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a position where it could act with effect, was, of itself, a notable achievement. For the army to have fought

the Union, which can alone insure in- skilful, and determined adversary, transfer it safely to ternal peace and external security to each state, 'must and shall be preserved,' cost what it may, in time, treasure,

and blood."*

* Mr. Swinton, remarking upon the close of the Peninsular campaign, justly says: "For the commander to have extricated his army from a difficult situa tion, in which circumstances, quite as much as his own fault, had placed it, and, in presence of a powerful,

through such a campaign was creditable, and its close soldiers. And, if alone from the appeal which great

found inexperienced troops transformed into veteran

sufferings, and great sacrifices always make to a gener ous people, the story of that eventful march and ardu ous retreat, when, weary and hungry and footsore, the army marched by night, and fought by day, through a whole week of toil, and never gave up, but made a good fight and reached the goal, cannot fail to live in grateful remembrance.”-“Army of the Potomac,” p. 165

CHAPTER XX.

1862.

GENERAL POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA.

Army of the Potomac at Harrison's Landing — McClellan's views and plans as to operating against Richmond -Adverse influences- Pope's and Halleck's opposition - McClellan ordered to leave the Peninsula — Re monstrance of no avail - Gen. Pope put in command of "Army of Virginia" - Concentrates his forcePope's address to the officers and army-His several orders in July-Plans of the rebels on McClellan's retirement from the Peninsula - Pope reinforced-Jackson crosses the Rapidan-Battle at Cedar Moun tain-Result-Pope on the Rappahannock — Lee attempts to cross - Stuart's raid on Catlett's Station Manoeuvring-Jackson's march- Stuart at Manassas Junction Destruction of supplies - Pope aban dons the line of the Rappahannock - Determines to cut off Jackson - Action at Kettle Run-Jackson's perilous position - Gives Pope the slip - Blunder of Pope - Serious injury resulting - Jackson attacks King's flank Sharp contest - King retires -The way left open for Longstreet to join Jackson - Sigel's attack on Jackson at Groveton - Aided by Reno, Hooker, Kearney-Result-Pope's condemnation of Porter's course-Doubts as to its justice - Porter court-martialed and cashiered - Pope unwisely tries another battle — The second Bull Run or Manassas battle-Terrible struggle - Losses not known, but very heavy - Lee's course - Jackson's further attempt at Germantown-Stevens and Kearney killed — The army withdrawn and placed within the defences of Washington - Fredericksburg and Aquia Creek evaouated Brief estimate of Gen. Pope and his campaign.

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In the preceding chapter, we have given as full a narrative as our limits admit, of the movements of the Army of the Potomac, under McClellan, up to the beginning of July, 1862. Being now in comparative security, the troops were permitted, during the ensuing month, the repose so much needed, and the opportunity of recuperating, and of being fitted in due time for active opera

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CH. XX.]

MCCLELLAN'S VIEWS AND PLANS.

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There is good reason to believe that the president not only favored, but would have heartily supported, McClel lan's views in regard to the advance on Richmond by the route he proposed; but there were several adverse influences bearing upon the question, which ere long completely nullified all the aspirations and plans of McClellan. There was, as usual, the fear lest the capital might be exposed to danger of assault, and some dashing rebel, like Jackson, might suddenly pounce down upon it. Besides this, it is to be noted, that the commander of the newly formed "Army of Virginia," Gen. Pope, confident of being able to march upon Richmond, by an overland route, and to put the enemy to flight as readily as, he affirmed, he had been in the habit of doing

appears to have been McClellan's de- that they would reinforce his army at sign not only to save the army from defeat and ruin, but also, as soon as the troops were in proper condition and suitable reinforcements had been obtained, to undertake operations against Richmond, by crossing the James and advancing by way of Petersburg. With the aid of the navy to keep the river open as a line of supplies, McClellan felt convinced that by the projected route, he could most effectually threaten the communications of the rebel capital and prevent Lee from aggressive move. ments northward. Consequently, he called earnestly and constantly for reinforcements to carry his plans into effect. He had brought with him to Harrison's Landing nearly 90,000 men, and he besought the government to furnish him with 50,000, or at least 30,000 more; with this force he was certain that Richmond could be taken, and the military in the West, scouted the idea of reinpower of the so-called "confederacy "forcements to McClellan where he now completely broken up. was. Halleck, too, who had recently been placed in the position of general-inchief, the duties of which he assumed July 23d, was decidedly opposed to McClellan's views, and insisted upon the withdrawal of the army entirely from the Peninsula.

Writing to President Lincoln on the 12th of July, McClellan says:-"I am more and more convinced that this army ought not to be withdrawn from here; but promptly reinforced, and thrown again upon Richmond." Again, on the 18th of July, he telegraphed, The "pressure" consequently became "it appears manifestly to be our policy too great for Mr. Lincoln. He had to concentrate here everything we can been quite willing for McClellan to take possibly spare from less important points 20,000 men from Burnside's and Hunto make sure of crushing the enemy at ter's command, and make an aggressive Richmond, which seems clearly to be movement, as he desired; and McClel the most important point in Rebeldom." lan, hoping that his plan might prevail, To the same effect, at the end of the had gone so far as to make a reconnaismonth, only still more urgently, he beg-sance in force with Hooker's and Sedgged the decision of the authorities at wick's divisions, driving the enemy Washington, and persisted in the hope from Malvern Hill and reoccupying it,

on the 4th of August; but he was not allowed to proceed further. The policy of Halleck was adopted. On the 3d of August, McClellan received a telegram, stating that the decision had been made; the army was ordered to with draw from the Peninsula to Aquia Creek, and to unite with Pope.*

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McClellan strove to have this order rescinded. He wrote to Halleck, August 4th "to withdraw this army to Aquia Creek will prove disastrous to our cause. I fear it will be a fatal blow. . . . . Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart of this rebellion; it is here that all our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation. I do now, what I never did in my life before, I entreat that this order may be rescinded." Halleck sent a long reply, giving his views quite at large, and stating his determination to unite the divided portions of the army into one. Of course there was no alternative, and McClellan proceeded at once to obey the orders he so thoroughly disliked. The needful steps were taken directly; the sick and wounded were sent off as rapidly as the means of transportation allowed; and the entire army

* It is interesting as well as instructive to note the fact, that Lee was watching with great anxiety the

probable course which McClellan would pursue, and he took every available means to lead him to withdraw

his army and free Richmond from any danger of attack

by way of the James River. So long as it was probable

that McClellan would be reinforced and enter on a new campaign, Lee dared not move, he could not undertake elsewhere operations of any account. It is curious to see, in this instance of forcing the Army of the Potomac away from its present position threatening Richmond, how fully Halleck was in accord with Lee; howmost strangely-they were both eager for the same thing.

having left Harrison's Landing, crossed the Chickahominy, marched to Williamsburg and Yorktown, and on the 20th of August, embarked for Aquia Creek, some forty miles from Washington. In his report, McClellan speaks of the various services he was called on to render afterwards, in connection with Pope's movements, and claims that all the way through, "he left nothing in his power undone to forward supplies and reinforcements to Gen. Pope."*

It will be remembered by the reader that, in various operations in the West (see p. 142), Major-Gen. John Pope had shown himself possessed of zeal, energy and perseverance to a high degree, and while acting under Halleck's command, had been very successful in his attacks upon the enemy. The qualities which he displayed seem to have struck the attention and won the applause of the directors of military affairs at Washington. The president, it is true, was a warm personal friend and admirer of McClellan, and would probably have been both willing and glad to have let him have control of warlike movements against the rebels; but there was a strong opposition to McClellan from the beginning, and his policy was sharply criticised, subjected to ridicule, and condemned in no measured terms by those who had the management of the army operations. When, then, McClellan failed in the peninsular cam paign, it was determined to put him

* On the other hand, Pope, in his report, affirms, that a small fraction of 20,500 men was all of the 91,000 veteran troops from Harrison's Landing which ever drew trigger under his command, or in any way took part in that campaign" which he conducted

CH. XX.]

POPE TAKES COMMAND IN VIRGINIA.

207

one side, and to try some other com- his troops together into such a position mander; it was determined to seek out as that, if the enemy descended the a general who should show a more Valley of the Shenandoah, he thought active, aggressive, "go-a-head" spirit he could interpose between their adthan McClellan had ever manifested, vance and main army and cut off the and who should not fail to march retreat. straight into the rebel capital. Pope McClellan's plan of operations on the seemed to be the very man, and Pope's line of the James River having been bold style of talking, his open censur- condemned, it was resolved to strengthing of McClellan's course, and his avowing a purpose of conducting the war in Virginia in a way quite different from that heretofore employed, gave rise to great expectations as to what it was that he said he was about to do.

Pope had been sent for in June, and was directed to assume command of the แ "Army of Virginia." The force thus named was made up of the corps of

en the Army of Virginia as much as possible, by reinforcements drawn from the Army of the Potomac and else where. There was also now an oppor tunity afforded to Pope not only to cope with the astute rebel chief, Lee, and to drive him before him, but also to test the worth of his bold words and assur ances.

On the 14th of July, Pope issued an address to the army, which was noted for its inflated style, its bad taste, and its boastfulness of tone, and which, as a matter of course, on the close of his brief campaign, brought down upon its author a full measure of ridicule and scorn. "I have come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies-from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary, and to beat him when found

Fremont, Banks and McDowell, 1862. numbering in all about 38,000. The cavalry, an arm of the service, as the country was effectually taught, too much neglected in these operations in Virginia, did not exceed 5,000, and was for the most part badly mounted and armed, and in poor condition for service. Pope was enjoined by the government to have special regard to covering the city of Washington from any attack from the direction of Richmond, to whose policy has been attack and secure the safety of the Shenandoah not defence. I presume that I have Valley, and to operate against the been called here to pursue the same enemy's lines of communication in the system, and to lead you against the direction of Gordonsville and Charlottes- enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and ville. The rebel commander being just that speedily. Meantime, I desire now, at the close of June, fully occupied you to dismiss from your minds certain in the defence of Richmond, where Mc- phrases which I am sorry to find much Clellan was operating, Pope was at in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly liberty to place his troops in position of taking strong positions and holding such as he might think best for the them-of lines of retreat, and of bases next campaign. He accordingly brought of supplies. Let us discard such ideas.

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The strongest position a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponents, and leave our own to take care of themselves. Let us look before, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance. Disaster and shame lurk in the rear." Several orders, dated July 18th, indicated the manner in which Pope proposed to conduct the campaign. He announced, that henceforth the troops should subsist on the country in which they were operating, compelling the people to furnish supplies. In order to put a stop to the guerrilla mode of warfare, he declared that the people in the vicinity should be held responsible for any damage done to railroads or trains; that they should be compelled to repair all such damage; that if a soldier were fired upon from a house, such house should be rased to the ground; and that any person detected in these outrages should be shot without waiting civil process. By another order, dated July 23d, he directed commanders to arrest all disloyal male persons, and if they refused to take the oath of allegiance, to conduct them south beyond our lines, and to warn them that if found within them at any time, they would be subjected to the severest punishments.*

1862.

* These orders were supposed to allow, and were certainly followed by, extensive pillaging and various disgraceful outrages. The ire of the rebel authorities was greatly roused, and on the 1st of August, they not only used the stereotyped language about "the unjust and aggressive warfare hitherto waged with savage cruelty against an unoffending people," but they threat ened the fullest retaliation. Pope and his officers were not to have any benefit of exchange, in case of

When the rebels became satisfied that McClellan and his army would give them no further trouble by way of the Peninsula, they were much elated, and resolved, by a rapid and ener getic movement, to march upon Pope, crush him and his force by sudden and overwhelming blows, and then invade Maryland, preparatory to a general invasion of the loyal states. Never be fore had so advantageous an opening been presented, and Gen. Lee was not the man to let it slip away without using it to the fullest extent.* Steps were taken directly for the advance, and as the entire rebel force in and about Richmond was now probably not less than 150,000 men, it is evident how fiercely and confidently the assault would be made upon Pope and his army, the only obstacle in the of way removing the battle-ground from the soil of Virginia, and of carrying fire and sword into the loyal states.

In this condition of affairs, it was all-important to strengthen Pope inme diately and as greatly as possible. Burnside, on the 1st of August, left Newport News with his troops, and reached Aquia Creek on the 3d. Gen. Cox was also ordered from Western

being made prisoners, and further it was declared, that

if any person or persons suffered under Pope's orders, one or more of our imprisoned officers was to be hung

instanter.

* Mr. Swinton quotes a passage from Lee's report, which is worth noting :-" The corps of Gen. Burnsid had reached Fredericksburg, and a part of Gen. Me Clellan's army was believed to have left Westover (Harrison's Landing) to unite with Pope. It therefore seemed that active operations on the James were no longer contemplated, and that the most effectual way to relieve Richmond from any danger of attack from that quarter would be to reinforce Gen. Jackson and advance upon Gen. Pope."-See note on p. 206.

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