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CH. II.]

VARIOUS RAIDS AND SKIRMISHES.

On the 4th of March, Col. Colburn, with some 1,800 men, attempted a reconnaissance from Franklin towards Springfield, encountering in his way Van Dorn's column of the rebel force, estimated to be over 7,000 men. The enemy retreated, drawing Colburn into a gorge, where he was surrounded, and nearly all his force captured. Two weeks later, on the 20th of March, Col. Hall, while on a reconnaissance, with about 1,400 men, met the famous raider J. H. Morgan, whose force was between 2,000 and 3,000. Hall succeeded in repulsing the enemy, after a sharp contest of three and a half hours. On the 25th of March, the rebel cavalry leader, Forrest, made a raid on the Nashville and Columbia Railroad, burning the bridge and capturing Col. Bloodgood's command at Brentwood. Gen. G. C. Smith, arriving opportunely with about 600 cavalry, attacked the enemy in the rear, and recovered a large portion of the property captured at Brentwood, pursuing the rebels to Little Harpeth, where they were reinforced. On the 10th of April, Van Dorn, with a large mounted force, attacked Franklin, but was repulsed by Gen. Granger, with a loss of nineteen killed, thirty-five wounded left on the field, and forty-eight prisoners. Gen. J. J. Reynolds made a raid upon the Manchester and McMinnville Railroad, destroying the depot, rolling stock, supplies, and other property, and capturing 180 prisoners. Col. Streight, with about 1,800 men,

* This man Van Dorn, an unscrupulous debauchee, was shot in open daylight, at his quarters, early in May, by a Dr. Peters, with whose wife he had been guilty of adultery.

349

started, April 9th, on a raid into Geor gia to cut the enemy's communication. After heavy losses in skirmishes with Forrest's cavalry, and when near its destination, he was forced to surrender. On the 22d of May, Gen. Stanley made a raid upon Middleton, capturing eighty prisoners and 200 horses, 600 stand of arms, and other property. On the 4th of June, Forrest made a raid upon Franklin, and on the 11th, attacked Triune. His losses in these unsuccessful skirmishes were estimated at over 100, while ours were only seventeen killed and wounded.

1863.

During the months of preparation alluded to above, Rosecrans was actively and earnestly engaged in seeking to strengthen his army by a thorough system of discipline, and also to excite in the minds of his men a proper sense and appreciation of the nature of the conflict which was being carried on between law and order on the one hand, and wicked and causeless rebellion on the other. Writing at this date, Rosecrans characterized the "Confederacy" as kept alive by "an oligarchy of traitors to their friends, to civil liberty, and human freedom. Whereever they have the power, they drive before them into their ranks the southern people, and they would also drive us. Trust them not; were they able, they would invade and destroy us without mercy. Absolutely assured of these things, I am amazed that any one could think of peace on any terms. When the power of the unscrupulous rebel leaders is removed, and the people are free to consider and act for their own interests, which are common with ours

under this government, there will be to his making an early advance, Roseno difficulty in fraternization."*

crans had not unduly hurried himself. He had taken time to recruit his army, to procure horses for his dismounted cavalry, and, as far as possible, to perfect all his arrangements, while he was carefully watching the dispositions of the enemy in his front. So that it was the month of June before the Army of the Cumberland was in motion.

The rebel Gen. Bragg, after the battle of Murfreesborough, (p. 253), withdrew his forces to Shelbyville, Tullahoma, and the line of the Duck River, which crosses the state in a westerly

Early in June, there was a military execution in this department, which attracted some attention from the audacity displayed by two rebel officers, L. A. Williams and W. J. Peter, in playing the parts of spies. Towards evening, on the 8th of June, it appears that two persons rode into Col. Baird's quarters at Franklin, Tenn., representing themselves to be Col. Austin and Major Dunlap, Inspectors-general of the United States Army. They had with them counterfeit official papers from Gen. Rosecrans, and told a well con- direction to the Tennessee, at its nearcocted story of their being plundered by the rebels on their way. They were admitted into camp, had an opportunity of noting its defences, and just before departing borrowed money of the officer in command. When they had left, en route for Nashville, as they said, the suspicion suddenly flashed upon Col. Baird that they were spies; and he immediately ordered them to be pursued and arrested. This was done; Rosecrans, in reply to a telegram, stated that no such persons were known to him; and on being searched, they were clearly proven to be spies. By Rosecrans's direction, they were tried by a court martial the same night, were found guilty, and the next morning, at nine o'clock, were hung in the presence of the garrison.

Although urged by the military authorities at Washington, and aware of the expectation of the public in regard

* Major-General Rosecrans in reply to a resolution

of the Honourable the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, Murfreesborough, Tenn., February, 1863.

est point, about thirty miles south of the line held by Rosecrans. Bragg's force was understood to be strongly entrenched in its main positions, while in front the occupation of the roads running south from Murfreesborough, with the natural features of the country, gave it additional security against attack. It was Rosecrans's plan, in his advance, to neutralize these advantages by turning Bragg's position and making a flank attack on his right, and thus to reach his immediate base of operations at Tullahoma, on the Chattanooga Railroad. In this way, he purposed compelling the enemy to an engagement on ground of his own choosing, or forcing him to a retreat.

On the 24th of June, the camps were broken up at Murfreesborough, and the army began its march in three corps, the right under McCook, the centre under Thomas, and the left under Crittenden.

By an admirably combined movement, Rosecrans was able to deceive the rebels by threatening an ad

CH. II.]

ROSECRANS ADVANCES ON CHATTANOOGA.

351

vance in force on their left at Shelby- undertaken during the month of Auville, while the mass of his army seized gust. The difficulties in the way of Hoover's, Liberty, and other Gaps, by pursuing the rebels were unusually hard fighting. They then moved on great. The Union army was now in Manchester, and having thus turned position from McMinnville to Winthe right of the enemy's defence of Duck chester, with advances at Pelham and River, directly threatened Bragg, who Stevenson; and in order to reach Chatwas forced to fall back to Tullahoma, tanooga from above, it had to cross the hotly pursued by Granger, after he had Cumberland Mountains to the upper brilliantly carried Shelbyville. Dispo- waters of the Tennessee River, while sitions were immediately made to turn the river, in its tortuous course, and a Tullahoma, and fall upon the rebel rear; continuation of the mountain passes, but Bragg abandoned his entrenched were interposed below.* camp, and rapidly fell back toward Bridgeport, Ala., pursued as far as practicable by our forces. "Thus ended," to use Rosecrans's words, " a nine days' campaign, which drove the enemy from two fortified positions, and gave us possession of Middle Tennessee, conducted in one of the most extraordinary rains ever known in Tennessee, at that period of the year, over a soil that almost becomes a quicksand. Our operations were retarded thirty-six hours, at Hoover's Gap, and sixty hours at and in front of Winchester, which alone prevented us from getting possession of his communications and forcing the enemy to a very disastrous battle. These results were far more successful than was anticipated, and could only have been attained by a surprise as to the direction and force of our movements." The losses, in all, were 560; 1,634 prisoners were taken, together with six pieces of artillery, abundance of stores, etc.

The next step in following up the enemy to their important position at Chattanooga, which was now fortified, and the approaches to which offered the best opportunities of defence, was

On the 16th of August, Rosecrans, having put the railroad to Stevenson in condition to procure supplies, commenced his advance across the Cumberland Mountains, Chattanooga and its covering ridges on the south-east, being what is termed, in military language, his objective point. In order to command and avail himself of the most important passes, the front of his movement extended from the head of Sequatchie Valley, in Tennessee, to Athens, Alahama, and thus threatened the line of the Tennessee River from Whitsburg to Blythe's Ferry, a distance of over 150 miles. The banks of the Tennessee were reached on the 20th of August, and the next day Chattanooga was shelled to some extent. Pontoon, boat, raft and trestle bridges were rapidly prepared at Caperton's Ferry, Bridgeport, the mouth of Battle Creek and Shell Mound; and, excepting the cavalry, the army made its way across the Tennessee in the very face of the rebels. Thomas, by the 8th

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of September, had moved on Trenton, seizing Frick's and Stevens's Gaps on the Lookout Mountain; McCook had advanced to Valley Head, and taken Winston's Gap; while Crittenden had crossed to Wauhatchie, was in communication on the right with Thomas, and threatened Chattanooga by the pass over the point of Lookout Mountain.

From various reports of spies and deserters, and from the fact that Chattanooga was given up without a strug gle, it was supposed that Lee was receiving reinforcements from Bragg; and the authorities at Washington were seized with an apprehension that Rose ! crans might be drawn too far into the mountains of Georgia, where he could not be furnished with supplies, and where also he might be attacked before Burnside could bring him any help.

Having thus passed successfully the first mountain barrier south of the Tennessee, Rosecrans decided to use his right in threatening the rebel communications, while, with his centre and left, he should seize the gaps and commanding points of the mountains in front. On the 9th of September, Crittenden made a reconnaissance, and developed the import fact that the rebel force in Chattanooga had evacuated that place on the day and night previous. While Crittenden's corps quietly took possession of Chattanooga, which was, as we have said, the objective point of the campaign, Rosecrans, with the remainder of his army, pressed forward through the difficult passes of the Lookout and Mis-nion that no troops had been sent from sionary Mountains, apparently directing his march upon Lafayette and Rome.*

* “A splendid opportunity was now presented to Bragg. The detached force in McLemore's Cove was

Thomas's corps. Being immediately opposite Lafayette, at and near which Gen. Bragg had all his forces concentrated, it was completely at the mercy of the latter. It was only necessary that Gen. Bragg should fall upon it with such a mass as would have crushed it; then turned down Chattanooga Valley, thrown himself in

between the town and Crittenden, and crushed him ;

then passed back between Lookout Mountain and the Tennessee River into Wills's Valley, and cut off McCook's retreat to Bridgeport; thence moved along the

Cumberland range into the rear of Burnside, and dis

posed of him." This, apparently so easy of accom

In reply to Halleck's dispatch, cautioning him on this subject, Rosecrans, on the 12th of September, telegraphed to Washington that, although he was sufficiently strong for the enemy then on his front, there were indications that the rebels intended to turn his flanks and cut off his communications. He, therefore, decided that Burnside should move down his infantry toward Chattanooga, on his left, and that Grant should cover the Tennessee River toward Whitsburg, to prevent any raid into Nashville. Rosecrans was of opi

Bragg's army, but that Bragg was being reinforced by Loring from Mississippi. Burnside, as we have noted (see p. 347), was directed to hurry forward his infantry, as rapidly as possible, toward Chattanooga. Hurlbut at Memphis, and Sherman at Vicksburg, were ordered to send all the available forces at those points to Corinth and Tuscumbia, to operate against Bragg, and to prevent his turning the right flank of Rosecrans's army and recrossing the river into Tennessee. Schofield in Missouri,

were retreating.-See Pollard's "Third Year of the

plishment, was not attempted, and owing to the delay
of the rebels, Rosecrans was able to escape the risk
which was run under the supposition that the rebels | War," p. 114.

CH. II.]

PREPARATIONS FOR THE BATTLE.

353

and Pope in the North-west department, tle in the mountains of Georgia. It were directed to send forward to the had been reinforced by troops from Tennessee line every available man in Johnson in Mississippi, and by the pri their departments; and the commanding soners released on parole at Vicksburg officers also in Indiana, Ohio and Ken- and Port Hudson and declared by the tucky, were ordered to make every pos- rebel authorities to have been exchangsible exertion to secure Rosecrans's lines ed,*-a course of conduct, by the way, of communication. Meade, too, was which Gen. Halleck vigorously deurged to attack Lee, while his army nounced. The line of Rosecrans exwas in its present reduced condition, or tended, at this time, from Gordon's at least prevent him from sending off Mills to Alpines, a distance of some further detachments. It was deemed forty miles. By the 17th of Septemunadvisable to send any more troops ber, his troops were brought within into East Tennessee or Georgia, on ac supporting distance, and the next day count of the impossibility of supplying a concentration was begun towards them in a country which the enemy had Crawfish Spring. On the morning of nearly exhausted. Burnside's army was the 18th, Thomas's troops pressed on on short rations, and that of the Cum- toward Gordon's Mills, and McCook berland very inadequately supplied; moved up directly in his rear. During and in the case of Rosecrans, while he the forenoon, Granger made a reconhad a large number of animals in his naissance across the Chickamauga, at depots, the horses for the artillery, cav- Reid's Bridge; Cols. Minty and Wil alry and trains were dying off for want der were sent, the former to watch of forage.* Ringgold road crossing, and the latter to resist any advance from Napier Gap; and although heavy cannonading ensued, they held their ground until a body of the enemy approaching their rear, they were compelled to retire. During the night, McCook's force, although greatly fatigued, moved northward to Pond Spring, seventeen miles south of Chattanooga. Crittenden, who

1863.

On the 14th of September, the army of Rosecrans was occupying the passes of Lookout Mountain, with the enemy concentrating his forces near Lafayette to dispute his further advance. Bragg's threatened movements, to the right and left, were merely cavalry raids to cut the line of Rosecrans's supplies, and threaten his communications with Burnside. Bragg's main army was only awaiting the arrival of Longstreet's corps, to give bat

* Halleck, in this connection, says, that hearing nothing from Grant or from Sherman's corps at Vicksburg, it was determined, on the 23d of September, to detach the 11th and 12th corps from the Army of the Potomac, and send them by rail, under the command of Hooker, to protect Rosecrans's line of communication from Bridgeport to Nashville.

VOL. IV. 45.

* Bragg, on the 17th of September, from his head

quarters in the field, at Lafayette, Georgia, issued an order in very urgent terms, endeavoring to rouse the

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spirit of his troops. Having accomplished," he said, our object in driving back the enemy's flank movement, let us now turn on his main force, and crush it in its fancied security. Your general will lead you. You have but to respond to assure us of a glorious triumph over an insolent foe. I know what your response will be. Trusting in God and the justice of our cause, and nerved by the love of dear ones at home, failure is impossible, and victory must be ours."

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