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brought across the stream - they were set free to do so partly by the progress of the French on the flank, partly by the action of two guns that Lord Raglan had brought across the stream in the space between the armies, and which, taking the Russian line in reverse, caused it to fall back. The English divisions thus maintained themselvesthe heavy columns that advanced against them were repulsed partly by artillery, partly by the fire of the line-the Russians fell back slowly to the top of the heights, and retreated along the plain, pursued by the fire of our horse-artillery. The English batteries then advanced. When they reached the plateau the enemy's masses were already at some distance, moving towards Sebastopol. The French on the right were coming up so deliberately that it was evident they had no thought of molesting the enemy's retreat, and on a proposition being made to them to join in a pursuit they declined it.

Whether it was or was not owing to the cause to which Mr Kinglake attributes it—namely, to the fact that the French leaders, selected as they almost all were for their share in the coup d'état, were men in whom the troops had no confidence -it is certain that the reputation of the French army was not augmented by this action. The report of St Arnaud paints their valour and skill in the most brilliant colours. He does not scruple largely to exaggerate the numbers of the enemy. There were, according to him, 40,000 Russian bayonets, 6000 cavalry, and 180 guns opposed to the Allies. The true numbers were, according to Mr Kinglake, 36,000 infantry, 3400 cavalry, and 108 guns. The advantages of the Russians consisted in their strong position, their superiority in cavalry, and their 14 heavy guns. The movement of the French was ineffective, partly from misdirection, partly from their slowness to close with the enemy. To the English, therefore, fell a task as difficult as

that which would have fallen to them in ordinary cases had the Russians been equal in strength to the Allies-and the battle of the Alma is eminently an English victory.

It is evident that if the general of an inferior army can oppose one great mass of his enemy with a small number of his troops, and is thus at liberty to meet the remainder on equal terms, he has gained a great point in his favour; and this Mentschikoff did. Yet we perfectly agree with Mr Kinglake that Mentschikoff showed no talent, and did no justice to his troops. As we have seen, he allowed the march to be unmolested. He made no use of the time at his disposal to strengthen his position artificially. Mr Kinglake rightly asserts this in contradiction to official and other authorities. Fords might have been rendered impracticable, roads obstructed, field-works thrown up, and the advancing troops would thus have been detained under the heavy fire of the defenders, till on closing, if they should succeed in closing, it would be with numbers too much diminished for success. But there were no intrenchments nor obstacles worth mentioning on the field. And we regret to observe that Mr Kinglake, though he explains in a note that he knows the term to be inapplicable, and that he only follows an established precedent, talks of the position of the Russian battery as "the Great Redoubt." We regret it, because the impression conveyed is false to those who do not know the truth, and irrelevant to those who do. The only work was a bank of earth not a yard high, which partially covered the Russian guns of position, and which was probably intended as much for preventing them from running down the hill as for anything else. There were no embrasures, for, as the guns looked over the bank, none were necessary; it had not even the additional impediment of a ditch in front, the earth which formed it being taken from spaces

dug between the guns. It was no more like a "Great Redoubt," than it was like the Great Wall of China. And this being the case, all such expressions as "storming" are quite inapplicable.

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It is evident that, if an army superior in numbers wishes to bring its superiority to bear, it must outflank the enemy on one or both sides. Which flank, then, would it have been best in the present case to turn? The French turned the left. There was the natural temptation of advancing ground where the turning columns were protected by the fire of the fleet. But they moved against an imaginary foe, and a large part of the force might have been as well on board ship for all the effect it had on the action. Moreover, though the turning movement was completed, yet it had none of its legitimate effects, for the Russians left only two guns and no prisoners. It is clear then that none of the advantages to be expected from a successful attack in flank followed here.

Now suppose-as there are but two flanks to an enemy, and no great things had been done by turning one-that the manœuvre had been effected against the other. The Allies would have moved away from the sea up the river. The road next the sea was closed to the Russians by the ships' broadsides. Opposite the next road, that by which Bosquet led his second brigade, the Turks might have been left. The right of the French would then have been where the right of the English really was, that is, in the village of Bourliouk. And the English would have stretched so far beyond the enemy's right, that at least three divisions would have been available for turning that flank. To the Russians, seeing this, only certain alternatives would be possible: either to try to thrust themselves between us and the sea-in which case the cliff would have restricted them to the one road guarded by the Turks,

and where any part of their force that made the attempt would be lost if it should fail, as it certainly would fail; or, secondly, an extension of their already sufficiently extended line till its length corresponded with that of the Allies, by which extension it would be fatally weakened; or, thirdly, a movement of the entire army to the right, which would have uncovered the Sebastopol road, and was therefore not to be thought of. Therefore the Russians must have stood to fight on the ground they occupied, throwing back their right wing to meet the threatened attack on their flank. The Allied artillery should then have been massed-one portion to oppose the great battery, one to pour a storm of shot on the right wing, the object of attack; and the horse-artillery and one or two batteries, after flanking the advance from their own side of the river, should have been held ready to follow the flanking columns of attack as soon as they should be established on the other bank. The advance, instead of being in echelon from the right, would be in echelon from the left

the Light Division, followed by the First and Fourth, would make the turning movement and attack the right wing-the remaining English divisions would advance upon the centre, and upon the angle formed by the centre and right; and, as soon as the Russian line fronting the river should be shaken by the front and flank attack and the reverse fire, the French divisions advancing would find their share of the task easy. Two results would have followed, both important — the first, that the position would have been carried with much less loss of life

secondly, that the losses of the Russians would have been far greater. For it is to be observed that, by turning the left of the Russians, and interposing between them and the sea, they were driven back along their proper line of retreat; whereas, had the right been

turned, the English left wing, pushing obliquely across the enemy's rear, would have reached the Sebastopol road on the top of the plateau, and the result of that would have been to drive the beaten troops towards the sea, and to enclose all that part of the Russian left which should be last to retreat between our line and the cliffs, thus capturing many prisoners. And as the enemy were superior in cavalry, the English left must have carefully guarded itself, during its advance, from the Russian horse, first, by our artillery on our own side of the river, and afterwards by guns following in support, by battalions on the left echelonned in squares, and by our own cavalry. Many reasons, then, induce us to consider the French attack a mistake. And the more complete turning movement which Mr Kinglake seems, as if by authority, to ascribe to Marshal Pelissier, as what he would have done -namely, "to avoid all encounter with the enemy on his chosen stronghold by taking ample ground to their left, and boldly marching round him "--would have been objectionable, inasmuch as it would have left no option of retreating on Eupatoria, in case the attack should prove unsuccessful; and no plan can be sound that does not provide for the contingency of defeat.

Mr Kinglake modestly declines to give an opinion on the question of what plan might have been better. But he need not have scrupled to do so, as he deals extremely well with the technicalities of military art. His account of the manoeuvres preceding and during the battle is remarkably clear. His discussion as to the respective merits of lines and columns shows that he thoroughly appreciates the philosophy of the subject. But it is not so much to the credit of his estimate of what constitutes generalship, that he implies so great approval of Lord Raglan's solitary ride beyond the enemy's front, and of his continued occupation of the knoll there

throughout the stress of the battle. Of course it would be a great advantage to a general in every action to be able to see exactly what was passing in rear of the enemy's line. But it would be an advantage only as it would give him the means of directing his own troops with greater certainty. To see the enemy's rear, at the expense of losing the control of his own army, would be quite the reverse of an advantage. And imagine the state of things if two opposing generals in a battle should be absorbed in their efforts to pass, like two pawns at chess, behind the opposing lines. If it had appeared to the general that an opportunity existed for wedging a part of his force within a weak spot of the enemy's line, staff officers might have been sent to ascertain the fact, while the guns and their escort required to effect the manœuvre might have been brought from the reserve, or the nearest available division, and posted in readiness to advance. We know that during this excursion of Lord Raglan the English divisions were confused for want of a controlling power to direct them. The action of the English artillery was without unity, at a time when a concentrated fire against the hill on which the attack was to be made would have had a most important influence on the result. Mr Kinglake tells us that Lord Raglan from his knoll witnessed the first advance of the troops of our first line, and saw that they would not be able to hold their ground because they were not supported; but adds, that he did not attempt to apply a remedy, because no order sent by him could possibly arrive in time to be of service. Surely this of itself might have convinced Mr Kinglake that the general's place was elsewhere. And we will add, that, at the close of the struggle, our successful troops did not receive that impulsion which none but the supreme directing authority can give, and which was necessary to push the victory home.

But though we do not think the occasions for praising Lord Raglan are always judiciously chosen, we thoroughly agree in Mr Kinglake's estimate of the character of that kind excellent gentleman and gallant soldier. His tact, temper, and bearing were all of a kind calculated to be of eminent service in an allied command, and secured to him at once the attachment of his own army and the respect of the French.

Mr Kinglake has scarcely accomplished half of that task which is so weighty, but which his qualities as a narrator have made to seem so light. And it is because so many events yet remain to receive his impress, that we would venture to remind him how the French army in the Crimea, though it did not by its first achievements enhance its reputation, yet performed many great and gallant actions. The aid which Bosquet brought us at Inkermann, though long in coming, was effectual. The part of the French in that battle, infantry and artillery, was highly honourable. They often maintained terrible conflicts in the trenches, where both sides fought well, but where the French were victors. Their arrangements for receiving the attack on the Tchernaya were such that the assailant never had a chance of penetrating their lines. And their terrible losses in the final assault prove the magnitude of the obstacles they encountered, and the ardour with which they overcame them. But while we do not forget this, neither can we regret that thus far Mr Kinglake has sought to redress the balance of history, by awarding to our army its share of credit. Reputation is the breath of its nostrils, and our allies have appeared but too desirous to monopolise what was gained in this

war.

And we also venture to observe that Mr Kinglake's enemies-and he has scattered in these volumes dragon's teeth enough to produce a plentiful crop-may find occasion to say that in praising his friends

he is equally uncompromising as in censuring his foes. Small traits of character receive undue prominence, small merits, undue laudation; as, for instance, when the way in which the Highland Brigade was made to drink at the Bulganak is praised as if it were a stroke of military genius, and where a paragraph is devoted to describing how its commander pronounced the not very remarkable words, "Forward, 42d!" and when it is further added, "As a steed that knows his rider,' the great heart of the battalion bounded proudly to his touch,” Mr Kinglake lets himself slip into a style much beneath his own. But what no enemy can deny is the extraordinary animation, clearness, sustained interest, and dramatic as well as descriptive excellence of the work. A vast field for these qualities yet remains-the flank march, the commencement of the siege, the hurricane, the action of Balaklava (fine soil for dragon's teeth), the battle of Inkermann, the long calamities and glories of the trenches, the death of the Czar, and of the English commander, the final assault, and the destruction of the stronghold-into all these scenes we shall follow Mr Kinglake, confident of seeing them treated by a great artist.

As a concluding remark, we will say that we think no history of this war can be complete which does not devote a chapter to the discussion of the causes which made the British army of 1854 so different, in all except fighting power, from the British army of 1814, as a machine of war. The long peace, the growth of the commercial spirit, the Peace Party, the administration of the army by the Duke of Wellington, and the influence of the long-continued public demand for economy, must all be taken into account before the breaking down of that machine, as to be recorded hereafter, can be fairly and fully accounted for, and a true comparison drawn between our military system and that of the French.

THE OPENING OF THE SESSION.

THE Session has commenced under circumstances so unfavourable to the Ministry that even their most sanguine friends are dejected. The omens are unmistakably against them, and the auspices are corroborated by the more palpable evidence of hard facts. The Session was barely a week old when the first division took place, and left the Ministry in a minority. It was a Government question, but the Opposition motion, brought forward by Mr Peacocke, was carried by the large majority of 113 to 73. This was a bad beginning; and, unenlightened by the result, the Ministry have since then exposed themselves to, and undergone, two similar defeats. The events of the same week out-of-doors brought them a worse and less avoidable disaster. Two elections went against them. We certainly do not claim the Cambridge election as any great triumph of Conservative principles, but it was a blow to the Ministry. Lord Palmerston's reputation is deserved ly great, and in not a few elections the Ministerial candidate has escaped defeat by proclaiming himself simply a Palmerstonian, and asserting that the Premier was as good a Conservative as any member of the Opposition. The ex-member for Cambridge, Mr Steuart, although returned as a Conservative, subsequently became a "Palmerstonian ;" but no sooner did his constituents obtain an opportunity of showing their sentiments by their votes, than they declared in favour of a Conservative who avowed himself an opponent of Lord Palmerston. This, we say, may be called a trifle, but it is a straw which shows which way the wind is blowing. The other electoral contest

at Devonport-was a very different affair. In former elections for that borough the Liberals had won the day. Moreover, owing to the large

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Government dockyards, the constituency of Devonport is peculiarly amenable to Ministerial influence. In spite of all this, the Ministerial candidate, although strenuously backed by the whole influence of the Admiralty, and himself a Grey to boot, has been defeated, and one of the most stanch of Conservatives, and a thorough party-man, Mr Ferrand, has been elected by a majority of thirty. This is a triumph for the Opposition too remarkable to be explained away. The Government has been defeated in its own dockyard. Driven to candour by the very magnitude of the disaster, a Ministerial journal* says :-" It is a surprising innovation. Constituencies like Devonport, where the Government is a great employer of labourers having votes, have hitherto been considered almost as nomination boroughs." Even the Whigs have got sick of "innovations" now, finding they will no longer go down with the public; but such an innovation as that accomplished by the constituency of Devonport must cut them to the heart. If they can no longer get their candidates returned even in Government pocket boroughs, what are they to do? In Ireland a Government appointment went a-begging for a year, because no Whig member would risk the new election that must follow his acceptance of it. It would seem that the Government are now in the same sad predicament on both sides of the Irish Channel.

Obviously the "Conservative reaction" has entered upon a new phase. The country is resolved to have not only a Conservative policy, but a Conservative Ministry. At first, when it was seen that the Whig Ministry abandoned its mischievous attempts to degrade the franchise, many constituencies contented themselves with electing

*The Daily News.'

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