ABBAT-continued.

founded between 602 and 1133. An abbat together with his monks formed a convent, and were a corporation. By statute 27 Hen. 8, c. 28, the lesser monasteries were abolished, and by statute 31 Hen. 8, c. 13, the larger ones were dissolved also.

ABDICATION.

This is a renunciation of office by some magistrate or other person in office before the natural expiration thereof. Such a renunciation differs from a resignation of office, being usually pure and simple, whereas resignation is commonly in favour of some particular successor. James II. was considered to have abdicated the Crown in 1688.

ABDUCTION. This word is commonly used of the criminal offence of carrying off females on account of their fortunes. See statute 9 Geo. 4, c. 31; but the law is now comprised in 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, ss. 53-4. And by the same statute (24 & 25 Vict. c. 100), s. 55, the unlawfully taking away any unmarried female under the age of sixteen years out of the possession and against the will of her parents or guardian is a misdemeanour; and under s. 56 of the same Act the like offence in respect of an unmarried female under the age of fourteen years is a felony.

ABEYANCE. This word as applied to real property, whether estates or dignities, denotes that the same are in expectation, remembrance, or intendment of the law. Abeyance is said to be of two sorts, being either (1) Abeyance of the fee simple, or (2) Abeyance of the freehold. The first is where there is an actual estate of freehold in esse, but the right to the fee simple is suspended, and is to revive upon the happening of some event; e.g. in the case of a lease to A. for life, remainder to the right heirs of B. who is alive, the fee simple is in abeyance until B. dies (Co. Litt. 342 b.) Similarly, during the incumbency of each successive incumbent of a church, he having only a freehold interest therein, the fee simple is in abeyance (Litt. § 644-6.) The second species of abeyance, i.e. an abeyance of the freehold itself, occurs on the death of an incumbent, and until the appointment of his successor (Litt. s. 647.) But saving this one case, the freehold is never in abeyance, and cannot possibly be so.

It was customary in speaking of a thing in abeyance to say that it was "in nubibus" (which was rather a profane expression), or "in gremio legis (Carter v. Barnardiston, 1 P. Wms. 516), the latter

ABEYANCE-continued.

phrase denoting that the fee simple or freehold which was in abeyance was meanwhile under the care or protection of the law.

There is no abeyance either of the fee simple or of the freehold in the case of conveyances operating under the Statute of Uses, for in these what is not given away remains in the grantor until it is so given.

ABILITY TO PAY. Before any one may be imprisoned at the present day under the 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62 (The Debtors Act, 1869), it is necessary (subject to the exceptions mentioned in s. 4 of the Act), that the debtor should have had since the date of the order or judgment the means to pay the sum in respect of which he has made default, s. 5 of the Act being substituted for ss. 98 and 99 of the County Court Act, 1846. Moreover, no imprisonment under this section is to operate as a satisfaction or extinguishment of any debt or demand, or cause of action, or to deprive any person of any right to take out execution against the lands or goods of the person imprisoned.

ABJURATION. This is a foreswearing or renouncing upon oath. To abjure the realm was to take an oath to quit it for ever, and such abjuring persons were and are civilly dead, So also to abjure the Pretender was to take an oath disclaiming all allegiance or obedience to him. The oath of abjuration is a natural issue from the duty of allegiance, but, apparently, was not devised until after the Revolution of 1688, when the 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 27, first imposed it in respect of temporal sovereigns at least. (See title PRÆMUNIRE, as to spiritual sovereigns.) More recently the oath of abjuration has been wrapped up in the oath of allegiance prescribed by the 21 & 22 Vict. c. 48, s. 1, which is in these words: "I, A. B., do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Victoria, &c., and I do faithfully promise to maintain, &c." the succession to the Crown as settled by the Act of Settlement, 1701 (12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2), "hereby utterly renouncing and abjuring any obedience or allegiance unto any other person claiming or pretending a right to the Crown of this realm; and I do declare that no foreign prince, person, prelate, state, or potentate, hath or ought to have any jurisdiction, power, superiority, pre-eminence, or authority, ecclesiastical or spiritual, within this realm." Under the Naturalization Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 14), s. 9, the oath of allegiance leaves out the words of abjuration, being merely an expression of

ABJURATION― continued.

the positive duty of allegiance to the Queen.

Formerly, ie, in the time of Edward the Confessor, and the other succeeding sovereigns, down to the reign of James I., if a person committed a felony he might obtain sanctuary in a church or churchyard; and there on confession of the crime, he might abjure the realm. But this privilege, growing into an abuse, the thing was abolished by 21 Jac. 1, c. 28, since which statute this kind of abjuration has ceased. 2 Inst. 629.

ABORTION. Under the statute 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 58, any woman being with child who with intent to procure her own miscarriage, unlawfully administers to herself any poison, or uses any instrument with the like intent, and any person other than the woman doing for her the like (whether or not the woman is with child), is guilty of felony; and by s. 59, the person supplying such poison or instrument with knowledge of the intended unlawful use thereof, is guilty of a misdemeanour. For the complete commission of this offence, the earlier statutes of 43 Geo. 3, c. 58, and 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 14, had required that the woman should be quick with child; but that is no longer a requisite. R. v. Goodhall, 2 C. & K. 293; R. v. Isaacs, 9 Cox, C. C. 228; Arch. Crim. Pl. and Evid. 711.

ABRIDGMENT.

That is an epitome. The principal abridgments of the law are the following:

1516. Fitzherbert's Abridgment, going down to 21 Henry VII.

1568. Brooke's "Grand Abridgment," going down to Elizabeth. Statham's Abridgment, going down to Henry VI.

1762. Comyns' Digest.

1736-51. Bacon's Abridgment.
1741-51. Viner's Abridgment.
1:99-1806, with Supplement.
1853. Chitty's Equity Index, 3rd Ed.;
and

1870. Harrison's Digest, by Fisher.

ABSCONDING DEBTOR. Under the Debtors Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62), s. 12, a bankrupt or liquidating debtor, who either after or within four months before the commencement of the bankruptcy or liquidation, quits England, and wrongfully takes with him property to the amount of £20 or upwards, is guilty of felony. And under the statute 33 & 34 Vict. c. 76, intituled "The Absconding Debtors Act, 1870," such a debtor may be arrested, notwithstanding the abolition of arrest on mesne process by the Debtors Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62), s. 6.

ABSENCE. In French law, where a person has absented himself from his residence and domicile for four years, and nothing has meanwhile been heard of him, a declaration of absence may be obtained against him (la déclaration d'absence), one year after the parties have applied for same, failing the success of the inquiries for him that are officially directed upon such application. The effect of such a declaration is to put his next of kin (heritiers présomptifs), into possession of his property, they giving security, and distributing the property according to the will of the absent person, or (in the case of intestacy), according to law. In case the absentee returns home, the next of kin are accountable to him, and return him a fifth part of the income if he returns before fifteen years, and one-tenth part if after fifteen years and before thirty; if after thirty, they return no part at all, and cease to be accountable, their security being discharged. The consort of such an absentee may re-marry, and the second marriage is not impeachable excepting by the absentee (personally).

ABSENTING HIMSELF. This conduct, if done with the intention of avoiding one's creditors, is an act of bankruptcy sufficient to found an adjudication of bankruptcy within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 6.

These

ABSQUE HOC (without this). These were formal words made use of in the conclusion of a special traverse, and the traverse itself was thence frequently called a traverse with an absque hoc. words were not essential to a special traverse, others of a similar import being sometimes used in their stead; their object was directly to deny some proposition or averment set forth in the plaintiff's declaration. By the C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 65, it is enacted that special traverses shall not be necessary in any pleading.

See SPECIAL TRAVERSE.

ABSTRACT OF TITLE. This is an epitome of the vendor's evidence of ownership. It should commence with a purchase deed or marriage settlement; and if it commences with a will, proof of the testator's seisin or possession, or at any rate of his receipt of the rents and profits at the time of his decease, should be furnished. If the abstract commences with a disentailing deed (or fine or common recovery), then the creation of the entail which purports to be barred thereby ought to be shewn. The abstract should set forth in epitome every subsequent document relating to or affecting the title, excepting leases which have expired, but not excepting mortgages, although the money has

ABSTRACT OF TITLE-continued. been repaid, unless perhaps, where the mortgage was only equitable (Drummond v. Tracy, John. 608). But a deed which does not affect the right to sell need not be abstracted. When it is necessary (as it almost always is), to shew the birth, death, or marriage of any person, the proper certificates of these facts must be produced; when it is necessary to prove a peligree, as where a descent occurs in the course of the abstract, then the heirships must be proved if possible by strict evidence, i.e., by means of certificates of births, deaths, and marriages, and by the wills and letters of administration of persons having a possible prior title; but failing such proof, evidence of deeds, wills of relatives, extracts from parish books, from family Bibles, from tombstones, and such like, may be given. It should also be shewn that no outstanding interest requires to be got in, such as dower, freebench, curtesy, or any unsatisfied charge; also (in the usual case) that legacies charged on the land have been paid; also (if the property is sold free of land tax), the certificate of such redemption, together with the receipt and memorandum of registration, should be produced.

In the case of leasehold properties, the abstract should shew the original lease and all subsequent assignments thereof, unless where the original lease is of very ancient date, when some of the mesne assignments may be left out. Also, when the lease is less than sixty years old, the lessor's title must be shewn.

When land (whether freehold or leasehold), has devolved upon any one by the death of another since the 19th of May, 1853, the payment of succession duty must be shewn.

By the Act 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 24, the wilful concealment of any document, or the falsification thereof, is a misde

meanour.

It is usual, however, to limit the contents of the abstract of title by special conditions of sale.

See title CONDITIONS OF SALE.

ABUTTALS (abutter). The buttings and boundings of land, either to the east, west, north, or south, shewing on what other lands or places it does abut. But strictly speaking, the sides on the breadth are properly adjacentes, i.e., lying or bordering, and only the ends on the length are abuttantes, i.e., abutting or bounding. Cowel.

The importance of a careful statement of the abuttals in describing the parcels in conveyancing consists in the facility thereby afforded of establishing the identity of the lands or plots of land sold, at

ABUTTALS-continued.

almost any distance of time. Also, in criminal law, in indictments for those offences which the law regards as being of a local character, an accurate description is necessary, and this is often best given by abuttals. Thus, an indictment for not repairing a highway must specify the situation of the road within the parish; also, on an indictment for night poaching, the locus in quo must be described either by name, ownership, occupation, or abuttals, and it would not be sufficient to describe it as a certain close in the parish of A. And by the rules of pleading (H. T. 16 Vict. r. 18) in an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, the close must be designated in the declaration by name or abuttals, or other description, to avoid on the one hand the necessity of the defendant's pleading liberum tenementum, and on the other hand the necessity of the plaintiff's new assigning. Taylor on Evidence, 268, 327.

An

ACCEPTANCE. When a bill is' drawn by A. B. upon C. D., and C. D. writes the word "accepted" and his name across the face of the bill, the bill becomes his acceptance. Such an acceptance is usually made by C D. when he holds goods consigned to him by A. B. and not yet paid for, or when he is otherwise in debt to A. B. When he accepts it under other circumstances, the acceptance is for the accommodation or honour of the drawer. acceptance by E. F., who is not a party to the bill, would also be an acceptance for honour or accommodation, but in this case, for that of the drawee. Every acceptance must since 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 78, s. 2, be on the bill,-a requisite which by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 6), is extended to a foreign bill as well as an inland one. An acceptance may be either general, as where the word "accepted," either alone or with the words "payable at" a particular place is written on the bill, or it may be special, as where the words "and not elsewhere are added to the particular place mentioned in the acceptance for payment. For the general law as to the liability of an acceptor, see title BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

ACCEPTANCE AND RECEIPT. The acceptance which is intended by the Statute of Frauds must either precede or be contemporaneous with the receipt of the goods, and as there can be no receipt without delivery, it follows that the acceptance must be separated from the receipt by the delivery, thus,-1, acceptance; 2, delivery, and 3, receipt. Consequently the acceptance signifies a mere expression of one's selection of the particular goods or article.

ACCEPTANCE AND RECEIPT-contd. Upon the goods being delivered and received, the purchaser if dissatisfied with those sent may return them; consequently the acceptance and receipt which the statute speaks of does not preclude subsequent objection.

ACCESS: See title BASTARD.

ACCESSARY. A person guilty of a felonious offence, not by being the actor, or actual perpetrator, of the crime, nor by being present at its performance, but by being some way concerned therein, either before or after its commission. If he has been concerned in it before its commission he is termed an accessary before the fact; if after, an accessary after the fact. An accessary before the fact is defined to be one who, being absent at the time the crime is committed, yet procures, counsels, or commands another to commit it; and, in this case, absence is necessary to constitute him an accessary, for if he be present, he is guilty of the crime as principal. Thus if A. advises B. to kill another, and B. does it in the absence of A., in this case B. is principal and A. accessary to the murder. An accessary after the fact is one who, knowing a felony to have been committed, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon; and generally any assistance whatever given to a felon, to hinder his being apprehended, tried, or suffering punishment, makes such assister an accessary, as furnishing him with a horse to escape his pursuers, money or victuals to support him, a house or other shelter to conceal him, or using open force and violence to rescue or protect him (2 Hawk. P. C. 316, 317, 318). And now by stat. 24 & 25 Vict. c. 94, s. 1, it is enacted, that whoever shall become an accessary before the fact to any felony, may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished in all respects as if he were the principal felon. And by sect. 3 of the same statute, it is enacted, that whoever shall become an accessary after the fact to any felony, may be indicted and convicted either as an accessary after the fact to the principal felony, together with the principal felon, or after the conviction of the principal felon, or may be indicted and convicted of a substantive felony, whether the principal felon shall or shall not have been previously convicted, and may thereupon be punished in like manner as any accessary after the fact to the same felony, if convicted as an accessary, may be punished. And see generally the last-mentioned Act, which is intituled "An Act to consolidate and amend the Statute Law of England and Ireland relating to Accessaries to and Abettors of Indictable Offences."

ACCESSARY-continued.

To a misdemeanour there are no accessaries, as neither is there to the offence of high treason.

See also title AIDERS AND ABETTORS.

ACCESSIO.

This is a term in Roman law used to denote a mode of acquisition of property by natural means; and the like use of the word is not uncommon in English law. Thus, the maxim "accessio cedit principali" denotes generally that an accessory thing when annexed to (as it naturally is annexed to) a principal thing becomes part and parcel of the latter, and thereupon and thereby becomes the property of the owner of the principal thing. This mode of acquisition is particularly illustrated by the Law of Fixtures, as well in English as in Roman law, the maxim of the English law being " Quidquid plantatur solo, solo cedit," and of the Roman law being "Omne quod inædificatur solo, solo cedit." (See Brown on Fixtures, 2nd ed. 1872.) But the principle is of universal application, applying to the incorporation of any substance of minor importance in, or its addition to, another substance of a larger or principal importance. By many civilians it is used as the general term, including in it the various more particular natural modes of acquisition, which are designated respectively Alluvio, Specificatio, Confusio, Commixtio. See these several titles.

ACCIDENT. This is any unforeseen event that is not attributable to the contrivance or negligence of the party. It is a rule of all systems of jurisprudence that no one is liable for an accident, being purely such (Wakeman v. Robinson, 1 Bing. 213; 8 Moore, 63); but it is an equally universal rule, that the slightest negligence will exclude the defence of accident (Kearney v. London, Brighton, &c. Ry. Co., L. R. 5 Q. B. 411). But this nonliability from accident does not, of course, protect the purchaser of a specific chattel from payment of the price, in case the chattel is either injured or destroyed by accident. Tarling v. Baxter, Tudor's M. C. 596.

The Courts of Equity go further than the Courts of Law, and attempt even to relieve parties against the consequences of accident, but within a limited group of cases only. Thus, if a party has, to begin with, a conscientious title to relief, then if the accident consists in the loss of a bond, or of a negotiable or non-negotiable instrument, the Court of Chancery will assist him to getting paid, upon the one condition of his giving a bond of indemnity to the obligor against any possible second payment; but the Courts of Law also have now

ACCIDENT-continued. acquired jurisdiction to give relief in such cases upon the like condition, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125 (C. L. P. Act, 1854). Equity will also occasionally relieve in the case of a lost deed (Dalston v. Coatsworth, 1 P. Wms. 731). With reference to a destroyed instrument, whether the same is negotiable (Wright v. Maidstone, 1 K. & J. 708) or non-negotiable (Byles on Bills, 372), Equity seems to give no relief, inasmuch as the Law can do so. Sed quare, Hansard v. Robinson, 7 B. & C. 95.

The Courts of Equity will also relieve against the defective execution of a power, but that only in favour of a purchaser (including a mortgagee or lessee), or of a creditor, or of a wife, a child, or a charity. They also relieve against mistaken payments by an executor, decreeing, for example, the residuary legatees or next of kin to make up, i e., refund, to an annuitant-legatee the diminution which the annuity fund may have sustained through a reduction in the value of stock, occasioned by Act of Parliament.

But the Court refuses to extend its relief to cases of contract, for there the parties have been to some extent negligent in not providing against the particular casualty, e.g., the destruction of premises leased (Bullock v. Dommitt, 6 T. R. 650); and the relief which the Court gives to one party will never be given so as to prejudice another. White v. Nutts, 1 P. Wms. 61.

ACCIDENTAL DEATH. For the law of compensation in the case of persons killed by railway accidents, see Lord Campbell's Act (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93); also the Act amending same (27 & 28 Vict. c. 95). By the latter Act any of the persons beneficially interested in the death may, when no action for compensation is brought within six months from the death by the executor or administrator of the deceased, bring such action; and the defendant is enabled to pay a lump sum of money into Court, without specifying the shares into which the same is to be divided among the parties interested.

ACCIDENTS, INSURANCE AGAINST. The law of insurance in its general principles is applicable to this particular species of insurance. Thus, the assuring person must have an interest in the life of the assuree, under the stat. 14 Geo. 3, c. 48, s. 2 (Shilling v. Accidental Death Insurance Co., 2 H. & N. 42). Also, there must be a full disclosure of all circumstances material to the exposure to accidents (Shilling's Case, supra). It is usual in such policies to provide that the injury from the accident insured against shall be caused by some outward and visible means,

ACCIDENTS, INSURANCE AGAINST— continued.

of which satisfactory proof can be furnished to the company; as to the meaning of such a provision, see Trew v. Railway Passengers Insurance Company, 5 H. & N. 211; on app. 6 H. & N. 839. And see generally Fisher's Dig. 4926-30.

ACCOMMODATION: See title BILLS OF

EXCHANGE.

ACCOMPLICE: See title AIDERS AND ABETTORS.

This is

ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. a defence in law, consisting (as the name imports) of two parts; viz. something given or done to the plaintiff by the defendant as a satisfaction, and agreed to (or accorded) as such by the plaintiff. Therefore accord without satisfaction is not a good plea (Parker v. Ramsbottom, 3 B & C. 257), as neither is satisfaction without accord (Hardman v. Bellhouse, 9 M. & W. 596); but accord and satisfaction with one of several enures to the benefit of all (Wallace v. Rensall, 7 M. & W. 264; Nicholson v. Revill, 4 A. & E. 675). But the satisfaction must be complete and executed. Flocton v. Hall, 16 Q. B. 1039.

In the case of an ascertained sum of money, a less sum is no satisfaction for the debt unless there is some additional consideration (Fitch v. Sutton, 5 East, 230; Cumber v. Wane, 1 Sm. L. C., 6th ed. 301); but in other cases the value of the satisfaction is not inquired into (Pinnel's Case, 5 Rep. 117a; Curlewis v. Clark, 3 Exch. 375); excepting so far as to ascertain that the chattel given in satisfaction is of some value (Preston v. Christmas, 2 Wils. 86; Cartwright v. Cook, 3 B. & Ad. 701). One security is no satisfaction for another, unless it is of a higher or better quality than the original security; e. g., by being negotiable. Sibree v. Tripp, 15 M. & W. 23.

After breach, accord and satisfaction is in general a good defence (when specially pleaded) to an action on any contract, whether made by parol or by specialty (Blake's Case, 6 Rep. 43 b); unless where a sum certain is payable under the specialty (Peytoe's Case, Rep. 79a); but before breach it is never a good defence to an action on a specialty nam unumquodque eodem modo quo colligatur dissolvi debet."

66

An accord and satisfaction obtained by fraud may be set aside in equity (Stewart v. Great Western Ry. Co. 2 De G. J. & S. 319); and a receipt given for money received as compensation under circumstances amounting to imposition, or even undue consideration, will not estop the injured party even at Law (Roberts v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co. 1 F. & F. 460;