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was ahead of Thomas, had placed Van
Cleve's division on the left of Wood,
at Gordon's Mills, and Palmer on his
right; Thomas, in consequence, pushed
still further to the left. Johnson's two
brigades were given to Thomas and
posted on Van Cleve's left, while Neg.
ley, who was already in position at
Owen's Gap, a little way south of
Crawfish Spring, thirteen miles from
Chattanooga, was ordered to remain
there, temporarily attached to Mc-
Cook's corps.
The whole of Rose-
crans's force was now on the west side
of the Chickamauga, within easy sup-
porting distance.

enemy, when, by an unfortunate mistake a gap was opened in the line of battle, of which the enemy took in- 1863. stant advantage, and striking Davis in the flank and rear threw his whole division into confusion. Pouring in through this break in our line the enemy cut off our right and right centre, and attacked Sheridan's division, which was advancing to support our left. After a gallant but fruitless effort against the rebel torrent, he was compelled to give way, but afterward rallied a considerable portion of his force, and by a circuitous route joined Thomas, who now had to sustain the Bragg, moving his army by divi- whole force of the attack. Our right sions, crossed the Chickamauga at sev- and part of the centre had been comeral fords and bridges north of Gor- pletely broken, and fled in confusion don's Mills, near to which he endea from the field, carrying with them to vored to concentrate before giving Chattanooga their commanders, Mcbattle. This was on the morning of Cook and Crittenden, and also RoseSaturday, the 19th of September, Mc- crans, who was on that part of the line. Cook's corps forming the right of our Thomas, however, still remained im line of battle, Crittenden's the centre, movable in his position. About 3.30 and Thomas's the left. The battle was P.M., the enemy discovered a gap in the begun about ten o'clock, when the left hills in the rear of his right flank, and wing of Rosecrans was attacked by Longstreet commenced pouring his heavy masses, and vigorous efforts were massive column through the opening. made to turn our left, so as to occupy Granger, who had been posted with the road to Chattanooga. But in this his reserves to cover our left and rear, the rebels failed entirely of success. arrived upon the field at this critical The centre was next assailed, and tem- moment. Thomas pointed out to him porarily driven back, but, being the gap through which the enemy was promptly reinforced, maintained its debouching, when quick as thought he ground. As night approached, the threw upon it Steadman's brigade of battle ceased, and the combatants rested on their arms. The attack was furiously renewed, on the morning of the 20th, against our left centre. Division after division was pushed forward to resist the attacking masses of the

1863.

cavalry, and broke the enemy. We
held the gap, but the rebels again and
again tried to retake it. About
sunset, they made their last
charge, when our men, being out of
ammunition, moved on them with the

CH. II.]

THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

bayonet, and they gave way to return no more. In the meantime the enemy made repeated attempts to carry Thomas's position on the left and front, but were as often driven back, with great loss. During the night, Thomas fell back to Rossville, leaving the dead and most of the wounded in the hands of the enemy * and, on the night of the 21st, he withdrew the remainder of the army within the defences of Chattanooga. The rebel loss was estimated at about 18,000; our loss, in all, was something over 16,000. There were about 2,000 prisoners captured.+

Having retreated to Chattanooga, as above related, Rosecrans withdrew his forces from the passes of Lookout Mountain, which covered his line of supplies from Bridgeport. These were immediately occupied by the troops of Bragg, who also sent a cavalry force across the

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+ Pollard asserts that the rebels took over 8,000 pri

soners, and that the Union loss was many thousands

greater than that of the rebels. "Chickamauga," he says, “conferred a briliant glory upon our arms, but nooga, and with it the possession of East Tennessee. Two thirds of our nitre beds were in that region, and a large proportion of the coal which supplied our foundries. It abounded in the necessaries of life. It was

little else. Rosecrans still held the prize of Chatta

one of the strongest countries in the world, so full of lofty mountains that it had been called, not unaptly, the Switzerland of America. As the possession of Switzerland opened the door to the invasion of Italy, Germany and France, so the possession of East Tennessee gave easy access to Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia and Alabama.”—“ Third Year of the War," p. 128.

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355

Tennessee above Chattanooga, which destroyed a large wagon train in the Sequatchie Valley, and captured Mc. Minnville and other points on the railroad. By this means the rebels almost entirely cut off Rosecrans's army from its supplies. Fortunately, however, the line of railroad was well defended, and the enemy's cavalry, being vigorously attacked by Col. McCook at Anderson's Cross Roads, on the 2d of October, by Mitchel at Shelbyville on the 6th, and by Crook at Farmington on the 8th of October, were put to rout and mostly captured.

In the judgment of Rosecrans, "the battle of Chickamauga was absolutely necessary to secure our concentration and cover Chattanooga. It was fought in a country covered with woods and undergrowth, and wholly unknown to us. Every division came into action opportunely, and fought squarely, on the 19th. We were largely outnum bered, yet we foiled the enemy's flank movement on our left, and secured our position on the road to Chattanooga."* It being deemed inexpedient to have separate commands or armies operating in the same field, the authorities at Washington determined to place the entire force in this region under a single commander, so as to secure both unity of design and a more perfect cooperation than had heretofore been practicable Gen. Grant was, almost of course, immediately fixed upon for this

*The defeat of Rosecrans was looked upon as disas trous, and its results as very alarming; he was, too, considered to be obstinate and impracticable.-See Col. Badeau's " Military History of Ulysses S. Grant," vol. i. pp. 421-424.

crans was relieved of his command, and Gen. Thomas was put in his place, in charge of the Army of the Cumberland; Sherman was assigned to the command of the Army of the Tennessee; and Burnside, (who was soon after succeed

position, and having left New Orleans, where he had been suffering from an injury occasioned by a fall from his horse, he reached Louisville on the 18th of October. The same day, he issued a general order, assuming command of the new "Military Division of the Mis-ed by Foster), to that of the Army of sissippi, embracing the Departments of the Ohio, of the Cumberland, and of the Tennessee." He also gave a stirring notice that "the headquarters of the division will be in the field." Rose

the Ohio. The narrative of further operations against the rebels, as carried forward vigorously and successfully unGen. Grant's direction, we defer to the following chapter.

CHAPTER III.

1863.

GRANT'S CAMPAIGN: BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA: SIEGE OF KNOXVILLE.

our men

ful

Bragg's investment of Chattanooga - Holds Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge - Expects to starve out Sherman's advance and Grant's orders - Plan to seize the hills in Lookout Valley - Success Supplies obtained Hooker and his force- Attacked by the enemy - Grant's plans against Bragg - Bragg's blunder in detaching Longstreet - Position of Grant's army and preliminary arrangements— The battle begun, November 23d, in fine style - Carried forward the next day with spirit and success Various details-Grant's activity - The struggle of November 25th-Successes thus far - In the afternoon, the Ridge carried by storm - Extreme daring and gallantry of our men - Rebel panic-Bragg decamps hastily in the night - Retreats to Dalton -- Losses, etc. - Grant's dispatches characteristic - Burnside in East Tennessee - Longstreet's march against him— Contests at several points-Burnside bo sieged at Knoxville - Scarcity of supplies - Longstreet makes an assault, November 29th- Failure and consequent retreat - Sherman's advance - Burnside relieved of command Gen. Grant's congratulatory order.

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THE rebel commander, Bragg, after | tanooga by a circuitous and difficult Rosecrans's retreat to Chattanooga, followed closely on his steps, and investing the place, thought that his best plan was to starve Rosecrans out. Communication by the river, and by the railroad on the southern bank to the camp of Thomas, twenty-eight miles distant, was interrupted by the position of Bragg's force; and hence it became necessary to send supplies to Chat

road, over two ranges of mountains, by wagon transportation, upon which route the rebel cavalry had opportunity to operate with advantage. Chattanooga itself was well fortified and protected from a direct assault, but the river be low was commanded by Bragg's troops at Lookout Mountain and its vicinity. Bragg occupied not only the mountain just named, but also the adjacent one,

CH. II.]

PLAN TO OBTAIN SUPPLIES.

connecting Missionary Ridge, running in a south-westerly direction directly in front of Rosecrans's camps, which were thus freely exposed to view from the heights. A battery of rifle 24-pounders was placed at a commanding point of Lookout Mountain, from which, at a distance between two and three miles, shells were thrown into Chattanooga, without, however, doing any material damage. The rebels also held Lookout Valley on the westerly side of the mountains, where a creek of the same name runs into the Tennessee. Bragg, looking to a speedy evacuation of Chattanooga, for the want of food and forage, was so confident of success in the starving out process, as to declare that he "held the enemy at his mercy, and that his destruction was only a question of time." But the result showed, as Pollard phrases it, "how vain were the sanguine expectations and the swollen boast of this ill-starred and unfortunate commander."

Gen. Sherman, previous to this, had been engaged in opening the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad castward towards Huntsville, with the design of effecting a communication

with Chattanooga. He was

1863. employed on this task, work

351

on the right bank of the Tennessee, thirty miles below Chattanooga, and crossing at that point, he was to march by the main wagon road through Whitesides to Wauhatchie. Palmer, with the 14th corps, was ordered to move to a point on the north bank opposite Whitesides. Then he was to cross, and follow in Hooker's track, holding and guarding the road in his rear. Grant, who had reached Chattanooga on the 23d of October, and ascertained the critical condition of affairs there in regard to supplies, saw plainly that the rebels must be dislodged, and communications opened, or disastrous consequences would follow. Hence the movements, above noted, were urged forward, and an excellently contrived plan of Gen. W. F. Smith, chief engi neer of Grant's army, having been adopted, speedy relief was looked for. The plan was to take a force of about 4,000 men, proceed down the river to Brown's Ferry, and seize the range of steep hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley; in this way, if the expedition were successful, Hooker's and Palmer's movements would be facilitated and rendered more secure, and the river would be open for steamboats to Brown's Ferry.

On the night of the 26th of October, ing resolutely in the face of the enemy 1,800 men, under Gen. Hazen, were eastwardly from Corinth, through Iuka; embarked at Chattanooga, in sixty ponbut when Grant took command, Sher-toon boats, in which they floated down man, in accordance with orders received the Tennessee with the current, round from Grant, abandoned the railroad, the sharp bend of the river below Look crossed the Tennessee at Eastport, moved by the north bank to Stevenson, where he united with the right wing of the Army of the Cumberland. Hooker was ordered to move to Bridgeport,

out Mountain, unobserved by three miles of pickets, until they reached the point proposed, Brown's Ferry, six miles by the river from Chattanooga. Landing at two points, they seized the pick

ets, and obtained possession of the spurs Our loss, in these operations of the near the river. The remainder of the 27th, 28th, and 29th of October, in

force, under Smith, who had marched by the north bank, were ferried over before daylight, strengthening the party under Hazen. By ten o'clock, A.M., the pontoon bridge, 900 feet long, was completed; the points occupied were well entrenched; the artillery was put in position so as to command the main road from Chattanooga Valley to Lookout Valley; and the rebel force between Lookout and Shell Mound, finding them selves in a critical position, hastily retreated behind the creek. Thus, Smith's plan was thoroughly carried out, and henceforth Chattanooga was relieved of all fears of starvation.

opening communications on the south side of the Tennessee, from Chattanooga to Bridgeport, was reported to be-76 killed, 339 wounded, and 22 missing; that of the enemy was supposed to be about 1,500.

In carrying out his plans, Grant's next effort was to see if he could not drive out Bragg and the rebels entirely from the position they held on Lookout Mountain. He was not content with simply relieving Chattanooga; a much greater work was before him, and he devoted all his energies to its accomplishment. Happily, Bragg made a great blunder, which proved of essential Hooker, on the 26th of October, cross-advantage to Grant's purposes. The ed the Tennessee, and occupied Lookout rebel general, thinking it good policy Valley, Geary holding the advance at to cut off Burnside in East Tennessee, Wauhatchie; while Palmer, following detached Longstreet from his army, in Hooker's rear as above noted, formed a strong moving base for that general's operations. The rebels were chagrined at the success of the expedition under Smith, and were determined if possible to retrieve their loss. Accordingly, on the night of the 28th and morning of the 29th of October, an attack was made upon Geary's division by two brigades, under Hood, of Longstreet's corps, and a desperate effort was made to cut off and capture Geary. Not only was the attack a failure, but Howard's corps being moved rapidly to the right, both the rebels were repulsed and the remaining crests lying west of Lookout Creek were seized and held by our troops.

*

* Gen. Thomas, in congratulating Hooker and his troops on the "brilliant success gained over his old ad

early in November, to attack Burnside and take Knoxville. This, of course, weakened Bragg materially, and enabl ed Grant so to arrange his movements as to be almost certain of victory. Sherman, with his corps, was at Bridge port on the 14th of November, and was quite ready to take his part in the work to be done. Grant sent word to Burnside, explaining his purpose, and urging him to occupy Longstreet at various points, and to draw him further and further away from Bragg, only taking

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versary, Longstreet," on this occasion, gave it as his made up the side of a steep and difficult hill, over two opinion, that the bayonet charge of Howard's troops, hundred feet high, completely routing and driving the enemy from his barricades on its top, and the repulse by Geary's division, of greatly superior numbers, who attempted to surprise him, will rank among the most distinguished feats of arms of this war."

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