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society as the collective consciousness of its units, breaks down in one very important respect. There is a spatial continuity of the cells in an individual organism which seems to be the essential condition of the fusion of the consciousness of the cells, whereas no such continuity exists among the individual units of the social group.

The central idea in McDougall's whole discussion is that of "organisation" and he brings out the essential importance of this conception by dealing in successive chapters with the "mental life of the crowd" and the "highly organised group." Even in the crowd a minimum of organisation is essential for it to become a psychological crowd.

There must be some degree of similarity of mental constitution, of interest and sentiment among the persons who form the crowd, a certain degree of mental homogeneity of persons who form the group and the higher the degree of this mental homogeneity of any gathering of men the more readily do they form a psychological crowd and the more striking and intense are the manifestations of collective life. Under these conditions one of the most characteristic results of the formation of a crowd is the great exaltation or intensification of emotion produced. Individuals when in a crowd may have their emotions stirred to a pitch seldom attained under other circumstances; they feel carried out of themselves, caught up by their emotion and swept clear of feelings of individual limitation. One of the most characteristic intensifications of emotion in a crowd is the phenomenon of panic, and McDougall says panic is "the crudest and simplest example of collective life." He explains the intensification of emotion in a crowd by what he calls the principle of primitive sympathy.

The principle is that in man and in the gregarious animals generally each instinct with its characteristic primary emotion and its special impulse is capable of being excited in one individual by the expressions of the same emotion in another, in virtue of a special congenital adaptability of the instinct on its cognitive or perceptual side. In the crowd the expressions of fear of each individual are perceived by his neighbours and this perception intensifies the fear directly excited in them by the threatening danger.

In other cases again the intensification of emotional response may be explained by the fact that each member is aware of the crowd as a whole and conscious of his membership in that whole and thus loses his sense of individual responsibility, and gives himself up to the prevailing emotion without restraint. Dr Le Bon has compared this state of the individual merged for the time in the crowd in action to the state of fascination in which the hypnotised individual finds himself in the hands of the hypnotiser. But as McDougall points out "crowds undoubtedly display great suggestibility but great suggestibility does not necessarily imply hypnosis; and there is no ground for supposing that the members of the crowd are thrown into any such condition save possibly in very rare instances." Finally, a crowd acts by impulse, not by volition, and in its lack of self-consciousness and sense of responsibility is comparable to an unruly child or an untutored passionate savage in a strange situation." Whereas the mentality of the individual tends to be lowered in a crowd, in more highly organised groups the result is less detrimental; indeed, with a sufficient degree of organisation, the group mind may rise to a level superior to that shown individually by most, if not by all, of the members of the group. McDougall enumerates five conditions which are of importance in raising the collective mental life to such a higher level. These conditions are (1) continuity of existence of the group; (2) some adequate idea in the mind of each of its

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members of the nature of the group, its position, functions and capabilities and of the relations of the individuals to the group; in this way there may spring up within each individual member a sentiment for the group; that is, an organised system of emotional dispositions centred about the idea of the group; (3) the interaction of the group with other similar groups animated by other ideals and purposes, especially if this interaction is in the form of conflict or rivalry. Such interaction greatly promotes the self-knowledge of each group; (4) "the existence of a body of traditions and customs and habits in the minds of the members of the group, determining their relations to one another and to the group as a whole"; (5) a differentiation and specialisation of the functions of its constituents, i.e. the organisation of the group.

McDougall has defined volition and distinguished it from simpler forms of conation by saying that it is "a reinforcement of any impulse or conation by one excited within the system of the self-regarding sentiment" and he has shown in his Social Psychology how the self-regarding sentiment may become extended to other objects than the individual self and to all objects with which the self identifies itself which are regarded as belonging to the self or as part of the ideal self. He is now able to show that any highly organised group such as the patriot army is capable of true collective volition or "general will" through the blending of the self-regarding sentiment of each individual with his sentiment of patriotism.

The science of collective volition is not merely the direction of the wills of all to the same end, but a motivation of the wills of all members of the group by impulses awakened within the common sentiment for the whole of which they are parts. It is the extension of the self-regarding sentiment of each member of the group to the group as a whole that binds the group together and renders it a collective individual capable of collective volition.

McDougall proceeds to show, with reference to different levels of cultural development, that the group self-consciousness or the group spirit is the great socialising agency. It destroys the opposition and conflict between the crudely individualistic and the primitive altruistic tendencies of human nature. Groups are not always mutually exclusive, and an individual may share in the selfconsciousness of more groups than one so long as their natures and aims do not necessarily bring them into rivalry. This principle of multiple group consciousness in each individual is of the utmost importance, for

it allows the formation of a hierarchy of group sentiments for a system of groups in which each larger group includes the lesser; each group being made the object of the extended self-regarding sentiment in a way which includes the sentiment for the lesser group in the sentiment for the larger group in which it is comprised. Thus the family, the village, the county, the country as a whole, form for the normal man the objects of a harmonious hierarchy of sentiments of this sort, each of which strengthens rather than weakens the others and yields motives for action which on the whole co-operate and harmonise rather than conflict.

McDougall contrasts this with the collectivist ideal, as set out for example in Plato's Republic, which aims at developing in all members a sentiment of devotion to the whole while suppressing the development of sentiments for groups within the whole. In criticism of this plan McDougall writes

this sentiment for the all-inclusive group cannot be effectively developed save by way of development of the minor group sentiments and, though it may succeed with some persons, there will always be many who cannot grasp the idea of the larger whole sufficiently firmly and intelligently to make it the object of any strong and enlightened

sentiment of attachment; such persons will be left on the purely egoistic level whereas their energies might have been effectively socialised by the development of some less inclusive group consciousness.

The truth is that "the smaller groups harmonise more effectively than the larger groups the purely egoistic and the altruistic motives except, of course, in the case of those few persons who can play leading parts in the life of the larger group." If it be objected that the group spirit fosters rivalry and conflict the reply may be made that "the antagonism between men who are moved to conflict by the group spirit is less bitter than that between individuals who are brought into conflict by personal motives; for the members of each group or party, though they may wish to frustrate or even to destroy the other party as such, may remain benevolent towards its members individually.”

The above is a brief summary of the first-third of McDougall's volume. The remaining two-thirds are devoted to the consideration of the national mind and character and the processes of their development. Although of the utmost value and interest they have not the same importance for medical psychology. The book teems with challenging statements and original points of view. Among so much that constitutes solid advance in psychological theory, one may single out for special emphasis the theories of individual and collective volition, which in their strict parallelism mutually confirm one another, and the conceptions of psychological organisation and group self-consciousness and self-knowledge. It is especially in these respects that the book is so much more satisfying than the brilliant commentary upon it which Freud has written under the title "Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse" (Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, Leipzig, Wien, Zürich, 1921) from the point of view of his own Libido theory.

WILLIAM BROWN.

The Psychology of Day-dreams. By Dr J. VARENDONCK, with an Introduction by Prof. Dr S. FREUD. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1921. pp. 367.

The Psychology of Day-dreams is written in order to throw light on a part of the mechanism of thought which has hitherto been insufficiently investigated. The book, which is prefaced by an introduction by Freud, is addressed especially to English readers, the English being, in the author's opinion, of all nations the most interested in psycho-analysis.

Dr Varendonck's terminology, as Frend points out in the introduction, calls for some comment. He defines the day-dream as "the product of affective thinking on the fore-conscious level." Hence he employs the term "foreconscious" thinking, to which Freud takes exception on the ground that daydreaming does not owe its peculiarities to the circumstance that it proceeds fore-consciously. The term "affective" thinking, used later in the book, is also open to criticism, so too Bleuler's term "autistic" thinking. The author himself is alive to the ambiguities of his terminology, but considers it of secondary importance to his aim of detecting the nature of this special thoughtmechanism. Freud prefers the term "freely-wandering" or "phantastic thinking.

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After a preliminary chapter on realistic as opposed to phantastic thinking, the book falls into two main parts: an analytical and a synthetical section,

while in the concluding chapter the author discusses the function of the daydream and takes a brief survey of the difference between conscious and foreconscious thinking.

The observations contained in the analytical section were, for the most part, made during the war, when the author was serving as interpreter with the British Army. He records some of his own day-dreams and the conclusions he reaches are the result of a thorough analysis of the chains of thought which he accustomed himself to retrace.

In the three successive chapters in which the genesis, contents and termination of such chains are considered, he shows that in every instance they originate in some emotionally emphasised memory, arising either from an outer stimulus or an inner perception, and that the progress of the chain is directed by a wish. The process is always accompanied by visual images, but includes also verbal thought-constructions and approaches more nearly to the dream process or to conscious, directed thinking, according as the one or the other element prevails. The last link is, like the first, a memory, and awakening from fore-conscious thought takes place under the influence of an affect or an external stimulus at a moment of mental passivity or "memorydrifting."

In the fore-conscious state we have at our disposal more recollections than in the conscious state; further, memory is no longer "an inert mass," but "a dynamic contrivance," which, like the "unlimited capacity for forgetting" which characterises the fore-conscious state, fulfils an active function in the formation of the day-dream.

The weaknesses of this mode of thinking are soon apparent. There is a marked unsteadiness due to the fascination exercised by memory and the fore-conscious cannot correct its mistakes or recall links in the associative chain. Further, the critical faculty is weakened: in the fore-conscious, hypothesis becomes reality, and errors and absurdities are perpetrated. True, a certain selective activity is shown (Dr Varendonck demonstrates that the thought proceeds by a succession of suppositions advanced to meet the desired end), but, where there is evidence of sound critical judgment, we may suppose that there is a rising towards the level of consciousness.

The difference between day-dreams and night-dreams is only briefly. touched upon, but we are told that "the impressions left by a day-dream and a night-dream respectively, although they defy description, are indeed very different to a careful observer." Possibly the difference depends on the relative awareness of accompanying gratification.

The latent content of the day-dream is not referred to and the relation of fore-conscious to unconscious wishes is mentioned only in passing.

In the synthetical section, Dr Varendonck discusses the part played by affect in the mechanism of fore-conscious thought-activity, which he treats under the heads of memory, apperception and ideation. He regards affect as forming the active connection between memory and perception: "in foreconscious thinking the relation between memory and affect is causativeaffects may stimulate recollection: conversely, remembrances may provoke dormant affects."

Again, in apperception affect is of supreme importance and its intervention may give rise to erroneous perceptions or, by a protraction of the apperceiving process, to chains of fore-conscious associations.

In the chapter on ideation and affect it is shown that, as there is a

centripetal form of affect leading to perception, so there is a centrifugal form leading to conception. Fore-conscious thought is directed by a wish and a wish is feeling applied to an end.

The relation of fore-conscious to conscious attention and that of wish to will are discussed at some length. Fore-conscious attention is defined as "the manifestation of the wish when it bears upon a fore-conscious perception." In consciousness, on the other hand, attention does not necessarily coincide with interest or perception. "In fore-conscious attention...a connection has been established between affect and intellect, which leads to the fore-conscious awareness of a memory element in the forum of the mind." Strictly speaking, awareness implies consciousness. The fore-conscious awareness of the author might be described as that susceptibility of the fore-conscious which promotes thought activity as the result of a stimulus not consciously perceived.

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Passing to the discussion of wish and will, Dr Varendonck defines will as an acknowledged wish which has become conscious," volition having taken over the rôle of affect in the control of our mental processes. In his subsequent definition of will as the awareness of our power to use mental energy (freed of affect) for achieving a conscious purpose-a definition which includes the function of conscious attention and the process of conscious repression-the essentially dynamic nature of will seems to be somewhat lost sight of.

In the chapter dealing with intuition and repression and their relation to mental evolution, intuition is regarded as the reverse of repression; for, while the latter clears the field of consciousness at the expense of the foreconscious, intuition is an invasion into consciousness of fore-conscious modes of thinking.

The inhibitory aspect of affect is not considered, nor its relation to repression, and the differentiation of affects accompanying memory traces is superficial.

Of special interest to the general reader are the views put forward with regard to fore-conscious thinking in relation to creative thought, to visualisation and to the mechanism of insomnia.

Tracing the evolution of thought processes, the author shows how there has been a progressive separation of the mental processes and the motor system. In fore-conscious thinking the two are interdependent; only in voluntary thinking are we able to separate at will intellection from motor reaction. All thought is to be regarded as an attempt at adaptation under the authority of the pleasure principle.

"This investigation," concludes Dr Varendonck, "tends to establish that the unconscious, fore-conscious and conscious thought-processes are three manifestations, varying only in degree, of the same function. This function, originally regulating the relations of the individual with the outer world, constitutes a manifestation of universal energy and is as eternal and unceasing as the other organic activities in the service of adaptation."

CECIL M. BAINES.

Zur Psychologie der Amputierten: Ein Beitrag zur praktischen Psychologie. By NARZISS ACH. pp. 30. 1920. Verlag von Wilhelm Engelmann. Leipzig. Illustrated almost entirely by references to amputations of the arm. Falls into the following sections:

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