The Rational Design of International InstitutionsBarbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, Duncan Snidal Cambridge University Press, 2003年12月8日 International institutions vary widely in terms of key institutional features such as membership, scope, and flexibility. In this 2004 book, Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal argue that this is so because international actors are goal-seeking agents who make specific institutional design choices to solve the particular cooperation problems they face in different issue-areas. Using a Rational Design approach, they explore five features of institutions - membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility - and explain their variation in terms of four independent variables that characterize different cooperation problems: distribution, number of actors, enforcement, and uncertainty. The contributors to the volume then evaluate a set of conjectures in specific issue areas ranging from security organizations to trade structures to rules of war to international aviation. Alexander Wendt appraises the entire Rational Design model of evaluating international organizations and the authors respond in a conclusion that sets forth both the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach. |
內容
The Rational Design of International Institutions | 1 |
The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement | 41 |
Uncertainty and Escape | 69 |
MostFavoredNation Clauses and Clustered Negotiations | 99 |
Reciprocity Coercion and Exchange | 131 |
From Litigation to Arbitration | 159 |
Multilateralizing Trade and Payments in Postwar Europe | 189 |
The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties | 211 |
How States Built a Market in International Aviation Services | 233 |
On the Rational Science of Institutional Desing | 259 |
Looking Back to Move Forward | 291 |
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airlines Alexander Wendt alternative analysis antidumping arbitration argue arrangements asymmetric externalities Austria-Hungary bargaining benefits Bermuda institutions bilateral agreements CENTRALIZATION increases choice clustering concessions conjecture C4 cooperation costs countries courts create debtor governments defection disputes distributional problems domestic political Duncan Snidal east economic effects empirical enforcement problems enlargement equilibrium escape clause European governments example expansion explain fares GATT guarantees hard-currency IATA important incentives increases with ENFORCEMENT increases with UNCERTAINTY independent variables institutional design international institutions issue-areas issues large number linkage Lisa Martin logic monitoring multilateral multilateral clearing NATO negotiations normative number of actors outcomes parties payments Peter Rosendorff Poisson distributed POW system POWs Rational Design conjectures Rational Design framework Rational Design project reassuring reciprocity regime Rosendorff rules Snidal standard strategic tariff trade treaties treatment of POWs trust game uncertainty about preferences United Kingdom violations whaling WLIM World War II