conceived of, affect us in a disagreeable manner; although, through the influence of Habit and Association, they may come ultimately to be contemplated without our being affected in a manner that is at all disagreeable, but rather the reverse. Now, between those things, the first conception or acquisition of which is agreeable, and the constitution of the human mind, there is implied an original suitableness or adaptation; while, between those things which do not affect us agreeably at first, but which come to do so afterwards, and the human mind, no original adaptation is implied; and any tendency towards them, or any complacency in them, which may be subsequently experienced, is acquired. These facts furnish a clear ground of distinction between those Springs of action which remain to be arranged.

Those Desires which can be traced to an original adaptation between the object desired and the constitution of the human mind, may be called Primary and Natural; Primary, to denote the affection of the Sensitivity which is experienced on the first presentment of their object; and Natural, to denote the fact, that, from an original suitableness between those objects and the human mind, all men experience the correspondent desires, in a greater or lesser degree. The Desire of knowledge, the Desire of society, &c., may be called Primary; inasmuch as there is an adaptation between the objects of these desires and the constitution of the human mind, so that, on their first presentment, they excite a pleasing feeling; and, inasmuch as all men seek after or desire the objects, in a greater or lesser degree, they may be called Natural. In like manner, Joy and Sorrow, Love and Hatred, Fear and Anger, may be called Primary and Natural; because all men are affected by them, under suitable circumstances; and the feelings being cherished in the mind, as an intelligent view of the circumstances will warrant, from mere affections of the Sensitivity, they assume the form of Passions. Some of the Affections also, such as Esteem, Gratitude, Friendship, &c., may be called Primary and Natural, rather than Instinctive or Implanted; because, they are felt by all men, under suitable circumstances, and, because, in their growth and exercise, they are aided and strengthened by our Intellectual and Rational powers.

On the other hand, there are Desires, and Passions, and Affections which are irregular and fantastic, springing from some malconformation of mind, or body, or both, or produced by the effect of circumstances which are peculiar, and by the modifying influence of Habit

and Association. Habit and Association, aided by the effect of circumstances, have also a great sway in forming our Opinions and practical rules of conduct, as well as our prevailing temper and Disposition, and our ordinary manners and mode of life. So that, after having set down, in the Order of Primary and Natural, such of our Desires, and Passions, and Affections, and Dispositions, and Opinions, as arise from the constitution of the human mind, and the common circumstances of the human condition, there will still remain to be noticed under the Order of Secondary and Factitious Springs of action, the power of Habit and the influence of Association, in altering and modifying all the other Springs of Action, and producing artificial Appetites, irregular Desires, singular Passions, fantastic Affections, peculiar Dispositions, and eccentric Opinions.

According to these views, the classification of the Springs of Action will stand thus :

I. Instinctive or Implanted. These are blind impulses, which do not imply, in their first manifestations, any knowledge of the end to which they prompt, nor of the means of attaining it. This Order includes Instinct and Appetite.

II. Primary or Natural. These are not blind impulses; but are accompanied with knowledge, and intention, and imply an original adaptation between the objects towards which they tend, and the constitution of the human mind. This Order includes Emotion, Desire, Passion, Affection-Disposition, and Opinion.

III. Secondary or Factitious. Between the Springs of Action in this Order and the objects towards which they tend, there is no original adaptation. They are generated according to the law of repetition, or Custom, and acquire form and pressure under the influence of Habit and Association, altering the direction or degree of the original Springs of Action.

In this Classification, a distinction is taken between what is Instinctive and what is Natural. This is a distinction which has been recognised and applied, in reference to Principles of Knowledge; as many who have objected to the epithet Innate being applied to ideas, have agreed to call them Natural. But in a Classification of Springs of Action, there is room for the application of both epithets; inasmuch as some of them are inserted in the human constitution, in full form and elasticity from the first, and may therefore be called

2 Hutcheson, Oratio Inauguralis, p. 20, sect. 2. Stewart, Act. and Mor. Pow., vol. i. 4to., Glasg., 1730. Reid, Inquiry, ch. i. p. 351.

Innate, Instinctive or Implanted. There are other Springs of Action which do not come into full play and vigour at first, but are gradually developed, with the development of the human faculties; and as they manifest themselves, in some degree, in all men, when the correspondent objects are presented, they may be called Primary and Natural-the epithet Primary distinguishing them from those Springs of Action which are acquired by Custom, and the epithet Natural distinguishing them from such as are Instinctive, or implanted in full form and vigour from the first

ORDER I.

INSTINCTIVE OR IMPLANTED.

CHAPTER I.

OF INSTINCT.

1

THE word Instinct (ev or evros and oriĝei, intus excitare) signifies an internal stimulus. In its widest acceptation, it has been applied to plants, as well as animals; and may be defined to be, "the power or energy by which all organised forms are preserved in the individual, or continued in the species." But we never ascribe action to the vegetable tribes. None of the movements of the inferior animals can be called actions, in the sense in which that word is used by the moralist; yet as their movements resemble many things which are done by human beings, and are prompted by Instinct, it may be well to look to the manifestations of this principle in the inferior animals.

"

1 Mons. Jouffroy has characterized Instinct as the cri d'organization,”. the cry, expression, or utterance of organization. It is called by Paley "a propensity prior to instruction, and independent of experience." "Instinct," says Leibnitz,

"is the inclination of a living creature to do what is suitable to it, without any conception of the reason for doing it." The term Instinct, says Dr. Whewell, may properly be opposed to Insight. Dr. Reid calls it "a natural blind impulse."

SECTION I.

There are two classes of actions, which, in the inferior animals, have been referred to Instinct as their spring.

1. Those which have reference to the preservation of individuals— as the seeking and discerning the food which is convenient for them, and the using their natural organs of locomotion, and their natural means of defence and attack.

2. Those which have reference to the continuation of the species -as the bringing forth and the bringing up of their young.

These instinctive actions are not done,

1. By instruction nor tradition, from generation to generation; for many of the inferior animals are orphans from their birth; and chickens hatched in an oven have the same instincts as those hatched by the hen;

2. Nor from experience acquired by the individuals; for the young bird builds its nest as curiously the first time as during any subsequent season;

3. Nor with any knowledge or design in the animals; for, while bees work most geometrically, they have no knowledge of geometry; nor any design that the grubs which they enclose and feed in their hexagonal cells shall one day fly out, as the free members of their commonwealth or kingdom, or depart as the germ of a new colony.

Various theories have been proposed to explain the instinctive actions of the inferior animals.

These may be arranged in three classes, according as the phenomena of Instinct are referred to a cause which is Physical, Psychical, or Hyperpsychical.

I. According to the Physical theories, the operations of Instinct are all provided for in the structure and organisation of the inferior animals, and do not imply any mind or soul. The principle of life may be developed,

1. By the mechanical or automatic play of bodily organs. This opinion has been supported by Gomez Pereira (in a work entitled Margarita Antoniana, published at Medina del Campo, in 1554), by Descartes and his followers, by Cardinal Polignac (in the sixth

book of his Latin poem, entitled Anti-Lucretius), and by Mr. Norris (in his Essay towards the Theory of an Ideal World, pt. ii. ch. 2).

2. By Irritability. The insect tribes are remarkable for the strength and number of their Instincts. Yet they are destitute of brain and the ordinary organs of sensation. Their instinctive movements must therefore be excited by Irritability, and be regarded as the results of the vital principle (Insect Life, by David Badham, M.D., Edin., 1845). In like manner, Dr. Mason Good (Book of Nature, vol. ii. p. 132) defines Instinct to be "the operation of the living principle.” “The life is the law according to which the phenomena of pure Instinct are developed.” "But Instinct does not necessarily imply Intelligence or even Sensation."-Virey, De la Physiologie dans ses Rapports avec la Philosophie: 8vo., Paris, 1844; p. 394.

3. By Sensation. "Instinctive Actions have their source, each, in some uneasy Sensation, arising from a specific irritation, and urging animals to adopt the only proper means of getting rid of it. Instinctive Actions appear to be directly connected with Sensation, in the same way as certain organic actions are connected with Irritability, and rational actions with Thought. They seem to stand midway between the two latter, with one or other of which, it is remarkable, that they have been almost constantly confounded." -The Philosophy of Instinct and Reason, by Dr. Bushman, p. 178.

Mr. Barlow (Connection between Physiology and Intellectual Philosophy) thinks that the instinctive movements of the inferior animals result from impressions on the nerves of sense, and imply little or no intelligence. And the Rev. Will. Kirby (Bridgewater Treatise, vol. ii. p. 255) says that, "as bodily appetite is the consequence merely of physical action upon an organisation adapted to respond to it, can we not conceive that the organisation of the brain and nervous system may be so varied and formed by the Creator as to respond, in the way that He wills, to pulses upon them from the physical powers; so as to excite animals to certain operations, for which they were evidently constructed, in a way analogous to the excitement of appetite?"

Among the Physical theories, as to Instinct, may be mentioned the doctrine held by Paracelsus and Van Helmont, concerning the Archæus or Vital Principle, which presides over the nutrition and conservation of every living being; and the doctrine of a Plastic Nature, or Spirit of Nature, which pervades and assists all cor