1. They are alike in the promptitude with which they urge to action. A man under the influence of a well-formed Habit goes through the movements to which it has reference, as promptly as the animal whose movements are stimulated by Instinct.

2. Instinct and Habit are alike in the power which they exercise over those who are subject to their sway. An inveterate Habit is almost as difficult to overcome as an implanted Instinct.

3. Instinct and Habit are alike in the extent of their sway. For, while the various tribes of animals have their peculiar and appropriate Instincts, the various tribes and families of men have their peculiar customs and mannerss—that is, Habits or modes of life. 4. It has been thought that, as Instincts are transmitted from one generation to another, so Habits may also be transmissible. But this can only be admitted in a very limited sense. Man derives his bodily frame in the way of inheritance; and, in so far as bodily temperament may lead to particular indulgences, or bodily endowment may fit for performing any manual operation with dexterity, the resultant Habits may be said to have been transmitted; but no farther. Indeed, this is just the prime and cardinal distinction between Instinct and Habit.

1. Instinct is implanted, in full form and vigour, from the first; while Habit is acquired by degrees.

2. Instinct belongs to species; Habit to individuals. All bees and all beavers build their cells and their habitations in the same way, all the world over; but men, in different places, follow different plans.

3. Instinct is always useful, and tends to the conservation of the nature in which it is implanted; Habit may grow up in reference to what is hurtful, as well as in reference to what is useful.

4. The natural gratification of Instinct continues to give pleasure; the indulgence of Habit may cease to do so. What a tumult of satisfaction and alacrity pervades a hive of bees, when pursuing their instinctive operations! How dull and listless are men often seen when complying with their inveterate Habits!

The attempt to reduce Habit to a kind of Instinct derives plausibility from the fact, that while the passive impressions, or feelings, which prompt to action, in the first instance, grow weaker by the repetition of the action, the practical Habit is, at the same time, strengthened and confirmed. Hence it is that things which are done frequently come to be done without any effort of attention,

and almost without consciousness. Habit, when full formed, operates like an Instinct or blind impulse, prompting to an end or action, without any will or intention on the part of the agent. It was this which led Bishop Berkeley (Siris, No. 257) to identify the results of Instinct and Habit, and Dr. Reid to classify them together, as principles which he called Mechanical. The similarity of Instinct and Habit is also implied in the common saying, that Custom is a second nature. But this second nature grows up with our consciousness and concurrence; and although it may come, by degrees, to operate like a first nature, still, the fact that the one is a primitive tendency, while the other is an acquired tendency, is sufficient to distinguish between Instinct and Habit. Instinct is a blind impulse; Habit implies intelligence and will. Instinct is perfect at first; Habit is perfected by degrecs. Instinct is confined to an action or train of actions, from which it never deviates, and beyond which it cannot go; Habit may be acquired in doing anything. Instinct is indestructible; Habit may be abandoned. Instinct is the law of mere conservation or continuance; Habit is the law of progress and improvement, and is suited to beings who are intelligent and free, and whose nature is capable of alteration and advancement. Instinct is stereotyped; Habit is movable, and admits of correction and improvement. Sir H. Holland has said, “Though habits contracted in life often assume the character of instincts in their persistence, regularity, and separation from voluntary control, yet must we regard them in their origin and nature as essentially distinct principles of action." (Chapters on Physiology, ch. x.)

CHAPTER IV.

OF HABIT AND ASSOCIATION.

CAN the phenomena of Habit and Association be reduced to one law? And, if so, can Habit explain Association, or can Association explain Habit?

Both views have been taken.

1. Can Association explain the phenomena of Habit?

In Barrow's Works (vol. iii., 8vo., Lond., 1846, p. 287) there is a Latin thesis, in which it is attempted to show, that Habit is not

different from Memory, which operates under the influence of Association.

Dr. Hartley professes to explain the power of Habit by Association; yet he makes it a necessary condition to the Association of ideas, that they shall have co-existed a sufficient number of times.

Mr. Stewart thinks it more philosophical to resolve the power of Habit into the Association of ideas, than to resolve the Association of ideas into Habit (Phil. of Hum. Mind, ch. 5). Yet in his Outlines (sect. 6) he says that, "The connecting of different thoughts in such a manner that the one seems spontaneously to follow the other, is the effect of custom."

Dr. Brown uses the term Suggestion as synonymous with Association, and says (Lect. 43) that, "What is called the power of Habit is Suggestion, and nothing more."

But the stated and certain way in which the inclination to perform habitual actions recurs, and the greater strength which the inclination gradually acquires, are not accounted for by Suggestion or Association. (Chalmers, Nat. Theol., book iii. ch. 4; Hazlitt, On Principles of Human Action, p. 48.)

2. Can Habit explain the phenomena of Association ?

Dr. Reid says (Intell. Pow., Essay iv. ch. 4), "That trains of thinking, which, by frequent repetition, have become familiar, should spontaneously offer themselves to our fancy, seems to require no other original quality but the power of Habit."

On this passage Sir W. Hamilton has remarked (Reid's Works, p. 387), "We can as well explain Habit by Association, as Association by Habit."

But may not the phenomena of both be resolved into the effects of one general law, the law of familiarity, repetition, or Custom?

All who treat of Memory, Suggestion, or Association, speak of the influence of repetition, familiarity, or Custom; and the formation of Habit goes forward under the same influence; so that the phenomena of both may be reduced to the same law. It has been attempted to show this by Dr. Turnbull. (Principles of Mor. Phil., ch. 3.)

He represented Association of ideas as antecedent or ancillary to Habit. But Association of ideas takes place according to the law of repetition or Custom, and may be called Habit. There are Habits of memory, Habits of judging, Habits of feeling, and Habits of reasoning, as well as Habits of acting; and although the term Habit

is usually applied to the doing of some overt act, to the carrying of a volition into practical effect, we acquire the proneness and facility of this kind, in the same way, and in accordance with the same law, as that by which we acquire a facility and proneness to follow particular trains of thoughts, or to cherish particular feelings.

The fact of their having been once simultaneously experienced by the mind, is not, in every case, sufficient to establish a permanent association between two or more mental movements; and the fact of having once done an action is not sufficient to form a practical habit of doing it under similar circumstances. So that previous co-existence is the condition under which, rather than the law according to which, Association of ideas and the formation of Habits take place. It gives occasion for the effects of the law of repetition or Custom to be manifested. For, let mental movements be frequently experienced at the same time, and an association is established between them; or, let an action be done frequently, and the recurrence of any of the circumstances under which it was done will awaken the desire to do it again. And, as associated ideas recur more easily from the frequency with which they have recurred, so actions done frequently come to be done more easily also; a greater dexterity in doing them, and a stronger desire to do them being the result. (Gerard On Genius, pt. ii. sect. 2; Beattie On Imagination, ch. 2, sect. 3.)

CHAPTER V.

OF THE FORMATION OF SECONDARY AND FACTITIOUS
PRINCIPLES OF ACTION.

THE influence of the law of repetition or Custom extends not only to ideas, but to all our thoughts and feelings. When these are said to be Associated, it is now meant, not merely that they recur in succession to each other, but that they are so perfectly blended that they can no longer be disjoined. And the result of this union or combination is a Secondary or Factitious principle of action. The formation of such principles takes place in accordance with the law of repetition or Custom.

SECTION I.

In a general view, the influence of this law may be seen in Education. Man has a nature. That nature has certain original principles and primitive tendencies. The business of education is to draw out these, and to direct and regulate them in the prosecution of their proper objects. And the whole process of teaching and training, Doctrina and Disciplina, goes on in accordance with the law of repetition or Custom.

It is the same with the influence of Example. Man is a social being, and delights in the company and converse of his fellowcreatures. He is prone to imitation; and the language, and manners. and conduct of those with whom he is familiarly associated are gradually adopted by him.

Even the general society in which a man lives has an effect upon his character and conduct. What is fashionable in dress or ornament, in the way of speaking, or in the mode of living, is associated with ideas of elegance and comfort, and, under the influence of such views, comes to be desired and followed. (Stewart, Elem. of Phil., vol. i. ch. 5.)

Education, Example, and Fashion are brought to bear upon a man as the member of a family, a community, or a country. But if he be regarded as an individual, similar influences may be seen to be at work, in a similar way, to alter his character and conduct.

From some peculiarity in his mental constitution, or in his bodily temperament, a man may be more inclined to gratify some one natural desire or passion-by repeated indulgence it may acquire an undue predominance other parts and principles of his nature will not be developed-his views and feelings will receive a tinge from his practices, and his whole character and conduct may be modified by the pursuits to which he has devoted himself.

A man's Experience of life may have been prosperous or adversefamiliar intercourse with the world and the things of the world may have been followed by satisfaction or disappointment—and according to the issue, his views and feelings, his habits and associations, will be cheerful or melancholy, solitary or social.

Health and Sickness, when long continued, have a similar effect; in accordance with the same law of Repetition or Custom. And the gradual decays of age work similar changes in a man's views