These

APPOINTMENT, POWERS OF. are either general or special; the former enabling the donee of the power to appoint to any one he pleases, and even to himself (for which reason, the property which is subject to a general power of appointment is liable in case of his bankruptcy: Bankruptcy Act, 1869, s. 15, sub-s. 4),; the latter enabling him to appoint among particular individuals only, or not at all. There is also the following distinction between these two kinds of powers, viz., that the general power, when exercised, dates from the exercise thereof, and not earlier; while the special power, when exercised, dates from the creation thereof, which is necessarily an earlier period than that of the exercise.

See further, titles CONVEYANCES;
POWERS.

APPORTIONMENT. This word applies to rents, annuities, and common. First, as applied to rents, it denotes a division of the rent in certain proportions; and as to rentsservice, these (although originally and in their own nature indivisible) have been divisible since the stat. Quia Emptores, 18 Edw. 1 (Statute of Westminster the Third) c. 1, and as to rents-seck, rentscharge, &c., these have been made apportionable by the stat. 4 Geo. 2, c. 28; and now also by Lord St. Leonards' Act, 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, the release of part of land subject to a rent-charge does not release the other part, which the intention was should remain unreleased. By the stat. 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, rents secured on leases are made apportionable between a landlord (tenant for life) deceased and the succeeding remainderman or reversioner-an apportionment which has been made universal by the stats. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 22, and the

APPORTIONMENT-continued.

Apportionment Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 35). Secondly, as applied to annuities, these were made apportionable by the stat. 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 22, a provision which has been extended by the stat. 33 & 34 Vict. c. 35, the 2nd section of which enacts as follows: "From and after the passing of this Act [Aug 1, 1870], all rents, annuities, dividends, and other periodical payments in the nature of income (whether reserved or made payable under an instrument in writing or otherwise) shall, like interest on money lent, be considered as accruing from day to day, and shall be apportionable in respect of time accordingly." Thirdly, as applied to common, upon a purchase by the commoner of part of the land over which his right of common exists, the right may be apportioned (Co. Litt. 149 a); and it makes no difference, semble, that the right of common is that to common sans nombre. Wild's Case, 8 Rep. 79; Bennett v. Reeve, Willes, 232.

See also titles RENT; ANNUITIES; DIVI-
DENDS; and COMMON.

APPORTIONMENT OF RENT. By the Common Law there was no apportionment of rent in respect of time, rent not being regarded as accruing due de die in diem. Clun's Case, 10 Co. 126 a.

Accordingly (1.) If the lessor was owner in fee simple, or (being owner for a limited estate) had a power of leasing, upon his death in the interval between two days of payment, his executors were not entitled to any part of the rent in respect of the accrued portion of the interval, but the rent for the entire interval went to the person who took the reversion (whether as heir-at-law, devisee, or remainderman). Earl of Strafford v. Lady Wentworth, 1 P. Wms. 180.

And (2.) If the lessor was tenant for life, or for any other limited estate, and had no power of leasing, upon his death in the interval between two days of payment, his executors were not entitled to any part of the reut in respect of the accrued portion of the interval, and neither was the reversioner entitled to that part of the rent, but that part ceased to be payable at all by the tenant to any one. Jenner v. Morgan, 1 P. Wms. 392.

However, by statute, rents have been made apportionable, the principal statutes being the following:

(a.) By 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 11, when any tenant for life, not having a power of leasing, dies on or before the day on which the rent is payable by his lessee, the executors of such tenant for life are entitled to the whole or a proportion (as the case may be) of the rent in respect of the accrued interval or accrued portion thereof; and it has been

APPORTIONMENT OF RENT-contd. held that the statute extends to a tenant in tail (Whitfield v. Pindar, 8 Ves. 311). The statute did not, however, extend to land tax or quit rents; neither were such rents apportionable in Equity (Sutton v. Chaplin, 10 Ves. 66); and it was doubtful if it extended to tenancies held pur autre vie.

Accordingly, (b.) By 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 22, commonly called the Apportionment Act, it has been enacted that rents reserved and made payable on any demise or lease of lands, tenements, or hereditaments which have been and shall be made, and which leases or demises determined or shall determine on the death of the person making the same (although such person was not strictly tenant for life thereof) or on the death of the life or lives for which such person was entitled to such hereditaments, shall, so far as respects the rents reserved by such leases and the recovery of a portion thereof by the person granting the same, his or her executors or administrators (as the case may be), be considered as within the provisions of the Act 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, s. 11; and that all rent service reserved on any lease by a tenant in fee or for any life interest, or by any lease granted under any power (being in each case a lease granted after the 10th of June, 1834), and all rentscharge and other rents, annuities, pensions, dividends, moduses, compositions, and all other payments of every description in the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland made payable or becoming due at fixed periods under any instrument (being an instrument that came into operation after the said 10th of June, 1834) should be apportioned so and in such manner that, on the death of any person interested in the said respective payments, or on the determination otherwise of the interest of such person therein, he or she, and his or her executors, administrators or assigns, should be entitled to a proportion thereof, according to the time which should have elapsed from the commencement or last period of payment thereof respectively (as the case may be) including the day of the death or other determination of the interest of such person, subject nevertheless to all just allowances and deductions in respect of charges thereon respectively, the remedies for the recovery of such proportion to become available when the entire amount is become payable, and not before; such remedies to lie and be directed against the person or persons who (but for this Act) would have been entitled to receive and to retain the entirety of the said respective pay

ments.

(c.) By the Act 14 & 15 Vict. c. 25, s. 1, when the lease or tenancy, being at a rack rent, shall determine by the death or cesser

APPORTIONMENT OF RENT-contd.

of the interest of the landlord entitled for his life or for any uncertain interest, instead of claims to emblements, the principle of an apportionment of rent is introduced, the tenant being allowed to hold on till the end of the current year of his tenancy, upon the terms of the old holding, whereupon he goes out without any notice to quit either given or received.

(d.) By the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 18) s. 119. and under the Church Building Acts (17 & 18 Vict. c. 32), the principle of apportionment of rent is also adopted, when part only of the land comprised in the lease or underlease (as the case may be) is required for the purposes of the works authorized by those Acts respectively.

Lastly, (e.) By the Apportionment Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 35), the principle of apportionment was extended to the cases of rents, annuities, dividends, and other periodical payments in the nature of income reserved or made payable otherwise than by an instrument in writing, with the like remedies for the recovery of the proportionate payment. This Act was necessitated by the decision in Cattley v. Arnold (1 J. & H. 651), which limited the earlier Acts to payments reserved by instruments in writing only.

APPRAISE.

To set or affix the true price or value on goods. By stat. 11 Edw. 1 (Acton Burnell), appraisements are to be made on oath, and are to be at the true value, under the penalty of the excessive appraiser having to purchase at his own valuation; and by stats. 46 Geo. 3, c. 43, and 8 & 9 Vict. c. 76, appraisers must be licensed, and by the Stamp Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 97), every appraisement is to bear a stamp of 6d. for every £10 of value, and for every value between £5 and £10, and a stamp of 3d. for £5 of value or under. But appraisements made for one side only, and not being obligatory as between the parties, are exempted.

APPREHENSION OF OFFENDERS: See title CONSTABLE.

APPRENTICE. A person in the course of learning any profession is so called in law; but the name is now commonly limited to a person bound by indenture to a tradesman, who thereby undertakes for certain considerations to teach him his trade. See the duties of the master explained in Couchman v. Siller (23 L. T. 480); and those of the apprentice in Cooper v. Simmonds (7 H. & N. 707). Where, as usually happens, the apprentice is an infant, no action lies against him on his covenant (Gylbert v. Fletcher, Cro. Car. 179),

APPRENTICE-continued

unless by special custom (Whittingham v. Hill, Cro. Jac. 494); therefore usually the parent covenants for him, but the infant must execute the indenture (R. v. Arnesley, 3 B. & A. 585). Under the Stamp Act, 1870, the indenture must be stamped with a 58. stamp for every £5, or fraction of £5, of premium, and with a 2s. 6d. stamp where there is no premium.

Regarding parish apprentices, see 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 63, and 7 & 8 Vict. c. 101; and for the jurisdiction of justices of the peace regarding such, see the same statutes, and also Reg. v. Pround, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 71.

APPROPRIATION. This word is commonly used in two senses, viz. (1.) the appropriation of benefices, and (2.) the appropriation of payments.

(1.) An appropriation of a benefice.This is the annexing of a benefice to the use of some religious house, or spiritual corporation, whether sole or aggregate, to enjoy for ever; just as an impropriation is the annexing a benefice to the use of a lay person or corporation. See also title IMPROPRIATION.

(2.) Appropriation of a payment.-This means the application of a payment to the discharge of a particular debt. Thus, if a creditor has two distinct debts due to him from his debtor, and the latter makes a general payment on account without specifying at the time to which debt he intends the payment to apply, it is optional for the creditor to appropriate (i.e., to apply) the payment to either of the two debts he pleases. The leading case upon the subject is Clayton's Case in Devaynes v. Noble (1 Mer. 585; Tud. Merc. Ca. 1); from which case and the notes thereto, the following rules may be gathered :

(1.) The first option to appropriate belongs to the debtor at the time of payment. The appropriation in this case may be either express (Ex parte Imbert, 1 De G. & J. 152), or implied (Shaw v. Picton, 4 B. & C. 715), or presumed (Young v. English, 7 Beav. 10). In the case of several debts, some of which are barred by the Statute of Limitations and some not, the presumption is, that the payment is made on account of the debt or debts not barred. Nash v. Hodgson, 6 De G. M. & G. 474, reversing the decision of Wood, V.C., Kay,

650.

(2.) The second option to appropriate belongs to the creditor (Dig. 46, 3, 1), and this appropriation need not be made at the time of payment, but at any time afterwards until the matter comes to trial (Simson v. Ingham, 2 B. & C. 65); appropriation can only be made once, at least after notice of the first appropriation has been given to he debtor. But it is competent for a debtor

APPROPRIATION.-continued.

and his creditor to make a new contract varying the appropriation of past payments (Merriman v. Ward, 1 J. & H. 371). Where one of two or more debts is barred by the Statute of Limitations, and the other, or others, are not barred, the creditor may appropriate the payment to the debt or debts which are barred, and afterwards pursue his remedy for the recovery of the other or others (Mills v. Fowkes, 5 Bing. (N.C.) 455); and similarly in the analogous cases mentioned in Cruikshanks v. Rose, 1 Moo. & Rob. 100 (sale of spirits on credit), and Arnold v. Poole (Mayor), 4 M. & G. 860 (solicitor to corporation). Secus, if the debt is absolutely unlawful, e.g. a gambling debt. And, apparently, the two debts must be of ascertained amount. Goddard v. Hodges, 1 C. & M. 33 (unsettled partnership accounts); Goddard v. Cox, 2 Str. 1194 (assets in administration).

(3.) Failing any appropriation by the creditor, the law appropriates the payment to the various debts in the order of their respective dates, beginning with the earliest (Clayton's Case, supra). Of course, however, one man's money will not be appropriated by the law towards payment of another man's debt, e.g. partnership moneys in payment of a single partner's debt (Thompson v. Brown, 1 Mood. & Malk. 40). The appropriation by the law is first to interest, and only secondly to principal (Chase v. Box, Hov. Freem. 261; Bower v. Marris, 1 Cr. & Ph. 351; Code 8, 53, 1; Dig. 46, 3, 5, § 3). But the law will not in the last-mentioned case appropriate any part of the money paid to interest barred by the statute (In re Fitzmaurices Minors, 15 Ir. Ch. Rep. 445); nor will the law appropriate a payment to money illegally due. Wright v. Laing, 3 B. & Č. 165.

Appropriation of payments must be distinguished from apportionment of same between debts having equal rights to be paid. Favenc v. Bennett, 11 East, 36; Dig. 46, 3, 8.

APPROPRIATION

OF SECURITIES. Where a security has been deposited with a creditor generally, and the debtor afterwards becomes bankrupt, owing two or more debts, one or some of which are proveable, and the other or others not proveable, the creditor may appropriate the security to the debt or debts which are not proveable. Ex parte Hunter, 6 Ves. 94.

APPROVEMENT. This word has several meanings. It signifies much the same as improvement; thus, approvement of common means the inclosing a part of a common by the lord of the manor for the purpose of cultivating the same, leaving

APPROVEMENT-continued. sufficient nevertheless for the commoners. Secondly, it is also said to signify the profits of a farm (Cowel). Thirdly, it signifies the act of an approver, who, when indicted of treason or felony, and arraigned for the same, confesses the fact before plea pleaded, and accuses others, his accomplices, of the same crime in order to obtain his own pardon. 3 Cruise, 89; Cowel;

2 T. R. 391.

This word denotes

APPURTENANT. annexed or belonging to; but in law it denotes an annexation which is of convenience merely and not of necessity, and which may have had its origin at any time, in both which respects it is distinguished from Appendant (see that title). In conveyances of lands and houses, it is usual to add to the parcels, or else to the habendum, or to both, the phrase "with the appurte nances," and to make surer, to add reputed as appurtenant or belonging thereto." The term is commonly confined in law to the purely incorporeal hereditaments that are commonly annexed to lands or to houses, and may include as well common, as any other right. Lister v. Pickford, 34 Beav. 576.

or

See title INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS. ARBITRATION AND AWARD. All matters in dispute concerning any personal chattel or personal wrong may be referred to the decision of an arbitrator; and although much jealousy was formerly, and some jealousy is still, felt in allowing references of questions regarding real property, yet references have been made and allowed of the following matters-partition between joint tenants and tenants in common, settlement of disputed boundaries, waste between landlord and tenant, title of devisees, and generally upon title. Parties may even agree to refer to arbitration any future differences between them, although none at present may exist. And under various Acts of Parliament civil matters are compulsorily referred, in particular matters of account, under the C. L. P. Act, 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, ss. 3-6), when they cannot be conveniently tried in the ordinary way. But with regard to criminal matters, the old rule was, that matters criminal were not arbitrable; and it may be said still that offences of a public nature are not referable. On the other hand, it has been said that in all cases where the injured party has a remedy by action as well as by indictment, he may refer same, procuring the consent of the judge if the indictment has been already commenced, or a conviction upon it obtained.

The persons who may refer matters to arbitration are of a correspondingly various

ARBITRATION AND AWARD-contd. character. Firstly, where the referring parties are interested on their own account in the matters referred, it is a general rule that every one capable of making a disposition or release of his or her right may also make a submission to an award (Com. Dig. Arb. D. 2); and conversely, the incapacity to contract involves the incapacity to refer. But as between partners, one partner cannot bind the other by his sole submission; and it matters not whether the partnership be general or particular, the submission to an award not being within the scope of the partnership or incident to any matters within such scope; and all the partners must execute the submission in order that any of them may be bound by the award (Antram v. Chase, 15 East, 209). Secondly, where the referring parties have no personal interest in the award, but act in the capacity of trustees or agents only, it is a general rule that the agent referring must have authority so to do, but such authority, where not express, may be implied from the nature of the agency. Thus, the better opinion is, that a solicitor or attorney retained generally has an implied authority to refer (Dowse v. Coxe, 3 Bing. 20), unless, semble, he is expressly forbidden to make a reference. Filmer v. Delber, 3 Taunt. 486.

See further titles SUBMISSION, REVOCATION, UMPIRE; and for the proceedings incident to a reference, and the form and execution of the award, with the remedies thereon, see generally Russell on Arbitrations.

ARCHBISHOP. The head or chief of the clergy in a whole province. He has the inspection of the bishops of that province, as well as of the inferior clergy, and may deprive them on notorious cause. The archbishop has his own diocese wherein he exercises episcopal, as in his province he exercises archiepiscopal, jurisdiction. To him, or to his Court, all appeals are made from inferior jurisdictions within his province; and as an appeal lies or lay from the bishops in person to him in person, so it also lies from the Consistory Courts of each diocese to his Archiepiscopal Court. 1 Burn's Ec. Law; 2 Roll. Abr. See also titles ARCHES, COURT OF; CONSISTORIAL COURTS; and ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS.

ARCHDEACON. A dignitary of the church who has ecclesiastical jurisdiction immediately subordinate to that of the bishop, either throughout the whole of his diocese or in some particular part of it. He is nominally appointed by the bishop himself, and has a kind of episcopal authority originally derived from the bishop,

ARCHDEACON-continued.

It

but now, independent and distinct.
was formerly his office to grant letters of
administration, but that duty is now dis-
charged by the district Probate Courts.
He visits the clergy, and has his separate
Court for the punishment of offenders by
spiritual censures, and for hearing all
other causes of ecclesiastical cognizance.
Com. Dig. Ecclesiastical Persons; Burn's
Ec. Law; 1 Lev. 192.

See titles ARCHBISHOPS; ECCLESIAS-
TICAL COURTS.

ARCHES, COURT OF. An ecclesiastical Court, so called because originally held in the Church of St. Mary-le-Bow (de Arcubus). It was latterly held in the hall belonging to the College of Civilians, commonly called Doctors' Commons: but in more recent times, the office of the Court of Arches has become annexed to, and is commonly discharged by, the judge of the Court of Admiralty, in his Court at Westminster.

The Court of Arches is the Court of Appeal of the Archbishop of Canterbury; the judge thereof hears all appeals from bishops or their chancellors, or commissaries, deans and chapters, and archdeacons; and from his decision an appeal lies at present to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, but under the Judicature Act, 1873, the appeal is to be to the Court of Appeal, constituted by that Act (ss. 18, 21). The Court of Arches has an original juris liction over the thirteen peculiar parishes in London which belong to the Archbishop of Canterbury: but upon receiving letters of request from any bishop, he may assume original jurisdiction in any ecclesiastical matter arising elsewhere.

ARCHIVES. This word, which is derived from arca, a chest, was originally used to denote a repository for documents, but by a natural transference, has come to denote the documents themselves.

ARISTOCRACY: See title CONSTITUTION.
ARMIGER: See title ESQUIRE.

ARMORIAL BEARINGS. For the duty on these, see Stamp Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 14), Sch.; see also title HERALD'S COLLEGE.

ARMOUR, or ARMS. In the meaning of the law are anything that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands for that purpose, or uses in his wrath to cast at another, or to strike him with. So that the appellations," armour" and "arms," do not in the law simply signify a sword, shield, helmet, or such like; but extend also to stones and other missiles used for the pur

ARMY. In ancient times, the English forces were composed of the following varieties of men-at-arms, viz. :

(1.) Persons holding by knight service, and who were required, by virtue of their tenure to serve forty days annually;

(2.) Other persons engaged by contract; (3.) Freemen or freeholders generally, in virtue of the mere general duty of allegiance.

The first and second of these varieties constituted the Army Proper; the third variety was the Militia.

I. Army Proper:-The statute 1 Edw. 3, c. 5, enacted that no one should be called upon for service otherwise than as before used and accustomed, and that no one should be sent out of his own county unless in cases of invasion, or other like sudden emergency; but inasmuch as that monarch, notwithstanding the statute, called upon the counties and principal towns to furnish him with forces, therefore the statute 25 Edw. 3, c. 8, further enacted that no unusual services should be required, unless with authority of parliament.

Upon the accession of the Tudor dynasty, these statutes of Edward III. were entirely disregarded, in particular by Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, who not only compelled the counties to furnish soldiers, but also pressed men into the service as well abroad as at home; and the statute 4 & 5 Ph. & M. c. 3, expressly recognises the right of the sovereign to levy forces.

The nucleus of a standing army appears to have been the 200 yeomen of the guard, maintained by Henry VIII., together with some artillerymen, stationed in the Tower of London, in the Castle of Dover, at the Fort of Tilbury, at Portsmouth, and at Berwick-on-Tweed. Subsequently, upon the split between the sovereign and parliament, in the reign of Charles I., the sovereign maintained his forces, and the parliament theirs; and upon the Restoration of 1660, Charles II. retained 5000 guards as a standing army, and shewed a disposition on several occasions, particularly in 1667, 1673, and 1678, to increase their number to 20,000. James II. maintained a standing army contrary to the wishes of Parliament; and upon the Revolution in 1688, William III. maintained 7,000 men as a standing army, a number which, under Walpole's administration (George II and III.), was increased to 17,000, exclusive of the forces maintained in Ireland.