adhering to what is right, in opposition to pain and difficulty. Temperance regulates our desires and indulgences; Fortitude restrains our fears and sustains our weakness. It is necessary to the attainment and maintenance of all the virtues. The path of duty is encompassed with hardships, and he who walks in it must be prepared to encounter them. Hence said Cicero-" Nemo justus esse potest, qui mortem, qui dolorem, qui exilium, qui egestatem timet.”

Fortitude has been distinguished into Active and Passive, according as the evils against which it is directed are to be encountered and overcome, or endured and submitted to. This is nearly equivalent to the distinction between Magnanimity and Equanimity-two virtues much insisted on by the ancient ethical writers.

“Magnanimity is a certain greatness of mind which raises a man above the influence of the good or evil things of this world, so that he does not think the one necessary to make him happy, nor leave it in the power of the other to make him miserable." An animated description is given of it by Cicero, De Officiis, lib. i. cap. 20. It is not so properly a single virtue, as a state or disposition of mind from which Fortitude and other virtues may spring. It includes a superiority to the fear of danger and also to the fear of reproach. Fabius Maximus, who showed himself superior to both, is given as an example of Magnanimity.

Equanimity denotes an even, uniform temper of mind, amidst all the changes of life. One of this temper is not fawning and servile when poor and dependent, nor haughty and overbearing when rich and powerful-but kind and respectful in both conditions. Such was the character of him of whom Horace said

"Omnis Aristippum decuit, color, et status, et res.”
"All parts and fortunes he alike became."

Great commendation is bestowed on Equanimity by Cicero, De Officiis, lib. i. cap. 26. In popular language, Magnanimity is employed to denote greatness of spirit in encountering and overcoming danger and difficulty, and so corresponds in signification to Active Fortitude; while Equanimity imports the suitable bearing of adversity, and so is equivalent in meaning to Passive Fortitude.

Active Fortitude comprehends Resolution or Constancy, and Intrepidity or Courage.

Resolution or Constancy is that steadiness with which a good man

regards his duty as binding and important, and the firmness with which he adheres to it, although he knows the calamities which the performance of it may bring upon him. The example of Constancy which the ancient ethical writers delighted to give, was that of Regulus, who dissuaded the Romans from exchanging prisoners with the Carthagenians, although he knew that by doing so he was to meet with a cruel death.

Intrepidity or Courage is firmness and presence of mind in the midst of danger. Resolution or Constancy is manifested under evil from which no escape can be hoped for, and implies a steady adherence to duty even when the consequences are foreseen to be fatal; whereas Intrepidity or Courage is manifested in the midst of dangers which may be overcome, and implies that command or composure of mind which can adopt means of escape. The soldier who remains firm at his post, when he knows that a mine is to be sprung under his feet, manifests Resolution or Constancy; while he who falls into an ambuscade, and retains that presence of mind which enables him to adopt means of escape, manifests Intrepidity or Courage.

The vices which are opposed to Resolution or Constancy, and to Intrepidity or Courage, are, Irresolution or Inconstancy, by which a man is easily diverted from the path of duty on the appearance of danger or difficulty; and Cowardice or Fearfulness, by which he is deprived of all self-possession, and shrinks from things which he ought to encounter and overcome. The extreme of Intrepidity or Courage is Rashness, which rushes upon danger and difficulty when they do not interfere with the discharge of any duty. Resolution or Constancy, when carried to an extreme, may degenerate into Obstinacy. But as the course in which Resolution urges us to persevere is presumed to be a virtuous course, we can only be said to adhere to it too constantly when it is seen that a higher duty will be violated by our doing so. This, however, is very seldom the

case.

The manifestations of Passive Fortitude may all be included under Patience.

Humility is a temper of mind which makes us slow in taking offence at any slight or disrespect which may be shown to us. Meekness enables us to bear, with composure, wrong and injury. But both may be included under the general term Patience, which denotes the calm endurance of the evils to which we are liable. So long as any prospect of escape or relief remains, it becomes us actively to employ the means

of accomplishing it. But when hope of deliverance is altogether shut out, then it becomes us patiently to submit to the evil which has come upon us.

Arguments in favour of the exercise of Patience are derived from the fading and inconstant nature of all worldly advantages-from the insufficiency of them to constitute true or complete happinessfrom the desirableness of having our minds under all circumstances tranquil and at ease and from the misery and unprofitableness of fretfulness and murmuring. But the great argument in favour of the exercise of this virtue is derived from the fact, that the pains and evils to which we are here exposed form part of the moral government of God-that they are not designed unnecessarily to grieve or afflict us; but that they are intended and calculated to improve our nature and advance our happiness, and that it is at once our duty and our interest calmly and patiently to submit to them.

The vices to be guarded against under this head are Discontentment, Murmuring, Fretfulness, Peevishness, and Impatience. In guarding against these, there is much room for the exercise of Self-control, which may thus be viewed

SECTION IV.-In reference to the Temper.

"I have always preferred Cheerfulness to Mirth. The latter I consider as an act, the former as a habit of the mind. Mirth is short and transient, cheerfulness fixed and permanent. Those are often raised into the greatest transports of mirth who are subject to the greatest depression of melancholy: on the contrary, cheerfulness, though it does not give the mind such an exquisite gladness, prevents us from falling into any depths of sorrow. Mirth is like a flash of lightning that breaks through a gloom of clouds, and glitters for a moment; cheerfulness keeps up a kind of daylight in the mind, and fills it with a steady and perpetual serenity."-ADDISON, Spectator, p. 381.

In some remarks which he makes on the influence of the Temper on Happiness, Mr. Stewart (Act. Pow., book iv. ch. 4, sect. 3) uses the word Temper, "to denote the habitual state of a man's mind in point of irascibility; or, in other words, to mark the habitual predominance of the benevolent or malevolent affections in his intercourse with his fellow-creatures." It is here used to denote the prevailing tone or turn of a man's mind, not so much in reference to his intercourse with his fellow-creatures, as in reference to his individual

character and his condition or lot in life. "The balance of our animal principles (that is, of the desires, and affections, and passions), "I think," says Dr. Reid (Act. Pow., Essay iii. pt. ii. ch. 8), “constitutes what we call a man's natural temper; which may be good or bad, without regard to his virtue." In the proper government of the Temper, whether it be naturally good or bad, there is a wide field for the practice of virtue and the promotion of happiness.

The causes which affect or alter the Temper are chiefly the following-viz., Prosperity or Adversity, Health or Sickness.

BOOK II.

SOCIAL ETHICS.

"Philosophy consists not

In airy schemes or idle speculations:
The rule and conduct of all social life

Is her great province."-THOMSON, Coriolanus.

THE duties which respect our fellow-creatures are commonly treated of under the two great heads of Justice and Benevolence. In adopting this division, let it be understood that acts of Justice should be done with feeling of Benevolence or good-will towards those who are the objects of them, and that what we call acts of Benevolence are in truth acts of Justice-they are due to our fellow-creatures in the circumstances in which they are placed-they are due to our own social and rational nature-and they are in accordance with the arrangements of Providence and the will of God. When we call the one class duties of Justice and the other class duties of Benevolence, it is not meant that the ethical obligation to discharge the one is stronger than the ethical obligation to discharge the other. Both have their foundation in our moral nature and in our social condition, and, in the eye of the moralist, both are equally binding.

Mr. Hume says that "Benevolence is a natural virtue, while Justice is an artificial or conventional virtue." He confines the term natural to those virtues to which we are prompted by certain feelings and affections belonging to our constitution, which give strength and efficacy to the moral sentiments from which they derive their obligation. Thus, there are various affections and feelings in our nature which concur with our moral faculty in impelling us to kindness and compassion; but none, he thinks, that concur with that faculty in impelling us to Justice; and hence he would