road corporation before the war began. But he had now the temerity to offer advice and instruction to President Lincoln and his Cabinet, and to solve, in his camp on the James, problems in statecraft that seemed to the wisest men in the world almost impossible of solution.

To Lincoln he said: "Let neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws upon the people of every State." Then, after advising him as to the conduct of the war, the General said: "Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organizations of States, or forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for one moment." Then, as if by way of threat, he said that unless his views "should be made known and approved, the effort to obtain the requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies.”

This amazing communication, addressed to the President from a general who had just shown his incompetence to command an army engaged in offensive operations, did not anger the patient and much-enduring President. He was discouraged and profoundly depressed. Possibly he would have removed McClellan at this time, as he was importuned to do by many who reflected the impatience of the whole country at the dilatoriness that had characterized the operations against the Rebel capital and its lines of communication. In order to see for himself what was the condition of the army, Lincoln

visited the head-quarters of General McClellan at Harrison's Landing, on the 7th of July. Guided by the General, he examined the rosters of the troops, the reports of the chiefs of divisions, and the records which showed the effectiveness of the forces under the command of General McClellan. It was the President's judgment that the army should be recalled to Washington, and in this conclusion he was supported by the corps commanders. To this McClellan was opposed. He was unwilling to abandon the campaign so auspiciously begun and so ignobly concluded. He wanted Burnside's army, then operating in North Carolina, sent to him; and, with large reinforcements, he was confident of achieving success, although it was now evident that he had failed more than once to take advantage of the chances offered him to assault Richmond on this line of attack.

Returning to Washington, and calling for the records of the War Department that showed the number of troops sent to McClellan in answer to his importunate demands, Lincoln found that McClellan had had one hundred and sixty thousand men with him. He wrote to the General reminding him of this fact, and of the other fact that when he visited the General, a few days before, he found that there were only eighty-six thousand effective men on duty. Making liberal allowance for death by disease and in battle, and for the sick and wounded, fifty thousand men yet remained to be accounted for. Where were these fifty thousand? In reply, McClellan said 38,250 men were absent "by authority." And yet

McClellan complained of his lack of men, and of the failure to give him the army of Burnside, or of some other general, operating in other and more distant parts of the Republic.

Lincoln felt the need of a military adviser who should be always at hand and readily accessible. The successes of the generals in the western part of the Republic, contrasting as they did with the humiliating failures of the campaigns around Washington and in Virginia, suggested the designation of some one of these men to the post to be created. General H. W. Halleck accordingly was called to Washington, on the 11th of July, with the rank and title of General-in-Chief. Another Western general called to the East was General John Pope, whose successes in the valley of the Mississippi had given him fame. General Pope took command of a new military organization of three army corps commanded by Generals Frémont, Banks, and McDowell. This was known as the Army of Virginia, and its creation was naturally regarded by McClellan and his partisans with jealousy, a jealousy that was heightened by an intemperate and indiscreet address issued by Pope on taking command. In this address, Pope assumed a tone of confidence and boasting that was apparently designed to contrast the deeds he proposed to do with the failures of the Army of the Potomac. This aroused an intense and bitter hostility among the officers of the Army of the Potomac, and greatly vexed and disappointed Lincoln, who, from that moment, was apprehensive that Pope would raise up enemies against himself and impair his usefulness as a soldier.

On the 28th of June, 1862, there assembled at Altoona, Penn., the famous conference of loyal governors. It was a meeting of the governors of seventeen States to confer on the best means for supporting the President in carrying on the war. They united in an address to the President, assuring him of the readiness of the States to respond to calls for more troops, and to support the most vigorous measures for carrying on the war. Thereupon the President issued a call for three hundred thousand

Notwithstanding defeats and reverses, delays and sluggishness, the spirit of the country was unbroken. It was felt that this was a struggle for life or death.

Pope's command, numbering thirty-eight thousand men, was employed to defend Washington, against which point Lee was now advancing with a large force of the Rebels. Pope was also to hold the valley of the Shenandoah, in which active and aggressive squadrons of Rebel cavalry were manoeuvring. If McClellan now made a bold attack on Richmond from his position on the James, Lee's attention would be diverted from Pope, and keep him on the defensive. But McClellan, it was evident, could not be expected to execute any such movement. The Army of the Potomac was, accordingly, ordered to the line of the Potomac, to support Pope. The situation was full of peril. Lee's army was being massed to crush Pope, before he could be reinforced by McClellan, whose forces were in Virginia, farther from Washington than were Lee's. McClellan was repeatedly ordered to make haste. He delayed and dallied, as

if sullen and unwilling to obey orders. On the 13th of July he was ordered to send away his sick and prepare for his return to the Potomac. He waited, and on the 3d of August he was directed to move his army to Acquia Creek, a small stream emptying into the Potomac below Washington. He remonstrated and said he would obey "as soon as circumstances would permit." Again, on the 9th of the month, General Halleck, at the direction of the President, admonished McClellan of the dangers that menaced Pope, and told him that he must move with all possible celerity. Next day Halleck telegraphed McClellan that the Rebels had crossed the Rapidan and were attacking Pope; and he added: "There must be no further delay in your movements. Still the tardy and slow-moving McClellan did not respond. Finally, on the 23d of August, he sailed from Fortress Monroe, arriving at Acquia Creek on the following day, and at Alexandria on the Potomac on the 27th, nearly one month after receiving his orders.

Meanwhile, Pope was being driven towards Washington, assailed in turn by the Rebel forces under Jackson, Longstreet, and Lee. Not one of McClellan's trusted and favorite lieutenants came to Pope's relief, although they were within supporting distance. Fitz John Porter heard the guns of the hardly pressed Pope, as well as those of the Rebel army assailing him; he knew the desperate condition of the Army of Virginia. He refused to go to its relief. For this he was tried by a military court, found guilty, and sentenced to be dismissed from the army. The President approved this sentence.