COURTS ECCLESIASTICAL-continued. as arose either from the withholding ecclesiastical dues, or the doing or neglecting some act relating to the church, whereby some damage accrued to the plaintiff'; matrimonial causes were such as had reference to the right of marriage; as suits for the restitution of conjugal rights, for divorces, and the like; testamentary causes were such as related to wills and testaments, &c. The various species of Ecclesiastical Courts were as follows:

(1.) The Archdeacon's Court, which was and is the lowest Court in the whole ecclesiastical polity. It is held, in the archdeacon's absence, before a judge appointed by himself, and called his official; and its jurisdiction is sometimes in concurrence with, sometimes in exclusion of, the bishop's Court of the diocese.

(2.) The Consistory Court of every diocesan bishop, which is held in the cathedral of the diocese, for the trial of all ecclesiastical causes arising within the diocese, whereof the bishop's chancellor or his commissary is the judge.

(3.) The Court of Arches: See ARCHES, COURT OF.

(4.) The Court of Peculiars, which is a branch of, and annexed to, the Court of Arches. It has jurisdiction over all those parishes dispersed through the province of Canterbury, in the midst of other dioceses, which are exempt from the ordinary's jurisdiction, and subject to the metropolitan only. All ecclesiastical causes arising within these peculiar or exempt jurisdictions are originally cognizable in this Court.

(5.) The Prerogatice Court, which was established for the trial of all testamentary causes, where the deceased had left bona notabilia (see that title) within two different dioceses; in which case the probate of wills belonged to the archbishop of the province. And all causes relating to wills, administrations, or legacies of such persons, were originally cognizable therein before a judge appointed by the archbishop, called the Judge of the Prerogative Court: but all this jurisdiction has now been transferred to the Court of Probate.

(6.) The Court of Delegates, appointed by the king's commission, under his great seal, and issuing out of Chancery, was the great Court of Appeal in all ecclesiastical causes. The power and franchises of this Court were, by 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 92, transferred to the Privy Council.

(7.) A Commission of Review was a commission sometimes granted in extraordinary cases, to revise the sentence of the Court of Delegates, when it was apprehended they had been led into a material error. This appeal, however, is now to the king in council.

COURT OF HUSTINGS. This was the highest Court of record held at Guildhall for the City of London, before the mayor, recorder, and sheriffs. It determined pleas, real, personal, and mixed; and in this Court all lands, tenements, and hereditaments, rents, and services, within the City of London and suburbs, were pleadable in two hustings, one called hustings of pleas of lands, and the other hustings of common pleas. In the Court also the members who served for the City in Parliament were elected by the livery of the respective companies.

Its

COURT-LEET. This is a Court of record held once or twice in every year within a particular hundred, lordship, or manor, before the steward of the leet, for the preservation of the peace, and the chastisement of divers minute offences. original intent was to view frank-pledges, that is, freemen within the liberty, who, according to the institution of Alfred the Great, were all mutually pledges for the good behaviour of each other.

See title FRANK PLEDGE.

COURT OF MARSHALSEA: See title MARSHALSEA.

COURT MARTIAL. A military Court for trying and punishing the military offences of soldiers in the army.

COURT OF PECULIARS: See title COURTS ECCLESIASTICAL.

COURTS OF PRINCIPALITY OF WALES. A species of private Courts of a limited though extensive jurisdiction; which, upon the thorough reduction of that principality and the settling of its polity in the reign of Henry VIII., were erected all over the country. These Courts, however, have been abolished by 1 Will. 4, c. 70; the principality being now divided into two circuits, which the judges visit in the same manner as they do the circuits in England, for the purpose of disposing of those causes which are ready for trial.

COURT OF RECORD. Is a Court the judgment and proceedings of which are carefully registered and preserved, under the name of records, in public repositories, and to them frequent recourse is had when any critical question arises, in the determination of which former precedents may give light or assistance. By stat. 1 & 2 Vict. c. 94, the public records of the kingdom are now in general placed under the superintendence of the Master of the Rolls for the time being, and a public record office has been established.

COURT OF REQUESTS: See title CONSCIENCE, COURT OF.

COURT OF REVIEW: See title REVIEW, COURT OF.

COURT OF STAR CHAMBER (camera stellata). A Court of very ancient original, but new-modelled by stats. 3 Hen. 7, c. 1, and 21 Hen. 8, c. 20, consisting of divers lords spiritual and temporal, being privy councillors, together with two judges of the Courts of Common Law, without the intervention of any jury. Their jurisdiction extended legally over riots, perjury, misbehaviour of sheriffs, and other misdemeanors contrary to the laws of the land; yet it was afterwards stretched to the asserting of all proclamations and orders of state, to the vindicating of illegal commissions and grants of monopolies; holding for honourable that which it pleased, and for just that which it profited, and becoming both a Court of Law to determine civil rights, and a Court of Revenue to enrich the treasury. It was finally abolished by 16 Car. 1, c. 10, to the general satisfaction of the whole nation.

See also STAR CHAMBER, COURT OF.

COURT OF THE LORD STEWARD OF THE KING'S HOUSEHOLD, or (in his absence) of the treasurer, comptroller, and steward of the Marshalsea, was erected by stat. 33 Hen. 8, c. 12, with a jurisdiction to inquire of, hear, and determine, all treasons, misprisions of treason, murders, manslaughters, bloodshed, and other malicious strikings, whereby blood should be shed in or within the limits (ie., within 200 feet of the gate) of any of the palaces and houses of the king, or any other place where the royal person should reside. 4 Inst. 133.

The

COURTS OF THE UNIVERSITIES. Chancellor's Courts in the two universities of England used to enjoy the sole jurisdiction, in exclusion of the King's Courts, over all civil actions and suits whatsoever, when a scholar or privileged person was one of the parties; excepting in such cases where the right of freehold was concerned. These privileges were granted in order that the students might not be distracted from their studies by legal process from distant Courts. And these University Courts were at liberty to try and determine either according to the Common Law of the land, or according to their own local customs, at their discretion. These privileges are still in part exercised at Oxford, but by a recent private statute have been taken away from Cambridge. In pursuance of the statutes, 17 & 18 Vict. c. 45, and 25 & 26 Vict. c. 26, s. 12, the procedure is as in the County Courts; and the rules

COURTS OF THE UNIVERSITIES cont. of the Statute Law of England have taken the place of the rules of the Civil Law.

The

COURTS AT WESTMINSTER. superior Courts, both of Law and Equity, have for several centuries been fixed at Westminster Hall, an ancient palace of the monarchs of this country. Formerly all the superior Courts were held before the king's capital justiciary of England, in the aula regis, or such of his palaces wherein his royal person resided, and removed with his household from one end of the kingdom to another. This was found to occasion great inconvenience to the suitors, to remedy which it was made an article of the great charter of liberties both of King John and King Henry III., that "common pleas should no longer follow the King's Court, but be held in some certain place," in consequence of which they have ever since been held (a few necessary removals in times of the plague excepted) in the palace of Westminster only. The Courts of Equity also sit at Westminster nominally during term time, although actually only during the first day of term, for they generally sit in Courts provided for the purpose in the neighbourhood of Lincoln's Inn.

COVENANT. Is a mere agreement or promise under seal, and may be either to pay a liquidated sum of money or unliquidated damages, or to do, or abstain from doing, any particular act.

Covenants are of various kinds, the principal of which are the following:

(1.) Express and Implied Covenants.The former being in so many words, the latter arising by inference from the use of other words, e.g., "demise," which implies a covenant for quiet enjoyment, grant, bargain, and sell," which, as regards lands in the East and North Ridings of Yorkshire, imply a covenant for title;

(2.) General and Specific Covenants,-the former relating to land generally and placing the covenantee in the position of a specialty creditor only, the latter relating to particular lands and giving the covenantee a lien thereon;

(3.) Inherent and Collateral Covenants,the former affecting the particular property immediately, the latter affecting some property collateral thereto;

(4.) Joint and Several Covenants,-the former binding both or all the covenantors together, the latter binding each of them separately. A covenant may be both joint and several at the same time. Covenants

are usually joint or several according as the interests of the covenantors are such; but the words of the covenant, where they are unambiguous, will decide: although where they are ambiguous, the nature of

COVENANT-continued.

the interests as being joint or several is left to decide. Bradburne v. Batfield, 14 M. & W. 559.

(5.) Real and Personal Covenants.-These covenants being also sometimes called respectively covenants which run with the land and covenants which lie against the personalty.

The former, whether beneficial or burdensome, attach to the successive owners of the property in virtue of their being such; but both varieties of covenant, i.e., as well the real as the personal, form the basis of an action for damages against the covenantor himself, or, if he is dead, against his executors or administrators, and even against his heir, if the heir is specially named in the covenant. The statute, 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, ss. 27, 28, has limited the liability of executors and administrators in respect of the rents, covenants, and agreements of their testator or intestate. See also titles EXECUTORS, ADMINISTRATORS, and ASSIGNS. If the covenant does not concern the land itself, but only a particular mode of occupying or using the same, it does not run with the land, and the assignee of the lease (not being expressly named in the covenant) cannot sue the lessor upon it. Hayward, L. R. 4 Ex. 311.

Thomas v.

The benefit of real covenants passes to the heirs of the covenantee, although entered into with him and his executors and administrators only; also, the benefit of such covenants entered into with the covenantee his heirs and assigns, or even with the covenantee and his heirs only, passes to all persons taking the estate of the covenantee, or any estate derived out of such estate. Hence, when covenants are entered into with the releasee to uses and his heirs and assigns, or with him and his heirs only, they run with the land for the benefit of all the cestuis que use whose estates are derived out of the momentary seisin of such releasee, whether such cestuis que use are or are not parties to the conveyance, and whether they claim immediately under it or by virtue of an appointment made under a power contained in that conveyance. But when the covenants are made with the cestui que use and his heirs and assigns, or with him and his heirs only, although they run with the land for the benefit of any person who claims as alienee of his estate, yet they do not run with the land for the benefit of an APPOINTEE of the cestui que use, the reason being that such appointee, although the alienee of the cestui que use is not the alienee of his estate, but of a new estate which is substituted for it, and which takes effect, not out of the seisin of the cestui que use, but out of the original seisin

COVENANT-continued.

of the releasee to uses. Wherefore it is better, when the releasee to uses and the purchaser are different persons, for the covenants to be made with the releasee to uses and not with the cestui que use.

Again (6.), Covenants may be either dependent or independent. Thus, if A. covenant with B. to serve him for a year, and B. covenant with A. to pay him £10, the covenants are independent, and A. may maintain an action of debt or covenant against B. for the money before any service; on the other hand, if B. had in the case before mentioned covenanted to pay A. £10 for the service, the words in italics would have made the second covenant dependent on the first, and the service becoming in that way a condition precedent, A. could not have enforced payment of the money without averring and proving the performance of the service. By the C. L. P. Act, 1852, s. 57, such averment may now be general. Again, where A. covenanted with B. to marry B.'s daughter, and B. covenanted with A. to convey an estate to A. and the daughter in tail special, it was held that the covenants were independent, and that A. might marry another woman and yet have an action of covenant against B.; on the other hand, if B. had covenanted with A. in the last-mentioned case to convey the estate to him and the daughter for the cause aforesaid, the words in italics would have made the second covenant dependent on the first, and A. could not have had his action of covenant against B. without having first married the daughter of B. See 1 Wms. Saund. (ed. 1871), p.

549.

The distinction between covenants dependent and covenants independent, together with the practical importance of that distinction, being apparent, the following are the rules for deciding whether in any given case a covenant is dependent or independent:

(1.) If a day be appointed for payment of money, or part of it, or for doing any other act, and the day is to (or may) happen before the thing which is the consideration for the money or other act is to be performed, an action may be brought for the money or to enforce doing the other act, before the performance of the consideration (Ughtred's Case, 48 Edw. 3, 2, 3; Thorpe v. Thorpe, 12 Mod. 461). But it is otherwise, if the day is to happen after the consideration. Thorpe v. Thorpe, 2nd resolution, 12 Mod. 462; and see Pordage v. Cole, 1 Wms. Saund. (ed. 1871), p. 548.

(2.) Where a covenant goes only to part of the considerations on both sides, and a breach of such covenant may be paid for in damages, it is an independent covenant,

COVENANT-continued.

and an action may be maintained for a breach of the covenant on the part of the defendant, without any averment of performance in the declaration; a very remarkable illustration of such an action will be found in Boon v. Eyre (1 H. Bl. 273, n. (a)). And it is a general rule of law, that where the consideration has been executed in part, that which was at first a condition precedent, becomes for the purposes of pleading a warranty merely, for the breach of which a compensation must be sought in damages (Behn v. Burgess, 3 B. & Sm. 751); unless indeed the consideration is entire and indivisible, in which case there can be no partial failure, but the consideration if it fail at all must fail altogether (Chanter v. Leese, 4 M. & W. 295; 5 M. & W. 698). But it is otherwise where the mutual covenants go to the whole consideration on both sides for in that case they are mutual conditions precedent, and performance must be averred. St. Alban's (Duke) v. Shore, 1 H. Bl. 270.

(3.) Where two acts are to be done at the same time, neither party can maintain an action against the other, without shewing performance of, or an offer to perform, his part, although it be not defined which of them is obliged to do the first act; and this third rule applies more especially to all cases of sale. Peeters v. Opie, 2 Wms. Saund. (ed. 1871), 742.

See also title CONDITIONS PRECEDENT.

CREDIT, LETTER OF. Is an instrument in common use among bankers for the transmission of money either within the United Kingdom, or to the colonies, or to foreign countries. It is not negotiable as a cheque, but is only an authority from the banker who signs it to the banker [or other person] to whom it is addressed upon advice to honour the drafts of the person named in it upon his producing the letter. If the letter of credit is stolen or lost, the banker upon whom it is drawn is liable in case he honours the drafts or pays the amounts upon a forged signature; and the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 59, s. 19, does not apply to these letters, as it does to the drafts therein specified.

CRIER. An officer attached to the Courts of Common Law, whose duty it is to call a plaintiff who is nonsuited at the trial (see title CALLING THE PLAINTIFF), or to call the jury, &c. His fees (as are those of the other officers of the Courts) are regulated by a table of fees sanctioned by the judges under the authority of 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 30. Bagley's Pr. 8.

CRIME. The distinction between a crime and a tort, or civil injury, is, that the

CRIME-continued.

former is a breach and violation of the public rights and duties due to the whole community, considered as such, in its social aggregate capacity; whereas the latter is merely an infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong to individuals considered merely in their individual capacity. See title CRIMINAL LAW.

CRIMINAL

was the name of an action in which a husband proceeded for damages sustained by him in his wife by the act of an adulterer of her body. It was abolished by the stat. 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 59, but the husband may at the present day petition the Court of Probate for damages in such a case, without asking for a divorce also.

CRIMINAL INFORMATION. This is a mode of proceeding available in cases of alleged libellous publications, and in some other matters. It is within the discretion of the Court to grant or refuse it according to the circumstances (Anon., Lofft. 323); and the Court will not entertain an application for it on light or trivial grounds, but will leave the party to his remedy (if any) by action or indictment (Reg. v. Mead, 4 Jur. 1014). The Attorney-General or (during the vacancy of that office) the Solicitor-General may, however, file such an information ex officio, and without application to the Court (Rex v. Plymouth (Mayor), 4 Burr. 1087); and he may even stop the proceedings upon his first information, and file a second one (Rex v. Stratton, 1 Doug. 238). To an information for a libel, the defendant may, under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96, s. 6, plead in his justification the truth of the matter published.

A criminal information also lies against a magistrate who acts from corrupt motives, or who improperly grants or refuses an alelicence; but the magistrate must have notice of the intention to apply for the information against him. And the party applying for an information must in all cases come with clean hands.

CRIMINAL LAW. The persons concerned in the commission of a crime may be concerned in it either as Principals, or as Accessories, or as Abettors, as to the distinctions between whom, see these three several titles.

The varieties of crimes are innumerable; they are, however, distinguished generally into three classes, viz., Treasons, Felonies, and Misdemeanours; as to the distinction between which, see these several titles. The particular offences (such as Arson, Bigamy, Burglary, Murder, &c.) will be found explained under each particular head.

(2.) It is contrary to the policy of the English Law that there should be an appeal in cases of felony (Ex parte Eduljee Byramjee, 5 Moo. P. C. C. 276); nevertheless the stat. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 78, enables the judge to reserve any point arising on the trial for the consideration of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, which is established by that Act; but

(3.) After judgment the record may be removed by writ of error, in any case where an error, either of law or of fact, appears on the record; this writ of error lies from quarter sessions to the Queen's Bench, and from the Queen's Bench to the Exchequer Chamber. But, semble, in a case of misdemeanour (as distinguished from felony) the previous fiat of the Attorney-General is requisite, and it is in his discretion to grant or refuse his fiat. Reg. v. Newton, 4 El. & Bl. 869.

CROSS ACTION. Where A. having brought an action against B., B. brings an action against A. upon the same subjectmatter, or arising out of the same transaction, this second action is called a cross action. And this double action is sometimes necessary to insure justice to both parties; as in the case of a contract in which neither of the contractors is subjected to any condition precedent to his right to enforce performance by the other of his part but the promises on each side are independent of what is to be done upon the other. In such a case the non-performance of the plaintiff's promises would be no defence to an action for the non-perforinance of the defendant's, whose sole remedy, therefore, against the plaintiff would be by a cross action (6 T. R. 570; 9 B. & C. 259). However, in many cases, a cross action is rendered unnecessary, and the party may raise by answer or defence what he formerly

CROSS ACTION-continued.

required to raise by cross action. See also next title.

CROSS BILL.

A suit in Equity is commenced by the plaintiff filing his bill, wherein are stated all circumstances which gave rise to the complaint; the defendant's mode of defence is then usually by answer, wherein he controverts the facts stated in the bill, or some of them, &c. But when he is unable to make a complete defence to the plaintiff's bill without disclosing some facts which rest in the knowledge of the plaintiff himself, he then files what is called a cross bill, which differs in no respect from the plaintiff's original bill, excepting that the occasion which gave rise to it proceeded from matter already in litiA cross bill is in many cases gation. necessary in aid of the defence, which cannot properly be raised by answer merely, as in cases of alleged fraud. However, under the Judicature Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66), Sch. r. 20, a cross action will hardly in any case be now necessary in aid of a defence.

CROWN COURT. Is the Court in which the Crown or criminal business of the assizes is transacted.

See titles CIVIL SIDE; PLEA SIDE.

CROWN DEBTS. These are debts due to the Crown, usually from persons who were accountants to the Crown, but also on record, bond, or specialty, generally to the Crown. The liability of lands to make good these debts attached to the lands even in the hands of bonâ fide purchasers for value without notice, and notwithstanding the purchaser had no means of notice. But latterly, by the stats. 2 & 3 Vict. c. 11, 8. 8, and 22 & 23 Viet. c. 35, s. 22, it was enacted, that lands should not be charged in the hands of purchasers with Crown debts unless or until such debts were duly registered and re-registered, whether or not the purchaser had notice thereof. And now, by the stat. 28 & 29 Vict. c. 104, s. 4, a writ of execution in respect of the debt must also have been issued and registered, in order to affect a purchaser, in addition to the registration and re-registration of