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CHAPTER XXVI.

THE PRESIDENT AND HIS CABINET.

Popular Expectation that Secretary Seward would be the Leading Spirit of the New Administration-Mr. Lincoln's Firmness and Kindness with the Secretary of State-Mr. Stanton's Criticisms of Lincoln-Why Secretary Cameron lef: the Cabinet-The Exit of Postmaster-General Blair-Secretary Chase's Restiveness-His Subsequent Appointment as Chief-Justice-The President Deferred to the Ministers.

PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S relations with his

Cabinet ministers were always friendly and cordial. With each member he was habitually frank and sincere in his treatment of all questions that affected the personal relations of each. It was not the habit of any of the Cabinet ministers, excepting Secretary Seward, to visit the White House on purely social and informal errands. Mr. Seward lived not far from the Executive Mansion, and, more than any other of his associates, he was a customed tɩ make casual calls upon the President and his family. It may be remembered, to the credit of both of these eminent men, that it was Mr. Seward, rather than any other member of the Cabinet, who might have had occasion to feel restive over his own position in the councils of the President. Mr. Seward was the most prominent and conspicuous rival of Mr. Lincoln for the Presidential nomination in 1860. He He may have

felt that his failure to secure that honor was due to an accident rather than to Mr. Lincoln's fitness for the place into which he was installed. We cannot say what was the estimate which Lincoln put on the qualifications of Seward for the Presidential office; but we may be sure that Seward once thought himself the greater man of the two. Undoubtedly he was not alone in holding that opinion Many patriotic and intelligent men thought Seward was not only the greatest man in the new administration, but they expected and believed that he would be the author and director of its policy. It is possible that this was also Mr. Seward's expectation.

Very early in the history of the Lincoln Administration this question was to be settled once for all. When Mr. Lincoln had written his inaugural address to be delivered March 4, 1861, he submitted it to the criticism of several persons who were near to him, among others, Mr. Seward. Returning the document to the President-elect, Mr. Seward suggested numerous changes and emendations, some of which Mr. Lincoln adopted and others he rejected. It may be said that the joint labors of the two resulted in the production of a State paper of great power and dignity; that Mr. Seward's share in this work was, after all, inconsiderable; but the fact that the President-elect, then regarded as a raw and unskilled statesman, from whom no greatness could be expected, was willing to accept corrections and suggestions from the future Secretary of State was enough to give Mr. Seward encouragement to magnify his office as "premier" of the new administration.

The next step in the direction of addition to the dignity and importance of his office was taken by Mr. Seward at the end of the first month of the new administration, April 1, 1861. Although State after State had passed ordinances of secession from the Union, public opinion all over the North was in a greatly confused condition. Nobody knew what would be the result of these so-called secessions, whether there would be war, a peaceful breaking up of the Federal Union, or a series of concessions that would pacify the Southern seceders and restore things on a new basis of union. Even patriotic men were in some instances ready to make compromises for the sake of peace, and others equally patriotic were willing that the new administration should secure "peace at any price."

Perhaps as good an illustration as any other of the too prevailing popular opinion about Lincoln's abilities may be found in the letters of Edwin M. Stanton, written about this time. Mr. Stanton was a loyal and upright man, devoted to the cause of the Union; and afterwards, as Secretary of War under President Lincoln, he achieved fame for his herculean labors in defence of that cause. Yet, writing in June, 1861, he gave currency to the belief that the Rebels would be in possession of Washington "within thirty days," and in consequence of that "painful imbecility of Lincoln " to which he referred with grim sarcasm in a letter written about that time. While men were wondering what the new administration would do, and if it would do anything but parcel out the offices, Secretary Seward wrote for

President Lincoln's consideration a memorandum in which the general depression and uncertainty were dwelt upon, and a line of policy was marked out. Briefly, this extraordinary paper proposed that the topic of slavery extension as a political question be laid aside, and "Union or Disunion?" be substituted therefor; and, having set this forth as the local policy, the Secretary proceeded to suggest that explanations for alleged unfriendly acts be demanded from the governments of Spain, France, Great Britain, and Russia, that agents be sent to the colonial dependencies of some of these to stir up strife, and that, in default of satisfactory replies from Spain and France, war be declared against them. In other words, the newly installed President was asked to turn his back on the party that had elected him, and to divert the attention of the Southern rebels from their rebellion by an invitation to join in a series of foreign wars.

This scheme of the Secretary of State had in it a certain suggestion of arrogance, because it contained a very direct hint that he expected to be the officer charged with the duty of carrying out the policy which he had thus boldly outlined. He said that if

the President did not choose to manage this undertaking, he should "devolve it on some member of his Cabinet." He added: "Once adopted, all debates on it must end, and all agree and abide. It is not my especial province. But I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility." The President's reply to this amazing communication was simple, direct, and in admirable temper. Having disposed of the Sec

retary's criticisms on an alleged lack of domestic and foreign policy, Lincoln then took up the scheme outlined by Seward, and said: "I remark that, if this must be done, I must do it." This effectually settled any question which Mr. Seward might have entertained in his own mind as to the primacy of any man in that Cabinet. It should be said, to the credit of Lincoln, the wise, kindly, and generous statesman, that until after his death this paper, which might have wrought ruin to its author, remained locked as securely in secrecy as the fact that the newly installed Secretary of State had sought to assert himself as the power behind the throne. And to the end of his own heroic life Lincoln kept his unwavering trust in Seward, who, in his turn, served his country and his illustrious chief with an equally unwavering devotion.

Another incident which illustrates the intimacy and candor of the relations existing between the President and Secretary Seward was the revision of an important despatch sent from the Department of State to Mr. Charles Francis Adams, Minister of the United States to Great Britain. This despatch was written in May, 1861, when our relations with several of the greater European powers were in a strained. and delicate condition, and there was danger that those powers might interfere in behalf of the Rebel Confederacy and embarrass the Federal cause, if not bring disaster upon it. The Secretary's original draught of that important and memorable despatch, amended and corrected by the President, is still in existence. The Secretary had been rather peremptory in some of his statements, and a part of the duty

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