with the privilege of maintaining and defending that right. Therefore, when the right to life and liberty are conceded, it follows that every other right essential to the maintenance thereof, is also conceded. For the right to life would be of no value unless accompanied with the right to defend and maintain it; nor can the right to liberty be maintained without the accompanying right of self-defense.

$ 28. Man's right to pursue after or seek happiness, implies his right to acquire and enjoy that upon which his happiness or well-being depends. He can only be happy in the supply of all his needs. There cannot be contentment while the mind feels the demand of necessities it is unable to supply; and in the absence of contentment, there cannot be complete enjoyment. Thus, while there is hunger or thirst, and the means are not to be had to supply the demand, there can be no complete enjoyment. The higher necessities may be so abundantly supplied in the presence of such physical lack, as almost to overcome the lower disquiet; but, nevertheless, the demands of hunger and thirst will make themselves felt, unless consciousness be entirely withdrawn from the physical nature.

$29. But there are, also, social, intellectual, moral and religious needs, which must be supplied, to enable man to attain his true destiny; and those needs, unless properly supplied, have their hungerings and thirstings, creating an "aching void." Every nature has its needs, without the supply of which man cannot obtain happiness. The gratification he experiences in the appropriate supply of the need indicated by hunger or thirst, is but one of the many strings vibrating in harmony with his perfect destiny, and tending to produce that state in him known as happiness. When every need of his nature is supplied, so that, physically, intellectually, and affectionally, there is no lack, he will have attained the state of complete happiness. The affirmation, therefore, of the right of man to seek happiness, implies his

right to seek perfection in every department of his being. He has a right to perfect his physical nature, by supplying every need thereof; he has a right to perfect his intellectual nature, by seeking all knowledge; he has a right to perfect his social and affectional nature, by striving to come into true and just relations to man and God.1

$30. This natural right to seek happiness, and, hence, to employ the means by which alone it can be obtained, gives also the right of property, by means of which, in many respects, man's needs are to be supplied.2 Man's

1 Perfect happiness is an incident of a perfected individuality and character, and is the proposed end of every human being. Such destiny is the birthright of all, and hence, the desire for happiness is instinctive in man. But happiness is to be distinguished from mere gratification of desire. That state called desire, looking for gratification independent of the supply of needs, arises from a disregard of the demands of the higher nature, whence arise spiritual hunger and thirst, creating an "aching void," uneasiness, discontent-to silence which, gratification is sought, not by the supply of those higher needs, but by the excitation of the lower appetites and passions. This undue excitation tends to disease, suffering and death. This desire for gratification is denominated "lust."

Real happiness can result only from obedience to law. It is a state of consciousness in the individual, realizing the complete supply of everything essential to his present well-being, without regrets for the past or anxiety for the future. It implies a sense of duty performed to one's self, neighbor and God. By obedience of every law of his being, man dwells in the smile of Divine favor, hearing the voice of God saying, "Well done good and faithful servant, enter into the joy of thy Lord." Perfect happiness can result only from perfect obedience to every law promotive, in the individual, of his perfect destiny; consequently, when man seeks happiness through the gratification of his selfish desires, he must not only fail, but must involve himself in a degree of suffering incident to such disobedience of the requirements of his highest destiny. It is to be observed that happiness can never be obtained while it is made the object of pursuit. It can only follow as a result incident to a state or condition in the individual, in harmony with the divine attributes. Hence, happiness cannot properly be made the object of pursuit, except as an incident of perfected condition or state.

2 The subject of property, or that to which the doctrine of property relates. GODWIN, in his treatise on Political Justice, says: "That it relates to all those things that conduce, or may be conceived to conduce, to the benefit or pleasure of man, and which cannot otherwise be applied to the use of one or more persons, than by a permanent or temporary exclusion of the rest of the species. Such things in particular are food, clothing, habitation and furniture. (Vol. 2, p. 415.)

of the nature of property. PUFFENDORF (B. IV, ch. 4, ? 1), says that property is a moral quality which does not affect the things themselves, or as to their intrinsic nature, but only produce a moral effect with regard to other persons; and that these qualities, as all others of the same kind, derive their birth from indisposition, &c. That the natural substance of things suffers no alteration, whether property be added to them or taken from them. He defines property

property rights are either in common, or such as belong to him exclusively as an individual. He has a right in common to that which nature has provided without the labor of man, and which is necessary or convenient for his use; to be so exercised, however, as not to interfere with the like right in others. He has a right in common to the use of the earth, and the natural products thereof; to the use of the water, and the natural products of the same; to the use of the sunlight, the air, etc., to be so used as not to interfere with the same right in others. But any appropriation of these natural provisions beyond the requirement of his wants, which necessarily excludes others, cannot be claimed as a natural right.1

$ 31. He has also a natural right to the products of his own labor. They are, so to speak, his creations, and he has a title thereto as the producer or creator of such products. This property belongs to the individual, and is not held in common, as in case of mere natural pro

to be "a right by which the very substance, as it were, of a thing, so belongs to one person, that it doth not in whole belong, after the same manner, to any other." (Idem, 2; see also Kaufmann's Mackeldey's Civil Law, 260.) He uses the terms "dominion" and "property" as synonymous. The right constituting a thing property, he says, "strictly speaking, inheres in the person from which the things themselves derive some kind of extrinsic denomination." (Idem.) But aside from metaphysical disquisitions upon the question, my right of absolute property in a thing implies my right of dominion over, and of appropriation of, the thing; and my property therein, when limited to a particular use, or when qualified by a particular obligation, is not absolute as to the whole thing, but is deemed a limited or qualified property. But of this hereafter. (See post,; see Kaufmann's Mackeldey's Civil Law, ? 260.)

1 Man's right to appropriate those things to his use which God has provided for the supply of his needs, is absolute in itself, but is only inchoate in respect to the things to be appropriated; and his absolute property in the thing does not commence until the appropriation has taken place. The right to appropriate for the supply of needs is absolute, but this right does not attach to a particular thing until exercised in respect to such thing. This right, which he holds in common with all mankind, to the use of those means provided by the Author of his being, without the labor of man, for the supply of his necessities, is, therefore, absolute, but it only attaches to the thing when exercised in respect thereto. Therefore, the right to appropriate must not be confounded with the act of appropriation. Before appropriation, his property in the thing is inchoate and conditional; after appropriation, as above, it is absolute. But this absolute right to appropriate these things made essential to the existence of man, extends only to the supply of his necessities; and when, by so extending, this right, he interferes with the like necessary rights of others, he is acting without authority from nature.

ducts, upon which man has bestowed no labor.1

He has an absolute right to apply to his own use that which he has produced without taxing the labor or invading the rights of others; and he has a natural right to keep or part with the same upon such terms as he thinks proper, subject, however, to such modifications as the rights of society impose.

S32. He may have property rights in whatever he takes from the common stock and renders more valuable to himself or to society by the bestowal of his labor upon it. Thus, he may take uncultivated land, and by his labor subdue it, until its products are more suited to the needs of man, or are produced in greater abundance. By so doing, he naturally acquires a property in such land, justly measured by the improved character imparted to it by his labor. The same principle is applicable to every natural thing made more valuable by the labor of man. His exclusive property in anything, naturally, is to be measured by what he has bestowed upon or imparted to it. Rights of property acquired by contract, etc., cannot properly be considered in this place.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENTS.

$33. Civil governments are institutions of society, established for the aid and protection of the members thereof; and man's right to use his faculties and powers to provide for his present and future well-being,

1 This right to the products of one's own labor is absolute, because such products are the creation of the laborer. His title thereto is original, and not derived after the thing has had an existence, as in case of title by appropriation or purchase. His title begins with the beginning of that to which he is entitled. This proposition presupposes the laborer to be the owner of himself, his faculties and his powers; and as such owner, to have the right to dispose of their use for a limited time, or of the products of their use; hence, by contract, he can transfer his title to the products of his labor to another, even before they have an existence, or, which is the same thing, he may hire out to another any lawful use of himself, his faculties and powers.

is the basis of the authority with which civil governments are necessarily invested. Were all men sufficiently wise, powerful and just to understand, respect and perform their various duties to themselves and others, the necessity for human governments would, in a measure, be obviated. But, as men are naturally weak, ignorant and selfish, and are inclined to prefer self to justice, human governments, established upon principles of impartial justice, become a necessity.1

$ 34. Man is so constituted, that, living alone, he cannot perfect himself in his social, moral and religious natures. He is constituted for society, and must live in it or fail of his destiny. He may live by himself as an animal, but he cannot as a social, moral and religious being. Hence, society is one of the necessities of his existence, giving birth to a class of rights to which those of the mere individual are necessarily subordinated.2

1 "All men are endowed with certain unalienable rights, among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that, for the protection of these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." (Declaration of Independence.)

? Man is so formed by nature that he cannot supply all his own wants, but necessarily stands in the need of the intercourse and assistance of his fellow creatures, whether for his immediate preservation, or for the sake of perfecting his nature, and enjoying such a life as is suitable to a rational being. (See Vattel's Law of Nations, Prelim., p 45, 10.)

"The great end of every being endowed with intellect and sentiment, is happiness. It is by the desire alone of that happiness that we can bind a creature possessed of the faculty of thought, and form the ties of that obligation which shall make him submit to any rule. Now, by studying the nature of things, and that of men in particular, we may thence deduce the rules which man must follow in order to attain his great end-to obtain the most perfect happiness of which he is susceptible. We call those rules the natural laws, or the laws of nature. They are certain, they are sacred, and obligatory on every man possessed of reason, independently of every other consideration than that of his nature, and even though we should suppose him totally ignorant of the existence of a God. But the sublime consideration of an eternal, necessary, infinite Being, the Author of the universe, adds the most lively energy to the laws of nature, and carries it to the highest degree of perfection. That necessary being necessarily unites in himself all perfection; he is therefore superlatively good, and displays his goodness by forming creatures susceptible of happiness. It is then his wish that his creatures should be as happy as is consistent with their nature; consequently it is his will that they should, in their whole conduct, follow the rules which that same nature lays down for them as the most certain road to happiness. Thus the will of the Creator perfectly coincides with the simple indications of nature; and those two sources, producing the same law, unite in forming the same obligation. The whole