principles which are universal. This development of mind seems to be reached by the human being alone to any significant extent" (131). That the author can spare no more than ten pages for "mental elements that are characteristic of the higher mental levels" that are "reached by the human being alone" would seem to indicate that, in an attempt to escape the errors of a too intellectual psychology, he has swung to the opposite extreme. We look in vain for any treatment of reason, judgment, knowledge, belief or volition; while the treatment of character, to be found in the first part of the book, is hopelessly inadequate. As Ward, paraphrasing Kant, writes: "Character is not a question of what nature (his talent and temperament) makes of the man, but of what the man makes of himself. Talent may give him a market-value in respect of the services he can render; temperament may give him an affection-value as a congenial and pleasant comrade; but character gives him (or may give him) an inner worth that is beyond all price1."

The book concludes with two chapters on abnormal psychology containing accounts of illusion, delusion, hallucination, dreams, crystal vision, automatic writing, and multiple personality. The last three are termed "spiritistic phenomena" and are used to bolster up a tilt at psychical research and those scientists who have been associated with it. The author's dislike of "psychical research in its spiritistic guise" (2) looms large in the book. We meet it in the introduction; in the chapter on perception, after a discussion of "the conjuror's success" and reference to experimental demonstration of the unreliability of evidence, we read: "In the light of such demonstrations, the evidence of the great majority of the witnesses of spiritistic manifestations, however honest and sincere they may be, must be regarded as utterly worthless" (79); the book concludes with the words: "He would be a bold man who would attempt to define the limits of the possible, but the limits of the probable are easily determined by any intelligent man who is willing to acquaint himself with the relevant evidence, and to consider that evidence without personal bias or prejudice"; while a little earlier we are informed: "The psychologist claims that, if he has not solved all the problems, he is at least in a fair way towards solution" (152). Need it be said that this extreme view is not the reasoned finding of psychology? Scarcely, we think, when Professor McDougall (whom the author places first in the list of psychologists to whom he "would acknowledge particular indebtedness") (vii), in his Home University volume on Psychology, gives F. W. H. Myers' Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death and Sir W. F. Barrett's Psychical Research in the list of six books on the abnormal included in the bibliography for the general reader.

This attitude towards psychical research would seem to be bound up with the author's attitude towards the question of the reality of mind. "The science which studies the mind...is not a satisfactory description of the province of psychology" (2) because "mind is not an observed fact" (3). Nevertheless the writer is not a thorough-going behaviourist: he does not finally discard mind. We find memory described as a "definite change in the structure of the nervous system, and of the mind" (16), and dissociation as "a definite blocking of...connecting paths in the nervous system-and in the mind" (35). Still in each case the inclusion of mind appears to be due to an afterthought and in no way essential to the argument. When we seek the author's meaning of mind we find the following: "Further, experience, regarded as a phase in

1 Psychological Principles, p. 461.

reaction to an environment, is a quite unique product of the life forces of the organism on the one side and the nature of the environment on the other.... It is a compound product, or a synthetic product, to use chemical terminology, but a compound in which the life forces and the external environment take on the new character of mind” (13). From which it would seem that for the author, either, mind is epiphenomenal, or, experience is mind, even as James argued "the thoughts themselves are the thinkers."

Lip service is given to introspection: "Introspection must be regarded as the final court of appeal in psychology" (7): "the science which studies behaviour will not be psychology except in so far as it regards behaviour as in some way the outcome of mental or psychical process" (3). The substitution of 'mental process' for 'mind' would seem to betoken a compromise, for while mind is rejected as not an observed fact, an attempt is made to find some place for "mental and psychical facts" in a definition of psychology. It is suggested that the definitions of the introspectionist and behaviourist schools of thought must be combined to secure a satisfactory definition. "The truth is psychology studies the two groups of related facts, the facts of experience and the facts of behaviour. The objective happenings are those activities which constitute the behaviour of a living organism, but those objective happenings are interpreted in the light of that inside knowledge of the underlying mental processes or happenings, which each individual has direct access to in his own experience" (3). This would seem to indicate that the fundamental methods of psychology necessarily involve the "psychologist's fallacy" and will satisfy neither party in the dispute. The position is readily demolished by the thoroughgoing behaviourist. He has no need to interpret behaviour in terms of experience. He assumes ability to use intelligence and reason, and these suffice for the building up of suitable hypotheses in explanation of his "observed facts." In common with workers in other sciences he is not concerned with introspection. On the other hand the introspectionist will declare that the object of his introspection is not primarily the interpretation of behaviour, but the observation of his own mental processes, in order that he may compare them with similar observations of others and seek, by that same use of the intelligence and reason on which the behaviourist and others rely, to evolve hypotheses explanatory of mental phenomena.

The given reason for rejecting mind from a definition of psychology is that "mind is not an observed fact." We are then at once faced with the question What is an observed fact? Is 'mind' in any worse position than 'light' or 'electricity'; or is the existence of 'matter,' the fundamental assumption in the science of chemistry, any more a demonstrable fact than the existence of 'mind,' the fundamental assumption of the 'old' psychology? The final word in the battle between realist and idealist has yet to be written. Without awaiting it, on the assumption of the reality of matter, other sciences, "daughters of philosophy and elder sisters of psychology" (2), have built up much valuable knowledge. Possibly psychology, as a science, must similarly make an initial assumption of the reality of mind, believing that mind is for the psychologist what matter is for the chemist. Two other possibilities seem open. We may class 'mind' with 'sound,' 'light,' 'heat,' 'magnetism' and 'electricity,' believing that finally it will be explained in terms of matter and motion, or, we may hand 'mind' back to philosophy, as for science, a useless concept. The first of these positions would seem to be that of the behaviourist the second that of our author.

We freely acknowledge the great value of the work of the behaviourist and quasi-behaviourist, but their activities are so engrossing that they have little or no time for the psychology which has absorbed much of the time of many of the world's greatest thinkers and must perforce leave untouched an important part of the field of psychology: the "higher mental levels" which can be studied in man only and apparently by no other means than introspection and the comparison of records of introspection. In discussing the formation of character, Ward writes: "Whereas the mere animal practically begins and ends with the stability of its instincts-is from first to last confined to the level of its species-man only gradually achieves personal stability in passing from that level through the instability of the imagining and desiring self of childhood to the steadfastness of a reasonable and autonomous being. But it is notorious that there are many who never, completely and all round, develop beyond the larval stage, are never altogether 'grown up'; but in one respect or in many behave like children all their days. Ribot calls such people les instables ou polymorphes; he even regards them as more or less morbid cases of arrested development or infantilisme psychologique1." Modern psychology, on the showing of our author, would seem to be the psychology of the instinctive levels and of the imagining and desiring self of the child and polymorph. He has done good work in showing the "new" psychology as but a section of "modern" psychology. It remains for "modern" psychology to realise that it, also, is a part, not the whole.

R. J. BARTLETT.

The Psychology of Industry. By JAMES DREVER, M.A., B.Sc., D.Phil., Combe Lecturer in Psychology in the University of Edinburgh. London: Methuen & Co., 1921. pp. xi + 148. 5s. net.

The author has written "not so much for the student of psychology as for the ordinary man" (p. v) a concise and interesting summary of the application of experimental psychology to industry, from which may be gathered both the value and limitations of "the applied psychology of industry" (p. 127). Case after case is quoted where output has been more than doubled while the quality of work has improved; but an antagonistic attitude of the workman will more than neutralise the best work of the "new profession...of 'psychologist' (p. 40). "Gilbreth's well-known bricklaying experiment" proved that it was readily possible "to lay 350 bricks per hour, in place of the 120 which represented the normal hour's work on the old method. In this country [Scotland] the present day's work of the bricklayer is 300 bricks!" (p. 84). The industrial psychologist had ideal conditions under which to work during the war, for then "the spirit in many factories was the spirit of the football field” (p. 52), but apart from that time, when a common cause banded all together to increase efficiency as much as possible "there has hitherto been a tendency on the part of the worker to regard the intervention of the psychologist with suspicion" (p. 41).

"Psychological problems of the economic life arrange themselves in three well-marked groups: (1) Problems of the worker-his character, intelligence, vocational fitness and the like; (2) Problems of the work, and the factors upon

1 Op. cit. pp. 464-5.

which its efficiency depends, such as fatigue, length of work and rest periods, economy of movement, conditions of working, and the like; (3) Problems of the market" (p. 8). Under (1) are described intelligence and vocational tests (chs. II, III), under (2) laboratory experiments on work and fatigue, analysis of the work curve and application of the results to industrial conditions with the object of improving both output and quality of work (chs. V-IX), while under (3) are considered advertisement, display and salesmanship (chs. X, XI). In the field of work, and to some extent in vocational tests also, it is difficult to separate the work of psychologist from that of physiologist. The "oft quoted" vocational test for bicycle ball examiners (p. 38) secures the reaction time for a visual stimulus by methods well within the realm of physiology.

The author also finds it necessary, and not particularly easy, to discriminate between industrial psychology and economics. He writes: "Marshall defines economics as 'a study of man's actions in the ordinary business of life.' This is curious and interesting, because it is precisely how a behaviourist might define human psychology, and the fact would seem to indicate how closely the two sciences may come to each other when we consider the relation of both to ordinary life" (p. 6). He considers the difference between them is "that economics is really an abstract science" whilst psychology studies "the concrete activities of the concrete individuals": economics is concerned with the average man, psychology with individual men. He refers to Ruskin's attacks on economics. Maybe the industrial psychologist, too, has need to remember that man appears to be more than a machine. It is noticeable that the first of the "problems of the worker" recognised by the author, character, is passed over with a casual reference, while the other factors, intelligence and vocational fitness, are given a chapter each.

"Industrial psychology" must be distinguished from "scientific management" (p. 9). "Psychology must not be made in any way responsible for some of that speeding up' and over-driving in industry, which various scientific management engineers have falsely attributed to psychology" (p. 50). Unfortunately, however, unscrupulous management, in normal times, may attempt to turn, solely to its own profit and that of capital, possibilities of labour revealed by the psychologist when called in, at an abnormal time, to assist in accomplishing abnormal tasks. It is this that labour fears and feels it must resist. Again, apart from the fear of unfair treatment, there are questions that arise directly from the nature of the results obtained by the psychologist. "Where 140 men can do the work formerly requiring 500, what is to happen to the other 360?" (p. 75). Labour fears increased efficiency in the human machine just as it feared, and to some extent still fears, the introduction of machinery, believing that increased efficiency must be accompanied by an increase in the number of unemployed. "You must convince the worker that he individually will not be the loser, and the trade union that its solidarity will not be imperilled" (p. 76). A psychology that deals with man primarily as a 'doer,' rather than as a 'thinker' and 'believer,' can do little to produce that desirable conviction.

While, however, the author is concerned primarily with the application of the older 'new' psychology to industry he seems uneasy in his self-imposed shackles and from time to time takes the broader outlook of an older psychology. "The worker's belief" (p. 52) obtrudes itself from time to time; the influence of "an effort of will" (p. 64) is recognised in the work problem, while

"the will to buy" (p. 110) is the crux of the difficulty in the discussion of problems of the market, and plays such tricks with applied psychology that the author is constrained to write: "A knowledge of general human psychology is probably even more important in business than a knowledge of the applied psychology of salesmanship and advertising" (p. 105); and again: "The psychology of salesmanship is in fact very largely a direct application of the principles of general psychology, not a highly specialised branch like industrial psychology" (p. 125). It would seem that the industrial psychologist, as many another industrial scientist, is but a tool in the hands of a controlling management that knows what it wants and wills to secure it. Among the leaders in that controlling management are men, brought up on classics and the humanities, who know little of science but much of human nature, and who, maybe as pastime, have read and enjoyed Ward's Encyclopaedia Britannica article on Psychology, absorbing therefrom some of those principles of general psychology that our author agrees are so valuable in the management of men. It is the old story of the 'doer' doing the will of the 'knower.'

In the introduction and conclusion we find material for a preliminary classification of the branches of psychology. "The real new psychology" is an applied psychology having at present at least three clearly differentiated sections: applied psychology of medicine, applied psychology of industry and applied psychology of education (p. 127). Applied science presupposes a 'pure' science and accordingly in addition to, or possibly including, the 'general psychology' already referred to we are, in passing, introduced to a "Pure psychology [that] seeks to understand... behaviour...by understanding ...mental processes (p. 5). To secure a satisfactory definition of this pure psychology is apparently an aim of the author. The attempt made, in The Psychology of Everyday Life, to combine the 'old' and 'new' definitions is carried a step further. The definition now put forward to replace the 'old' definition "The science of the mind or soul"-is: "The science of the facts of human nature and human behaviour" (p. 4). Remembering that elsewhere the author has written: "science, if it has done nothing else, has at least made us critical of definitions1," we would criticise. The inclusion of the word 'facts' in the definition of a science would seem to be an innovation, of doubtful value, challenging the question-What are 'facts'? Again-What is 'human nature'? In what respects is it superior to 'mind' in a definition of psychology? And lastly, we are greatly surprised that our author, whose best known work in psychology is work on instinct, should restrict the province of psychology by inserting the word 'human.'

R. J. BARTLETT

Symptomatology, Psychognosis, and Diagnosis of Psychopathic Diseases. By BORIS SIDIS, A.M., Ph.D., M.D. Edinburgh: E. & S. Livingstone, 1921. pp. xix + 448. 21s.

This is apparently the reproduction of a work published originally some years ago in America. The name of Boris Sidis is well known in connection with hypnoidal states and the method of mental exploration which he calls psychognosis, and when he describes this we recognise the writing of a practised 1 Psychology of Everyday Life, p. 2.