinity of which Forrest had been ope- On the 30th of November, Schofield rating with his cavalry, interrupting occupied Franklin. Repeated assaults communication on the river. Hood were made by the rebels during the was now preparing for his intended in- afternoon until late at night; but they vasion of Tennessee. Gen. Thomas were in every instance repulsed. The was in command, at Nashville, of all rebel loss in this battle was 1,750 killed, the troops which Sherman did not wish 702 prisoners, and 3,800 wounded. to use for his own especial purpose; Among the losses were six general offiand this brave and accomplished officer cers killed, six wounded, and one capwas diligently guarding his northern tured. Our entire loss was 2,300. “This line of railroad, and preparing to meet was the first serious opposition the enethe threatened invasion. Several weeks my met with," says Grant, in his report, elapsed before Hood began his advance. " and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to On the 20th of November, he moved all his expectations. During the night, northwardly from Florence, between Gen. Schofield fell back toward Nashwhich place and Corinth his forces had ville. This left the field to the enemy been gathered, and advanced to Waynes--not lost by battle, but voluntarily borough and Lawrenceburg, where he abandoned-so that Gen. Thomas's outflanked the advanced Union posi- whole force might be brought together. tion on the line of the Nashville and The enemy followed up and commenced Decatur Railroad at Pulaski. From the establishment of his line in front the latter place Gen. Thomas now with- of Nashville on the 2d of December." drew his forces to Franklin, on the same road, eighteen miles south of Nashville. In this retreat, which was a preconcerted strategic movement of the Union commander, to concentrate his forces for the defence of the latter city, our troops were closely pursued by the enemy, whose aggregate strength, including the infantry corps of S. D. Lee, Cheatham, Stewart, and Taylor, and Forrest's superior cavalry, was estimated at about 40,000. Gen. Schofield was in command of the force at Pulaski, which consisted of Stanley's 4th and Cox's 23d corps, together with a few regiments which had recently entered the service. There was some sharp fighting on the road to Franklin, at to the Cumberland River, on both

Although the central and southern portions of Tennessee were left open to the enemy by Schofield's retiring to Nashville, and though they drove out the garrisons and for the time possessed themselves of various towns and stations, yet they were not able to accomplish anything of moment. Murfrees borough, where Rousseau was stationed, effectually resisted the enemy; the line of road below, from Stevenson to Chattanooga, was firmly held; and the defences of Nashville, where Thomas's main army was, proved unassailable. Hood's army entrenched itself in front of Nashville, on the southerly side throwing up a complete line extending

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CH. XV.]

HOOD ROUTED AT NASHVILLE.

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wings. Thomas's line of entrenchments, hoped and expected by Davis and supported by a chain of forts, protected others, resulted in complete rout and the city, and reached on each flank to confusion.* the river, which was protected and securely held by gun boats and two ironclads.

1864.

Gen. Sherman, having sent two of his army corps to aid Thomas against Hood, retained the four others and the After delaying action for nearly two cavalry division for carrying weeks, mainly on account of the in- out the work which he had clemency of the weather and the re- set himself to do. On the 9th of Nomounting his cavalry force, Thomas vember, he issued a special order to assumed the offensive, on the morning this effect: the army was divided into of the 15th of December, and began two wings; the right, consisting of the the attack upon Hood's army. The 15th and 17th corps, was under com. battle lasted for two days, and mand of Gen. Howard; the left, con 1864. the rebels were driven from the sisting of the 14th and 20th corps, was river, from their entrenchments, from under command of Gen. Slocum; and the range of hills on which their left the cavalry division was assigned to rested, and forced back at all points, the command of Gen. Kilpatrick. The during the 15th and 16th of December, habitual order of march, it was ordered, for some eight or nine miles. They should be, whenever practicable, by were, in fact, completely routed, and four roads, as nearly parallel as posanxious only to escape from the vic sible, and converging at points to be torious defenders of the cause of loy- hereafter indicated. There were to he alty and order. Sixty-eight pieces of no general trains of supplies, and each artillery were taken from the enemy, corps was to have its limited ammuni besides about 10,000 prisoners. In tion and provision train so distributed addition, they lost in killed and wound- that, in case of danger, the advance and ed at least 10,000 more. Pursuit was rear brigades should be unencumbered kept up for several days, notwithstand-by wheels. The separate columns were ing the roads were almost impassable to start habitually at seven, A.m., and in consequence of the heavy rains and deep mud, and the shattered forces of the enemy were closely pressed, principally by our cavalry, even to the Tennessee River. On the 28th of December, our advance ascertained that Hood and his army had made good their escape to the south side of the river. Thus, the close of the year saw Tennessee thoroughly freed from the presence of the rebel army, and the invasion, from which so much had been

* Pollard, in his account of this mortifying and dis

creditable termination of the battle and campaign, says of Hood, no favorite with him (see p. 472, note):

"He finally made his escape across the Tennessee River with the remnant of his army, having lost from various causes more than 10,000 men, half of his generals, and nearly all of his artillery. Such was the

disastrous issue of the Tennessee campaign, which put out of existence, as it were, the splendid army that

Johnston had given up at Atlanta, and terminated forever the whole scheme of Confederate defence west of the Alleghanies." Pollard also says: "the effect

of Sherman's march to the sea on the morale of the Confederacy dates the first chapter of its subjugation." "Last Year of the War," pp. 128, 129.

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