which God has represented himself as doing, or which He has required us to do; nay, they think that the practice is expressly prohibited in Scripture. The passage appealed to is in Matt. v. 33-38. But that the bearing of this passage is against needless and profane swearing,3 and not against solemn and judicial oath-taking, is argued from the following considerations: (1.) The forms of swearing which are specified are such as were common among the Jews. (2.) The form of judicial Oath among the Jews was adjuration by the name of God. But as this form is not here mentioned, judicial oath-taking was not contemplated nor condemned. In confirmation of this view of the passage it may be noticeda. That our Saviour when adjured, answered; and His doing so amounted to a solemn asseveration or Oath. (Levit. v. 1.) b. The language of the Apostles, on several important occasions runs in the form of an Oath. (Rom. i. 9; Philip i. 8; 2 Cor. i. 18, 23; Gal. i. 20.) c. The primitive Christians refused to swear by the genius of the Emperor, as idolatrous; but they gave evidence sub attestatione veritatis. But while judicial oath-taking may be lawful and necessary, it should only be had recourse to in matters of importance, and should be gone about with solemnity and reverence. Epictetus said "Shun Oaths wholly, if it be possible; if not, as much as thou canst." And his commentator, Simplicius, added "We ought wholly to shun swearing, except upon occasions of great necessity." And in the Institutes of Menu, book vi. 5, 109, and book xii. 5, 16, similar sentiments are expressed. On the evils which flow from administering Oaths frequently and carelessly, see Hutcheson (Mor. Phil., book ii. ch. 11) and Paley (Mor. and Pol. Phil., book iii. pt. i. ch. 16). Of late years many needless and offensive Oaths have been dispensed with. Quakers and others, who have conscientious scruples 4 3 The Greek word translated "at all," in ver. 34, is ôλws, which in 1 Cor. v. 1 is rendered "commonly ;" and in ver. 37 the word Aóyos, which means speech or common conversation, is used; whereas, if judicial testimony had been meant, it would have been μαρτυρία. 4 They interpret the precept, "Swear not at all," literally. They also adhere to Yet the strict interpretation of the sixth com- as to the lawfulness of oath-taking, are allowed to make a solemn affirmation that what they say is true; and if they make a false affirmation they are liable to the penalties of perjury. 4. Vows.- Vows are promises made to God. The consideration of them therefore belongs to that department of duty which is due directly towards Him. We may make a Vow, however, to our fellow-creatures, or even to ourselves. In such cases Vows amount to firm purposes or promises to pursue some end, or to perform some act, solemnly made, as in the sight of God, and with an imprecation of punishment from Him should we fail through neglect. Care, therefore, should be taken to fulfil a Vow when it has once been made. The neglect to do so argues not only disregard of the good which the Vow bound us to follow, but want of reverence for Him whose name we invoked. It is better not to Vow, than to Vow and not pay. (Eccles. v. 5.) SECTION III.-Justice in reference to our Acts. This consists I. In according to others all that is due by the laws and usages of the community; and II. In doing what is fair and equitable in those cases which the laws and usages of the community have not provided for. It consists in following-1. The тo voμikòv; and 2. The тo tσov -Integrity and Equity. I. Strict or Legal Justice may seem at first to be an inferior species of virtue. Quam exiguum est ad legem bonum esse, said Seneca. But obedience to the law may spring not from fear, but from a conscientious feeling of obligation, and from seeing clearly, and feeling strongly, that it is only by maintaining the laws and institutions of society that the peace and happiness of its members can be secured and advanced. Among the moralists of antiquity it was a standing precept, To obey the laws; because, without this obedience, the framework of society would be dissolved, and social duty and obligation cease. The highest eulogium which the Greeks could pronounce over the heroes of Thermopyla was to inscribe on their tombs-" They fell in obedience to the laws." The duty of according to our neighbour all the rights with which the laws and usages of society invest him constitutes the virtue of Integrity or Uprightness-the manifestations of which are as many and as various as the relations subsisting, and the engagements entered into, between the members of a community and the rights rising out of these. A man of Integrity will carefully respect them all. Justice further requires― II. To do what is fair and equitable in cases which are not provided for by law. In his Ethics, book v. ch. 10, Aristotle has treated of Equity, and has shown that it is generically the same with Justice. It is called in to correct Legal Justice; and Legal Justice requires correction, because all laws must necessarily speak in general terms, and must leave particular cases to the discretion of the judge. He compares Equity to the leaden rule which was used in measuring Lesbian or rusticated building, in which the stones alternately projected and receded, but the rule bent accordingly. There are two grounds on which the duty of Equity may be called for. 1. The law may be defective, and not reach to every case. In an advanced state of society the relations and transactions between man and man are so exceedingly varied and multiplied, that it becomes impossible to frame laws which shall be applicable to all cases which can and do occur. Recourse is had to precedents, as a means of determining cases which may be similar. This presumes that the judgments adopted as precedents were in themselves just and wise, which may not always be the case. And it presumes further, that the matters formerly decided, and the matters now under deliberation, are precisely similar, which they may not be. Another expedient is to refer cases, which the law has not determined, to the decision of a jury, or of arbiters specially chosen. But neither in this way is there any absolute security against injustice. And the ultimate remedy for the defects of written law-defects which no administration of it can altogether remove-is to be found in the principle of Equity or Fairness. This principle will keep those who are guided by it not only from acts of injustice, but from many things which the wisdom of no legislator can provide against, and to which the sanction of no human law can ever reach. It will lead to the doing of what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of every particular case, and to the refraining from taking any advantage, or seeking any refuge, from the defectiveness of legal arrangements. But 2. The law may be erroneous as well as defective. Without requiring anything that is positively unjust, laws are frequently so framed that the rigorous application of them may issue in the grossest injustice. Hence the common saying, summum jus, summa injuria. In administering the law, judges are often compelled to lament that, by the authority of express statute, or of long-established precedent, they must give a decision which they feel to be at variance with true and substantial justice. Some of our courts, it is true, are courts of equity as well as of law, and the judgments pronounced may proceed, not on the strict letter of the law, but on a fair and equitable consideration of the whole circumstances of the case. But even judgments of this kind frequently fall short of the true and full merits of the case. And, after all, it appears "that a large portion of natural equity is left to be administered in foro conscientiæ; because, in addition to the difficulty of propounding precise rules applicable to all cases, a greater detriment and inconvenience to the community would probably ensue from attempting to enforce it in the public courts, than from leaving it to the decision and the power of conscience, and to the various motives by which mankind are ordinarily influenced." (Smith, Man. of Equity Jurisprudence, p. 5.) An equitable man looks not outward on a defective or erroneous law, of the mistakes or omissions of which he seeks to take advantage; but he looks inwards upon that law of rectitude which is written upon his heart, and seeks to be guided by its dictates. Whatsoever he would that others should do unto him in similar circumstances, he studies to do even so unto them. ECONOMICAL JUSTICE Includes the rights and duties of the family or household. These arise from I. The relation of husband and wife. II. The relation of parent and child. III. The relation of master and servant. CHAPTER I. HUSBAND AND WIFE. SECTION I.—Marriage. FAMILIA was the word used by the Romans to denote the persons collected in the house along with their parents, and also with the servants. The head of the house was called paterfamilias; his wife, in general, materfamilias. (Whewell, Elements, b. iv. ch. 5.) Marriage is defined by Dr. Beattie (Elements of Mor. Science, pt. ii.) to be" the strict and intimate union, for life, founded on mutual esteem, of one man and one woman, in one family, for the purpose of having children, educating them, and promoting the happiness of one another." Marriage is the parent, not the child, of civil society. Cicero called it (De Off., lib. i. cap. 17) Principium urbis et quasi seminarium reipublicæ. Both among the Greeks and Romans Marriage was encouraged by law, and the neglect of it was discountenanced and punished. The whole scheme of nature and of Providence proceeds on the supposition that the human race is to be continued, that the helpless members of that race are to be protected and cherished, and that the various affections and feelings by which they are linked together should be cherished and purified. But while Marriage is natural, reasonable, becoming, or even binding, there are many things requisite towards rendering this union productive of its full and happy effects. Of these conditions every one must judge for himself. And it is better that the legislature should neither directly encourage Marriage nor unnecessarily impede it, but trust to the operation of those principles and feelings which are natural to man, and which are sure to accomplish the ends for which they have been inserted in our constitution. But, when parties have agreed to live together, it is right that the law should interpose its authority to sanction and protect the union, as the living fountain of social happiness and virtue. In treating of Marriage, therefore, it falls to be considered in a legal as well as in an ethical light; because it is the subject of Jurisprudence as well as of Morality. It may be proper to notice |