Opinion of the Court

469 U. S. unlawful possession, and unlawful sale, of liquor, but was convicted of maintaining a nuisance by keeping unlawful liquor for sale at a specified place. The same evidence was adduced for all three counts, and Justice Butler's dissent persuasively points out that the jury could not have convicted on the nuisance count without finding that the defendant possessed, or sold, intoxicating liquor. Dunn, 284 U. S., at 398. Respondent's exception therefore threatens to swallow the rule.

Second, respondent's argument that an acquittal on a predicate offense necessitates a finding of insufficient evidence on a compound felony count simply misunderstands the nature of the inconsistent verdict problem. Whether presented as an insufficient evidence argument, or as an argument that the acquittal on the predicate offense should collaterally estop the Government on the compound offense, the argument necessarily assumes that the acquittal on the predicate offense was proper-the one the jury "really meant." This, of course, is not necessarily correct; all we know is that the verdicts are inconsistent. The Government could just as easily and erroneously-argue that since the jury convicted on the compound offense the evidence on the predicate offense must have been sufficient. The problem is that the same jury reached inconsistent results; once that is established principles of collateral estoppel-which are predicated on the assumption that the jury acted rationally and found certain facts in reaching its verdict-are no longer useful.

This problem is not altered when the trial judge instructs the jury that it must find the defendant guilty of the predicate offense to convict on the compound offense. Although such an instruction might indicate that the counts are no longer independent, if inconsistent verdicts are nevertheless reached those verdicts still are likely to be the result of mistake, or lenity, and therefore are subject to the Dunn rationale. Given this impasse, the factors detailed abovethe Government's inability to invoke review, the general

reluctance to inquire into the workings of the jury, and the possible exercise of lenity-suggest that the best course to take is simply to insulate jury verdicts from review on this ground.R

Turning to the case at hand, respondent argues that the jury could not properly have acquitted her of conspiracy to possess cocaine and possession of cocaine, and still found her guilty of using the telephone to facilitate those offenses. The Government does not dispute the inconsistency here. For the reasons previously stated, however, there is no reason to vacate respondent's conviction merely because the verdicts cannot rationally be reconciled. Respondent is given the benefit of her acquittal on the counts on which she was acquitted, and it is neither irrational nor illogical to require her to accept the burden of conviction on the counts on which the jury convicted. The rule established in Dunn v. United States has stood without exception in this Court for 53 years. If it is to remain that way, and we think it should, the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be

Reversed.

8

Nothing in this opinion is intended to decide the proper resolution of a situation where a defendant is convicted of two crimes, where a guilty verdict on one count logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other. Cf. United States v. Daigle, 149 F. Supp. 409 (DC), aff'd per curiam, 101 U. S. App. D. C. 286, 248 F. 2d 608 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U. S. 913 (1958).

Syllabus

469 U. S.

GARCIA ET AL. v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 83-6061. Argued October 10, 1984-Decided December 10, 1984 For assaulting an undercover Secret Service agent with a loaded pistol, in an attempt to rob him of $1,800 of Government "flash money" that the agent was using to buy counterfeit currency from them, petitioners were convicted of violating 18 U. S. C. §2114, which proscribes the assault and robbery of any custodian of "mail matter or of any money or other property of the United States." The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions over petitioners' contention that § 2114 is limited to crimes involving the Postal Service.

Held: The language "any money or other property of the United States" in § 2114 includes the $1,800 belonging to the United States and entrusted to the Secret Service agent as "flash money," and thus by using a pistol in an effort to rob the agent petitioners fell squarely within the prohibitions of the statute. Pp. 73-80.

(a) "Mail matter," "money," and "other property" are separated from one another in § 2114 by use of the disjunctive "or." This means that the word "money" must be given its ordinary, separate meaning and does not mean "postal money" or "money in the custody of postal employees." P. 73.

(b) There is no ambiguity in the language of the statute. But even if there were, the particular language here does not lend itself to application of the ejusdem generis rule so as to require reading the general terms "money" and "other property" following "mail matter" in a specific, restricted postal context. The term "mail matter" is no more a specific term-and is probably less specific-than "money." Pp. 73-75. (c) The legislative history shows no intent by Congress to limit the statute to postal crimes. Pp. 75-78.

(d) The fact that the Solicitor General in a prior case presenting the identical issue conceded that §2114 only applied to postal crimes, a concession he now states was unwarranted, does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to interpret Congress' intent in enacting § 2114. Pp. 78-79.

718 F.2d 1528, affirmed.

REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined.

STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 80.

Charles G. White argued the cause pro hac vice for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Theodore J. Sakowitz. Jerrold J. Ganzfried argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Trott, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, and John F. De Pue.

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. Petitioners assaulted an undercover United States Secret Service agent with a loaded pistol, in an attempt to rob him of $1,800 of Government "flash money" that the agent was using to buy counterfeit currency from them. They were convicted of violating 18 U. S. C. §2114, which proscribes the assault and robbery of any custodian of "mail matter or of any money or other property of the United States." The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed petitioners' convictions, over their contention that §2114 is limited to crimes involving the Postal Service. 718 F. 2d 1528 (1983). We granted certiorari, 466 U. S. 926 (1984), to resolve a split in the Circuits concerning the reach of § 2114,1 and we affirm.

Agent K. David Holmes of the United States Secret Service posed as someone interested in purchasing counterfeit currency. He met petitioners Jose and Francisco Garcia in a park in Miami, Fla. Petitioners agreed to sell Holmes a large quantity of counterfeit currency, and asked that he show them the genuine currency he intended to give in exchange. He "flashed" the $1,800 of money to which he had been entrusted by the United States, and they showed him a sample of their wares-a counterfeit $50 bill.

1

See United States v. Reid, 517 F. 2d 953 (CA2 1975); United States v. Rivera, 513 F. 2d 519 (CA2), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 948 (1975); United States v. Fernandez, 497 F. 2d 730 (CA9 1974), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 990 (1975).

Wrangling over the terms of the agreement began, and Jose Garcia leapt in front of Holmes brandishing a semiautomatic pistol. He pointed the pistol at Holmes, assumed a combat stance, chambered a round into the pistol, and demanded the money. While Holmes slowly raised his hands over his head, three Secret Service agents who had been watching from afar raced to the scene on foot. Jose Garcia dropped the pistol and surrendered, but Francisco Garcia seized the money belonging to the United States and fled. The agents arrested Jose Garcia on the spot, and pursued and later arrested Francisco Garcia as well.

Petitioners were convicted in a jury trial of violating 18 U. S. C. §2114 by assaulting a lawful custodian of Government money, Agent Holmes, with intent to "rob, steal, or purloin" the money. That section states in full:

"Whoever assaults any person having lawful charge, control, or custody of any mail matter or of any money or other property of the United States, with intent to rob, steal, or purloin such mail matter, money, or other property of the United States, or robs any such person of mail matter, or of any money, or other property of the United States, shall for the first offense, be imprisoned not more than ten years; and if in effecting or attempting to effect such robbery he wounds the person having custody of such mail, money, or other property of the United States, or puts his life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, or for a subsequent offense, shall be imprisoned twenty-five years."

2

Both petitioners were sentenced to the 25-year prison term mandated by § 2114 when the assault puts the custodian's life in jeopardy by use of a dangerous weapon. On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgments of conviction. The only issue before us on certiorari is whether the language "any money, or other property of the

2

2 Petitioners were also convicted of other crimes. See 718 F. 2d 1528 (1983).