impatient of military discipline. Many of the officers were lately from civil life and were unfamiliar with their duties. And the people at home, equally inexperienced, but more impatient, demanded that the army should do something to justify its existence and its cost.

Lincoln viewed the situation with great anxiety. He knew that the army, portentous as it appeared, was not in a condition to risk a great battle; and yet it might be attacked any day. He was excessively desirous of meeting the expectations of the people, without whose hearty coöperation no forces could be maintained. The Union troops held Fortress Monroe and the region round about, a defeat at Big Bethel, which happened on the tenth of June, having been incurred while the troops at that point were endeavoring to extend our lines. They also guarded Baltimore and its approaches, and were driving the Rebels from the western part of Virginia, under Gen. Geo. B. McClellan, a very capable young officer of the regular army. It seemed imperatively needful, whatever were the objections and the dangers, that an advance should be made in Virginia.

On the other side, there was much boasting and confidence. Although the rank and file of the Rebel army were as raw and untrained as ours, they were officered by men who had been professionally educated to the military service, among them being Generals Johnston, Beauregard, Stonewall Jackson, Longstreet, Kirby Smith, Ewell, Jubal Early, Lee, Holmes, Evans, Elzey, Jordan, and others of less note. They were commanded by Gen. Beauregard,

who was subsequently joined by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston. The two commands thus consolidated numbered 18,000 of the rank and file, with forty-four guns. The Union forces were commanded by Gen. Irvin McDowell, and numbered 17,676 of the rank and file, with twenty-four guns. Gen. Patterson, in command of a contingent of Union forces, was expected to hold in check the troops under Johnston, who was at Winchester, on the left of the Rebel line, their right being at Manassas, under Beauregard. At first, the attack of the Union forces was successful, but the tide turned in favor of the Rebels. The arrangements for the supplying of McDowell's men were imperfect; Patterson did not hold Johnston in check, and the first weakening of the Union lines. became a rout. The troops broke and fled in the wildest confusion, some of them abandoning their arms in their flight, but many marching off the field in good order. In a few hours, the great army upon which Lincoln had rested so many hopes, and of which the people expected such great things, was pouring into Washington over the bridges of the Potomac and filling the capital with most exaggerated and alarming stories of defeat. Many civilians, members of Congress, and visitors, had gone out to see the fight. These, in their reckless haste to reach a place of safety, added to the panic and confusion. An overturned carriage in the way caused a block of the retreat on that line, and terror almost ludicrous seized upon the fugitives. But the Rebels, not knowing their own advantage, did not pursue, and Washington, then at their mercy, was

left unattacked. The panic on the Union side of the lines was no stranger than the ignorance that prevailed on the other.

The Rebels, complete though their means of securing information was supposed to be, believed that they were opposed by at least 50,000 men, as reports of their commanding generals subsequently showed. The Union loss in this memorable defeat was 460 killed, 1124 wounded, and 1312 captured or missing, being a total of 2896. The Rebel loss in killed was 387, in wounded 1582, and 13 captured or missing, being a total of 1982. The difference in the return of "captured or missing," comparing the Union and the Rebel figures, is suggestive. It was facetiously said that some of the Union soldiers were so "demoralized" that they never ceased running until they reached their own homes. Certain it is that more than one regiment whose time was out shouldered arms and marched off the field before the fight was fairly begun.

The effect of the disaster upon the loyal people was not unlike that of the firing of the first gun on Sumter. It is difficult to determine whether wrath or mortification was the more prominent throughout the North, at this time. It was mortifying to the national pride that the first considerable battle had gone against the defenders of the Union; but the very danger of the situation only inspired the loyal people to renewed activity. The rush of volunteers was unprecedented. Popular indignation somewhat recklessly expended itself on the alleged incompetence of military commanders and advisers, as well as on the Rebels. Some of those who had clamored

for an advance forgot that they had incited what was now thought to be a premature and ill-advised movement, and insisted that the blame lay with those who had conducted the ill-starred advance upon the Rebel lines. But public opinion, although fickle and unjust towards some of the able and devoted military men engaged in the battle of Bull Run, did not slacken in the direction of the real defence of the Union. The disaster dismayed for a time the people, and it greatly encouraged the Rebels and their sympathizers in the North; but more troops and more military material were eagerly furnished, and the tide of determined patriotism rose even higher than ever before.

Upon Lincoln the effect of the Bull Run defeat was most depressing. It was well for him that he had an unshakable faith in the sturdy patriotism and the hearty support of the people. Even in the midst of his sorrows, he felt that the nation would rally, as it subsequently did, to the defence of the national integrity. He lamented, with a bitterness that none but those who knew his gentle and kind heart could understand, the needless sacrifice of human life; for, unaccustomed as the people then were to war and its deadliness, the list of killed at Bull Run seemed most dreadful and gory. But most of all he feared the effect of this their first success upon the minds of the Rebels of the South. He was hoping, always hoping, that the Southern people might yet see the error of their ways and return to the fold of the Union. Their elation over the defeat of the Federal troops, he knew, put further off than ever all

prospect of this greatly desired object of his prayers. But even then, doubtless, there were some among the friends and advisers of Lincoln who thought they saw in this defeat some grains of consolation. If the war were to be ended then and there, slavery would be saved alive; a long war would certainly kill the cursed institution that had caused the war.

One or two naval and military expeditions were fitted out at once. Fort Hatteras, on the coast of North Carolina, was captured from the Rebels by one of these, and later, Port Royal, South Carolina, was surrendered to the Union forces. In the meanwhile, General McClellan had driven the Rebels out of that part of the State of Virginia that lies west of the Blue Ridge, and the inhabitants, most of whom had been loyal to the Union, repudiated the ordinance of secession that had been passed by the Richmond convention, and organized a new and independent State, to be known as West Virginia, of which Mr. Francis H. Pierpont was the first provisional governor. Subsequently Congress ratified the act of separation "as a war measure," and West Virginia has remained an independent State unto this day.

Congress was in session when the battle of Bull Run was fought, having, as before said, been called together on the fourth of July. By this time the country had become somewhat accustomed to the idea that civil war was necessary to preserve the Union. The result justified Lincoln's wise patience. He had been expected by many impetuous persons to call Congress together as soon as Sumter was fired upon. He had waited for further developments,