are objected to by Dr. Hutcheson merely because the meaning which they would seem to suggest, if admitted, would prove inconsistent with or rather destructive of a peculiar theory or hypothesis of his own, by which he would explain the nature and mode of operation of a faculty whose office it is, or would be, to decide as to the propriety or impropriety, the merit or demerit of human actions. This kind of intellectual pioneering however, is illegitamate and inadmissable. If a truth be merely suppositious, it does not do on that account to pull it down and throw it aside in order to establish another and one of your own, perhaps after all equally gratuitous. But this advantage has been taken by Dr. Hutcheson in consequence of the uncertainty as to the existence of a faculty so peculiar and isolated as the one which is suggested by and implied in the words, a moral sense. But because of this uncertainty which, however, is rather weakened than strengthened by the knowledge, such as it is, which we possess upon this subject, let it not be allowed to any man whatever may be his powers, thus to set aside and do away with the arguments tending to establish the facts of the existence of such a faculty, merely because they do not at once clearly prove it.

While some theologians, even of the reformed church, have maintained that moral distinctions proceed from the arbitrary and revealed will of God, other theorists refer these distinctions to the positive institutions of the civil magistrate. In opposition to both of these speculations, Grotius contended that there is a natural law, coeval with the human frame, implanted in our natures, for the guidance of our lives. and from which principle (making man a law unto himself) all positive institutions derive their force. This natural law of Grotius is nothing more than the moral sense of Dr. Hutcheson, which Adam Smith endeavours to refute. With regard to the second theory, which originated with the philosopher Malmsbury, it is pretty evident as Adam Smith remarks, that to refer moral distinctions to the will of the civil magistrate, would be to suppose that there was no natural distinction between right and wrong. Civil laws, moreover, which are the institutions of the magistrate, cannot be supposed to be the origin of these distinctions, since this would still presuppose some antecedent notions of these very distinctions. Hobbes, moreover, broached this doctrine with the avowed intention of lessening the influence of the clergy of his time, who were disposed, like the casuists of the middle ages, to subject men's consciences to their own selfish code of morals, merely with the view of acquiring political influence. Thus then, the natural law, according to Grotius, the moral sense, according to Dr. Hutcheson, and the institutions of the civil

magistrate according to Hobbes, are severally liable to objection, when insisted on as the foundation of moral distinctions. The only remaining theory then, is, that which refers these distinctions to the arbitrary and revealed will of God. We say, the only remaining theory, because that of Adam Smith, which deduces these distinctions from immediate sense and feeling, is of a comparatively modern date. It would seem preposterous to refer these restrictions to the revealed will of God as to their original foundation, because these distinctions, or some of them at least, must have originated and been acted upon long previous to any revelation of the divine will. What are laws but these original distinctions put into practice? Laws were coeval with the social contract; these distinctions, therefore, as being the origin of laws, must have been prior to the actual formation of civil society. There can be no society without laws, and there would have been no laws but for these distinctions. The Ten Commandments prescribe nothing more, we humbly think, than human laws must necessarily have pointed out-derived as are these laws from an experience of the good effects resulting from an observance of that which is right. Moral distinctions may be said, perhaps, to be the inductions of a reflex moral experience, which presupposes the antecedent induction of some other experience. The general rules of morality, which are the inductions of reason from experience, presuppose, and are compounded of the perception of these original distinctions, and are in fact no other than these distinctions practically modified. This we think, is at once an explanation of the words of Adam Smith, when he says, that moral distinctions" are the objects of immediate sense and feeling."* This too, is one of the many instances in which Adam Smith endeavours to refute Dr. Hutcheson's notion of the existence of a moral sense; for if moral distinctions are the great results of a moral experience, it is evident that the office of the moral sense would be perfectly nugatory in the very instance in which its powers would be most emphatically called upon to exert themselves.

Theory of Moral Sentiments. Part iii. chap. 1.

(To be continued.)

A REVIEW

OF

THE HARP OF THE BEECH WOODS.

ORIGINAL POEMS.

Montrose, Penn. published by A. Waldie, 1822.-One vol. pp. 156.

THE foregoing is the romantic title of a small volume of very pleasing poems, with which we believe the reading world is very little acquainted. For our parts, it is only within these few days that we knew of its existence, and our meeting with it was purely accidental. Of the author we know nothing further, than that the signature to a short and extremely modest inscription, informs us that she is of the softer sex. Of her effusions, we have never heard a single whisper, either in praise Whatever our opinion of them is, it has therefore, arisen spontaneously from their perusal, and is uninfluenced by either name, reputation, or previous acquaintance.

or censure.

We are aware that selecting in this manner, a work concerning which the world has never yet given an opinion, for the purpose of passing in public our verdict upon it, carries with it an air of confidence in the accuracy of our own judgment, which some people may be inclined to call presumption. But we have never been in the habit of sacrificing our judgment at the shrine of complaisance for that of others. If we were, we should certainly be very unfit for the office, the duties of which we have undertaken to fulfil, that of conducting a work in which a free expression of our opinions on questions of literature, will be frequently expected, and must be honestly given.

Those who worship established reputations, who idolize great names, and believe that "no good can come out of Nazareth," will no doubt, he ready to sneer at the oddness, or as they may call it, the simplicity of our conduct, in choosing an obscure book, of an unknown author, as a subject of public animadversion, in preference to any of the numerous productions of

those celebrated writers who keep the pens of critics, as well as the types of printers, in perpetual motion.

But let such gentry sneer as much as they please. We have our own views of propriety; and we have a right to indulge them, when we think it advantageous to our readers, whether the connoisseurs of the critical circles be satisfied or not. In reference however, to this subject, we may observe, that in attempting to draw a work of merit from obscurity, we believe that we are rendering the public a greater service, than if we were merely re-echoing sentiments which are every day, nay, every hour, repeated with deafening clamour, and sickening uniformity, concerning writers already notorious-some of them, perhaps, too much so, for the benefit of mankind. But we must hasten to our business with the poems before us. We have already given them the epithet of pleasing. Had we not found them so, we should have done wrong to draw the attention of our readers towards them. But we can also conscientiously afford them a few other epithets of praise. Their sentiments are always pure, and frequently tender. Their versification is flowing and easy, and not unfrequently graced with striking and appropriate imagery. Their subjects, in some instances, are such as afforded scope for exercising the powers of both the imagination and the fancy; and neither of these have been absent from the work of their composition. In a pathetic address to her harp, the fair songstress exclaims:

O merrily flew the hours along.
From blush of morn, till twilight grey,
When to thy tones the youthful throng
Danced 'midst the flow'ring spray.

How changed the scene! my bower gone,
The friends who made it dear,

With Love and Time-all, all are flown!

My Harp alone is here!

From one of the most agreeable ballads, in the old English style, with which we have ever met, entitled "The Lake of Bala" we make the following extracts.

At evening cool, his skiff on the pool

Oft bore the chieftain's lovely daughter,

While the low sun beam, flung its length'ning gleam,

On the glittering waves of Bala-Water.

Then thus spake he, the minstrel youth,

As light his oars he feather'd featly,

While evening smiled on the mountains mild,
And the wide blue lake slept calm and sweetly.

"Lady, soon yon setting sun,

My days in distant lands may lighten,
And far from thee, when him I see,

The tear-drop in mine eye will brighten.

"Lest, when I part, thy changing heart
Forget the love of him that charms it;
And. like yon hill, be dark and chill
As soon as sets the sun that warms it.