The Rational Design of International InstitutionsInternational institutions vary widely in terms of key institutional features such as membership, scope, and flexibility. In this 2004 book, Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal argue that this is so because international actors are goal-seeking agents who make specific institutional design choices to solve the particular cooperation problems they face in different issue-areas. Using a Rational Design approach, they explore five features of institutions - membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility - and explain their variation in terms of four independent variables that characterize different cooperation problems: distribution, number of actors, enforcement, and uncertainty. The contributors to the volume then evaluate a set of conjectures in specific issue areas ranging from security organizations to trade structures to rules of war to international aviation. Alexander Wendt appraises the entire Rational Design model of evaluating international organizations and the authors respond in a conclusion that sets forth both the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach. |
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內容
The Rational Design of International Institutions | 1 |
The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement | 41 |
Uncertainty and Escape | 69 |
MostFavoredNation Clauses and Clustered Negotiations | 99 |
Reciprocity Coercion and Exchange | 131 |
From Litigation to Arbitration | 159 |
Multilateralizing Trade and Payments in Postwar Europe | 189 |
The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties | 211 |
How States Built a Market in International Aviation Services | 233 |
On the Rational Science of Institutional Desing | 259 |
Looking Back to Move Forward | 291 |
| 323 | |
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常見字詞
actors agree agreement airlines allies allow alternative analysis approach arbitration argue arrangements bargaining behavior benefits Bermuda bilateral centralized choice clearing clustering concerns conjecture consider cooperation costs countries courts create defection dependent discussion distributional distributional problems domestic east economic effects empirical enforcement problems enlargement equilibrium escape clause European example expansion explain externality face flexibility framework future given governments guarantees important incentives increases individual institutional design interests international institutions involved issues Italy less limited logic markets means mechanisms membership multilateral negotiations normative offer organizations outcomes particular parties political positive possible potential POWs preferences question Rational Design reciprocity reduce regime require restrictive result rules scope standard strategic structure suggests tariff theory trade treaties trust types uncertainty United variables violations volume
書目資訊
| 書名 | The Rational Design of International Institutions International Organization |
| 編者 | Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, Duncan Snidal |
| 出版者 | Cambridge University Press, 2003 |
| ISBN | 1139449125, 9781139449120 |
| 匯出書目資料 | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |